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I. INTRODUCTION
The insurance crises of recent years have generated a prolonged
and heated controversy over tort reform.' A major source of conten-
tion is the doctrine of strict liability in tort for product sellers, a doc-
trine that spread rapidly after its initial appearance in 1963.2 The
most controversial issue has been the standard of liability for design
defects. Scholars have observed that "[o]ne of the reasons for the
current unhappy state of tort law generally-and of products liability
law especially-is that the courts have apparently had an unusual
degree of difficulty in explaining the basis of liability." 4
The debate over products liability law has led to numerous pro-
posals for liability standards in design defect cases.5 Professor Alan
Schwartz 6 recently proposed a design defect system that includes a
1. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Dimensions of the Products Liabaility Crisis, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 147 (1991). The U.S. Department of Justice, the American Law Institute, the
American Bar Association, and other interested groups have conducted studies in an attempt
to reform the tort system. Id. at 147.
2. Strict liability first appeared in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897
(Cal. 1963). For a discussion of its rapid spread, see Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d
176, 180-81 (Mich. 1984) (citing John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their
Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551 (1980)).
3. See Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 182 (citing numerous articles on the design defect issue).
4. Guido Calabresi & Alvin K. Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 585 (1985).
5. See Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 182 n.14.
6. Professor Schwartz is the William K. Townsend Professor of Law at Yale Law School.
Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J.
353, 353 n. t (1988).
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rule of "true" strict products liability, with defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk as total bars to recovery.' This
Article finds significant deficiencies in Professor Schwartz's proposals
and presents an alternative system of liability for design defects. This
Article proposes a liability system that employs negligence as the
basic liability test, but places the burden of persuasion on the defend-
ant to show reasonable care if the plaintiff establishes either that the
product failed to meet consumer safety expectations, or that a safer,
alternative design was feasible at the time the product was sold.
Part II introduces Professor Schwartz's concept of the "optimal
contract." It then describes the ex ante and ex post liability tests of
Calabresi and Klevorick, which are used as standards for evaluating
Schwartz's proposals. Part III describes Schwartz's proposals and
analyzes them under the consumer-sovereignty norm and the effi-
ciency standard. Part III contends that Schwartz's proposed liability
system is less efficient than current liability rules and provides inade-
quate consumer protection; an inefficient level of accident prevention
would result from Schwartz's proposals to deny compensation for
nonpecuniary losses and to exculpate firms whose products comply
with regulatory standards. This Part also shows that Schwartz's illus-
trations of the operation of his system do not fit his description of the
system as one of strict liability with the defenses of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk. Part III concludes that Schwartz's jus-
tifications for his proposed liability system do not support the results
he describes.
Part IV identifies optimal reduction of primary accident costs' as
the principal goal of tort law and proposes a liability system that
approaches this goal more closely than does Schwartz's proposed lia-
7. Professor Schwartz derived his article from a report he made as Associate Reporter to
the American Law Institute's Project on Compensation and Liability for Product and Process
Injuries. Id.
The American Law Institute ("A.L.I.") published its report on April 15, 1991. See
A.L.I., REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY (Apr. 15,
1991). It issued the study for discussion by the A.L.I. membership at its May, 1991 meeting.
See id. at xii-xiii. The A.L.I. Council is scheduled to consider what further action might be
appropriate at its Fall 1991 meeting. Id. The study reflects some of the ideas advanced in
Professor Schwartz's article. See, e.g., id. at 33-82 (addressing product defects and warnings).
8. Dean Calabresi states that the purpose behind accident law is "to reduce the sum of
the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents." GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS 26 (1970). He divides this cost reduction goal into three subgoals. Id. The first
subgoal is the optimal reduction of primary accident costs-the "reduction of the number and
severity of accidents." Id. at 27. The secondary subgoal is reduction of secondary accident
costs, which are "essentially costs of rapid changes in income distribution." Id. at 33. The
third subgoal is the reduction of tertiary accident costs-the reduction of "the costs of
administering our treatment of accidents." Id. at 28. The aim of reducing tertiary accident
costs "is to reduce the costs of achieving primary and secondary cost reduction." Id.
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bility system. Part IV begins with a discussion of an article written by
Professor David Owen in 1980, which examines the various policy
goals courts and scholars have articulated to support strict products
liability.' In his article, Owen finds that he cannot defend some of the
stated goals for strict liability on any sound basis, and that other
goals, although socially significant, appear to conflict with one
another.' This conflict, Owen believes, stems from the failure of the
various policy goals to strike an appropriate balance between individ-
ual liberty and social welfare."I Owen's article has been followed by
others that have advanced the dialogue and helped to resolve the con-
flict among policy objectives. In particular, Professor John
Attanasio's article on the theory of aggregate autonomy provides a
principled basis for justifying autonomy infringements.' 2 Attanasio
recognizes Dean Calabresi's cost-minimization goal as the soundest
policy objective for a products liability system.' 3  In addition,
Attanasio provides a basis for striking a proper balance between indi-
vidual liberty and social welfare.' 4 He factors social as well as pecuni-
ary values into the cost-minimization calculus,' 5 an accommodation
tort law always has made and needs in order to achieve public accept-
ance and respect.
Part IV continues with discussion of other factors that a prod-
ucts liability system must take into account. These factors include
product image, 6 "soft" representations made in product advertis-
ing,' 7 the polycentricity of product design issues,' 8 and the inherent
limitations of the judicial function.19 The liability standard proposed
in Part IV attempts to identify the rules that best serve the cost-mini-
mization goal under various circumstances.
Professor Schwartz offers his proposals "in an exploratory
spirit."20 This Article proceeds in the same spirit, seeking to clarify
the effects of current products liability standards and the various pro-
posals for reform. Rich literature is available on current issues in
9. David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV.
681 (1980).
10. Id. at 703-15.
11. Id. at 684, 685, "14-15.
12. John B. Attanasio, The Principle ofAggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian Approach
to Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677 (1988).
13. See id. at 705-15.
14. See id. at 723-34.
15. See id. at 692-93.
16. See infra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 385-95 and accompanying text.
19. See id.; infra notes 290-307 and accompanying text.
20. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 356.
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products liability law, yet as Professor Schwartz observes, "[t]he eco-
nomic and psychological theories required to answer many of these
questions are primitive, and the empirical record presupposed by the
theories ranges from scanty to nonexistent."' 2' I set forth proposals in
this Article more on the basis of intuition developed from long expo-
sure to torts decisions, the doctrines these decisions develop and
apply, and the ebb and flow of the intellectual forces that alter those
doctrines, than on the basis of confidence that the underlying assump-
tions can be substantiated fully. I offer them, nonetheless, with the
support that is available.
Any discussion of products liability standards also must
acknowledge the tort system's limitations. A recent American Law
Institute report aptly described those limitations, which include the
unpredictability of litigation results and high administrative costs.
These costs preclude claims for many injuries, preventing the tort sys-
tem from producing an optimal level of primary accident cost reduc-
tion, even with ideal liability rules. Alternative systems for
minimizing accident costs, however, are also imperfect.22
Despite the tort system's shortcomings, it will continue to play a
central role in the distribution of losses caused by defective products.
As no replacement for the tort system is likely in the near future, the
evolving doctrines of products liability law require continued
scrutiny.23
II. STANDARDS OF EVALUATION
Professor Schwartz bases his analysis upon the consumer sover-
eignty norm.2 4 From that norm, he derives his theory of the "optimal
contract"-the contract that well-informed, uncoerced consumers
21. Id.
22. See A.L.I., COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT AND PROCESS INJURIES,
SPRING 1988 PROGRESS REPORT 14-15:
As an incentive system, tort has potential shortcomings in its high
administrative costs; unpredictability of liability standards and awards; and the
institutional difficulty in a decentralized adjudicatory system of taking into
account the social benefits as well as costs of technologies. . . High
administrative costs also effectively bar many claims for small amounts, even
where the risks in question are large in the aggregate. As a result, environmental
and safety risks may not be adequately controlled or redressed.
The drawbacks of the tort system must, however, be kept in perspective.
The other institutional systems available for dealing with personal injuries are
also highly imperfect. Even if they were regarded as the primary means of
dealing with such injury, tort liability may often be a needed supplement.
23. See id. at 17.
24. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 355.
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would choose for allocating product-related risks25 when they have
not actually consented to a contract.16 Schwartz's optimal contract
serves compensation goals." This Article contends that the optimal
contract should serve deterrence goals. My concept of the optimal
contract draws upon the standards for evaluation of systems of acci-
dent law originated by Dean Guido Calabresi in his book, The Costs
of Accidents,28 and elaborated by him in later articles.29
This Article accepts Dean Calabresi's conclusion that "the prin-
cipal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of
accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents."3 Calabresi argues
that tort liability rules that allocate accident costs to the "cheapest
cost avoider" minimize accident costs. 31 This Article further recog-
nizes that the "Learned Hand," or cost-benefit test,32 commonly used
by courts in design defect cases, reduces primary accident costs opti-
mally only in "a perfect world with perfect foresight."' 33 The cost-
benefit test identifies the cheapest cost avoider in some situations, but
in others it is unreliable. In these situations, a strict liability test is a
more reliable means of identifying the cheapest cost avoider. This test
places the loss on the party to the accident "in the best position to
make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident
avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made."
34
Finally, my analysis draws upon the four tests of liability defined
by Calabresi and Klevorick. 35 To derive these four tests, Calabresi
and Klevorick begin with the two basic tests, the Learned Hand (or
cost-benefit) test and the strict liability test, and then divide each into
an ex ante and an ex post version, as follows: (1) Under the ex ante
Learned Hand test, the victim bears the loss unless the trier of fact
finds that the injurer knew or should have known, when he or she
acted, that his or her accident avoidance costs would be less than the
25. Id.
26. Id. at 361.
27. Id.
28. CALABRESI, supra note 8.
29. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Calabresi & Klevorick, supra note 4.
30. CALABRESI, supra note 8, at 26.
31. Dean Calabresi states: "A pure market approach to primary accident cost avoidance
would require allocation of accident costs to those acts or activities (or combinations of them)
which could avoid the accident costs most cheaply." Id. at 135 (footnote omitted).
32. Dean Calabresi refers to Learned Hand's test as a cost-benefit test. Calabresi &
Hirschoff, supra note 29, at 1057, 1060; Calabresi & Klevorick, supra note 4, at 586. A better
term may be risk-benefit test. See infra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
33. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 29, at 1059.
34. Id. at 1060 (emphasis omitted).
35. Calabresi & Klevorick, supra note 4.
[Vol. 46:1
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accident costs. 36 (2) Under the ex post Learned Hand test, the victim
bears the loss unless the trier of fact finds, from the perspective of
hindsight, that the injurer's accident costs would have been less than
the accident costs. 37 (3) Under the ex ante strict liability test, the
victim bears the loss unless the trier of fact finds that the injurer knew
or should have known, when he or she acted, that he or she was in a
better position to decide whether accident avoidance costs would be
less than accident costs. 38 Under the ex post strict liability test, the
victim bears the loss unless the trier of fact finds, from the perspective
of hindsight, that the injurer was in a better position to decide
whether accident avoidance costs were less than accident costs.
39
Calabresi and Klevorick further subdivide these four tests, recog-
nizing that the burden of persuasion may be placed on either the
plaintiff or the defendant in the use of each standard of liability.4°
Calabresi and Klevorick's four tests represent the basic alterna-
tives available for imposing liability in tort law.4 The choice of a
primary option-between the cost-benefit and strict liability tests-
likely will depend on the difficulty of making the cost-benefit analysis.
Calabresi and Klevorick point out that courts tend to use fault-based
(cost-benefit) tests "when the relative size of accident and safety costs
is reasonably clear."'4 2 They also observe that when the cost-benefit
test is difficult to apply, "social decisions are likely to be more agnos-
tic and to be based not on the result desired but on an assessment of
which party is most likely to bring about the correct result if given the
incentives to make that choice."43
The choice of a secondary option-between an ex ante test and
an ex post test-involves a policy decision based upon fundamental
tort objectives, rather than a practical decision based on availability of
cost information. An ex ante test judges actions by what the actor
knew or should have known at the time of his conduct, whereas an ex
post test judges actions from the hindsight perspective of the knowl-
edge available at the time of trial." If society wants to burden only
the best decisionmaker and to affect future actions, then it makes
sense to determine the best decisionmaker using the best information
36. Id. at 587.
37. Id. at 590.
38. Id. at 588, 591.
39. Id. at 591, 592 table I.
40. Id. at 592-94. Calabresi & Klevorick also subdivide the four tests in terms of their
"mirror images." Id. at 587-92.
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available at the time of trial.45 The ex post cost-benefit test admittedly
would produce some undesirable effects resulting from uncertainty,
46
but nevertheless is a suitable choice if parties either systematically
overestimate safety costs or underestimate accident risks, or if social
decisionmakers systematically overestimate or underestimate these
costs. 4 7 Moreover, the ex post tests provide producers with greater
incentives to acquire new information."'
Calabresi and Klevorick's four tests operate as a backdrop for
this Article's analysis of Schwartz's proposals and for its development
of a cost-minimization structure for products liability law. Scholars
variously refer to the traditional negligence balancing test, used to
determine when a risk is unreasonable, as a "cost-benefit" test, a
"risk-benefit" test, and a "risk-utility" test. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts uses the terms "risk" and "utility" to describe the fac-
tors weighed in determining whether a risk is unreasonable.49
Professor Schwartz uses the terms "risk" and "benefit" to describe
these factors.50 Dean Calabresi refers to the traditional negligence
balancing test as the Learned Hand cost-benefit test.5
Professor Schwartz draws a distinction between a cost-benefit
and a risk-benefit analysis. He defines the former as a test that consid-
ers only whether the expected accident costs from the actor's conduct
exceed the actor's avoidance costs; 2 thus, he states that the test fails
to take account of the utility of the actor's conduct. A sharp kitchen
knife, for instance, would create an unreasonable risk if the cost of
blunting the knife were less than the expected accident costs of sharp
kitchen knives.5 3 Under a risk-benefit test, however, the social value
or utility of the actor's conduct is part of the calculus. Thus, sharp
kitchen knives would create a reasonable risk because the social utility
of sharp knives exceeds their expected risks.54 Professor Schwartz
concludes that the cost-benefit test is unworkable in design defect
cases55 because it would be unfair to hold manufacturers liable for
45. Id. at 615.
46. Id. at 619.
47. Id. at 617.
48. Id. at 621-25.
49. For a description of the factors bearing on utility and risk, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 292-93 (1965).
50. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 386-88.
51. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 29, at 1060.
52. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 385-86.
53. Id. at 386.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 385.
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making knives that cut.56
Dean Calabresi uses the terms "cost" and "benefit," but nothing
in his writings suggests that he would disregard a product's utility in
applying a cost-benefit test. Calabresi's definition of the cost-benefit
test is similar to Schwartz's definition," but he warns that his defini-
tion is oversimplified.5" Even under Schwartz's definition of the cost-
benefit test-whether expected accident costs exceed accident avoid-
ance costs-the benefits of a product to consumers cannot be ignored.
Thus, a knife producer's accident avoidance costs would include not
only the cost of blunting the knives, but also the cost of business losses
resulting from the inability to sell blunt knives.
To avoid confusion, the term "risk-benefit test" refers to the
traditional negligence balancing test throughout the remainder of this
Article.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE SCHWARTZ PROPOSALS
A. The Basic Proposals
Schwartz proposes a rule of "true" strict liability in design defect
cases, with contributory negligence and assumption of risk as affirma-
tive defenses that bar recovery.59 The proposed rule exculpates a
defendant for compliance with regulatory standards under certain
conditions,60 and allows compensation for pecuniary losses, but not
for nonpecuniary harms such as pain and suffering.
6'
56. Id. at 386.
57. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 29, at 1057.
58. Calabresi and Hirschoff state:
The goal, strictly speaking, is accident cost avoidance rather than accident
avoidance. It may be, for example, that minimization of the sum of automobile
accident costs and avoidance costs would come about by measures designed to
make automobiles "crashproof" rather than by measures directed at the
avoidance of automobile accidents altogether.
In determining whether an accident cost is worth avoiding, the test would
look not to the entire cost of the safety measure which would avoid it, but to the
cost of that safety measure discounted appropriately to take account of all of the
other accident costs that same measure would avoid. Thus the cost of avoiding a
given accident is ten dollars if a 100 dollar safety device would also avoid nine
other accidents of equal severity.
There are numerous other assumptions implicit in the application of any test
of this kind, but this is not the place to discuss them.
Id. n. 11; see also CALABRESI, supra note 8 passim.
59. Schwartz, supra note *, at 356, 392. Professor Schwartz finds no fault with current
rules on express warranty and manufacturing defects. Id. at 384. He believes, however, that
"[j]udicial efforts to establish quality obligations that do not depend on a firm's prior decisions
respecting quality.., have been unsatisfactory." Id.
60. Id. at 412-13.
61. Id. at 411.
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Schwartz's proposal attempts to "integrate and apply the insights
of the contracts and torts theorists. '62 He claims to analyze "current
law and these solutions under the dominant norm in the contracts
literature: consumer sovereignty. ' 63 Under this norm, according to
Schwartz, "the law should reflect the preferences of competent,
informed consumers regarding risk allocation. ' 'M
Schwartz's analysis "supposes both that consumer sovereignty
should be the governing norm and that market failure prevents firms
and consumers from implementing this norm by contract. ' 65 His
task, therefore, "is to identify the policy responses to market failure
that the consumer sovereignty norm best implies."' 66 He further
explains that his analysis "applies only to products liability issues con-
cerning contracting parties, and not to tort law in general. This is
because consumer sovereignty is most plausible as a governing norm
in market contexts, where consumer choice can directly influence firm
behavior. "67
Schwartz limits his analysis to contracting, or purchasing, par-
ties. Yet non-purchasers constitute a significant percentage of prod-
ucts liability plaintiffs, and they may collect a larger percentage of
total damages than product purchasers.68 Schwartz does not discuss a
liability standard for nonpurchaser plaintiffs. At least one author who
has endorsed Schwartz's proposal, however, appears to extend it to all
products liability actions.
69
This Part contests the validity of Schwartz's conclusions on four
bases. First, the consumer-sovereignty norm does not dictate the
exclusion of damages for nonpecuniary harms. Second, Schwartz's
criticisms of current liability standards for design defects reveal a mis-
understanding of those standards, and he contradicts his criticisms by
using those standards in his own proposal. Third, compliance with
regulatory standards should not exonerate producers from liability
automatically, as Schwartz proposes. Finally, Schwartz's illustrations
62. Id. at 355.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 356.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 357 n.4.
68. A 1977 report stated that products liability claimants with work-related injuries
constituted 11% of total claimants and received 42% of total payments. INSURANCES
SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
OF SURVEY RESULTS 60, 63 (1977), cited in Jeffrey O'Connell, A Correct Diagnosis of the Ills of
Liability Insurance-and a False Cure: a Comment on the Reports of the Federal Tort Policy
Working Group, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 161, 172 n.54 (1988).
69. See Jules L. Coleman, A Market Approach to Products Liability Reform, 17 Prod.
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 463, 472 (May 5, 1989).
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of his proposed liability scheme depart markedly from his description
of it as one of "true" strict liability with the defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk. In fact, Schwartz's proposal per-
mits liability only under a consumer-expectations test for safety, or
when a firm fails to inform the consumer of a safer, feasible alterna-
tive design and the firm knew or should have known of the alternative
design through an optimal safety research program.
B. The Optimal Contract Under the Consumer Sovereignty Norm-
Nonpecuniary Losses
Schwartz contends that an optimal contract premised on the con-
sumer-sovereignty norm precludes recovery for nonpecuniary losses
in design defect cases.7° Schwartz states the following premises of the
consumer sovereignty norm:
(1) "[C]onsumer sovereignty holds that courts should enforce only
contract clauses to which well-informed, uncoerced consumers
would have assented: when actual assent is lacking, courts should




(2) "[G]iving hypothetical consent the force of real consent is jus-
tifiable on utilitarian grounds when the contract clauses that courts
adopt as default rules or rules of law would maximize the utility of
affected persons.
' 71
(3) "[Consumers] want to minimize the amount of risk to which
they are exposed, but not to spend excessively on risk reduction.
73
From these premises, Schwartz reasons that the optimal contract
for a well-informed, uncoerced consumer would: "(1) compensate
him for pecuniary harm, (2) probably not compensate him for nonpe-
cuniary harm, and (3) induce the manufacturer to reduce the risk of
harm when the steps the manufacturer could take to do so cost less
that the reduction in risk these steps would avoid."
74
Schwartz justifies this optimal, hypothetical contract on the basis
of three assumptions. The first is that the price of a product includes
70. Pecuniary losses include monetary injuries such as damage to property, lost earning
capacity, and medical and related expenses. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 906 (1979). Nonpecuniary losses include all losses other than monetary losses. In a typical
personal injury action, compensatory damages for nonpecuniary losses include damages for
emotional distress, bodily harm, and the loss of consortium suffered by a spouse. See, e.g., id.
§ 905 & cmts. a-f. Bodily harm is "any impairment of the physical condition of the body,
including illness or physical pain." Id. cmt. b. Thus, such bodily impairments as
disfigurement and pain and suffering are compensable, nonpecuniary losses.
71. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 357.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 358.
74. Id. at 361.
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an insurance premium based upon the expected compensation cost of
harms that the product causes to consumers.7" The second is that this
insurance premium reflects the amount of insurance coverage that
consumers prefer.76 The third is that the amount of insurance cover-
age that consumers prefer derives from three further assumptions:
First, a consumer will choose an insurance contract that maxi-
mizes his expected utility. Second, consumers' utility functions are
"state dependent": They depend on the state of affairs arising after
purchase of the product. The consumer's utility is lower in the
state of the world in which the product is defective than in the state
of the world in which it works perfectly. Third, firms offer insur-
ance at actuarially fair prices; the amount of their premium equals
the expected value of the risk against which the person insures.
77
On the basis of these assumptions, Schwartz contends that it is
unlikely that the optimal contract "would require any insurance
against what now are sizeable and common elements of the standard
products liability judgment: pain and suffering and emotional dis-
tress."' 78  This conclusion, familiar in the products liability litera-
ture,79 is based on the principle that "[i]nsurance . . . shifts wealth
from the state of the world in which the marginal utility for money is
relatively low-the state in which no injury occurs-to the state in
which it is relatively high-the state in which an injury happens.
80
Although pecuniary losses incident to an injury increase the marginal
utility for money, nonpecuniary losses are unlikely to do so. 8 ' More-
over, nonpecuniary losses are hard to verify and are less predictable
than pecuniary ones, so that insurance for the former is more costly.
8 2
75. Id. at 362.
76. Id.
77. Id. (footnote omitted).
78. Id. at 367.
79. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 228-31 (1987).
80. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 363.
81. See SHAVEL, supra note 79.
82. Schwartz states that there is no reason to believe that accident victims with
nonpecuniary losses commonly desire to substitute activities that are more expensive than
activities the accident precludes, or that accident victims commonly desire to compensate for
physical pain or mental distress by the purchase of expensive goods or services. Schwartz,
supra note 6, at 364-66. He further states:
Consumers would prefer less than full insurance against accidents that cause only
mental pain, even when these accidents would increase the marginal utility of
money, because of "income effects." Recall that such accidents increase the
marginal utility of money only when victims will purchase expensive substitute
activities to assuage the utility losses from suffering. Such substitutes are sought
in the states of the world in which accidents happen. The demand for most
goods and services has positive income elasticity; people increase their
consumption as their incomes rise. Because accidents make people poorer in a
utility sense, people will purchase lesser amounts of substitute activities in
[Vol. 46:1
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Schwartz's justifications for excluding damages for nonpecuniary
loss from the optimal contract focus exclusively upon the consumer's
interest in insurance, disregarding the consumer's interest in product
safety. His claim that most people would not insure against nonpecu-
niary losses is plausible. Yet, it does not follow that the consumer-
sovereignty norm requires the optimal contract to exclude damages
for such losses. The question remains whether consumers would pay
to reduce the level of risk below the level dictated by a product price
that insures against only pecuniary loss. Schwartz's justifications for
his optimal contract fail to address this question.
3
"accident states" than they would have purchased if they had not been injured
but instead had to give up goods that they then valued as much as they valued
not suffering. Informed consumers will anticipate wanting lesser amounts of
substitute activities in accident states than they would otherwise want, and so
will make provision to buy less. In other words, consumers will not purchase full
insurance. Therefore, the ideal legal rule regulating accidents causing mental
losses that increase people's marginal utility for money would award victims
partial damages. These damages would reflect the partial insurance consumers
would want ex ante. The level of partial insurance consumers would want varies
among people, however, so the law's manageable choices are full insurance-
overcompensation-or no insurance-undercompensation. The issue is on
which side to err. The remaining factors that should influence courts in deciding
what consumers want imply erring on the side of undercompensation.
Intuition suggest that people would want to buy slight or no coverage
against purely mental harms.... [T]here is no good reason to suppose that, apart
from causing pecuniary harm, accidents commonly increase persons' marginal
utility for money. In addition, to buy mental loss coverage is, in effect, to
sacrifice considerable present wealth in the form of insurance premiums to
consume expensive vacations that will assuage whatever emotional distress
accidents may cause. In the absence of evidence that spending money is a
typical, or even common, response to grief and suffering, this motive for
insurance seems unlikely. Finally, pain and suffering losses are difficult for firms
to anticipate and verify. The likely response of firms to these problems is to
charge high prices for the coverage. These prices make pain and suffering
insurance a bad buy for most people, whether it is sold by manufacturers or by
insurance companies. These three factors together imply that the more purely
mental the loss, the less likely a consumer will want to insure against it.
Id. at 365-66 (footnote omitted).
83. Schwartz does raise the question of the price consumers would pay to reduce risk
below the level dictated by a product price that insures against only pecuniary loss, but he
answers it in an elliptical fashion-in effect, "finessing" the issue. He asks how a contract that
is optimal under the consumer sovereignty norm would specify the safety obligation of firms.
He responds with two possibilities:
First, courts could devise a version of the generic risk-reduction rule, assessing a
firm's safety performance against the criterion of consumers' willingness to pay
for safety. This could be done by choosing rules for damages that would induce
firms, when making products, to equate the marginal cost of investments in
safety with the marginal willingness of consumers to pay for safety. Second,
courts could specify the quality levels below which products cannot fall or the
safety features products must contain. Courts in products liability cases often do
the latter: Design defect litigation seeks to specify minimum quality levels and
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Schwartz recognizes that a premise of the consumer sovereignty
norm is that consumers want to minimize the amount of risk to which
they are exposed, but do not want to spend excessively on risk reduc-
tion. He fails to recognize, however, that the second and third ele-
ments of his optimal contract are interdependent. The second
element, which precludes compensation for nonpecuniary harm,
affects the third element, which posits a cost-justified level of care.
Schwartz makes an implicit and unwarranted assumption that the
level of product safety preferred by consumers is the one established
when producers are liable only for pecuniary losses.
Schwartz believes that "the contract-proscribing aspects of strict
liability drive a wedge between the law's compensation and safety
goals." 4 In Schwartz's view, the compensation goal dictates that
manufacturers and distributors "should be held strictly liable only for
pecuniary harm, because this is all the insurance consumers probably
want, [while the] safety goal suggests that firms should be liable for
more harm than this in order to create appropriate incentives for
firms to invest in safety.""5 Economists agree, however, that both
pecuniary and nonpecuniary harms constitute losses in social welfare;
consequently, potential injurers will achieve an optimal level of care
and activity only if they pay damages for both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary harm. 86  Economists also maintain that a socially ideal
required safety features. Both this effort and the generic risk-reduction method
seem undesirable policy responses, for they presuppose that courts and juries can
assess consumer tradeoffs between safety and risks, and there is no reason to
believe that courts possess this ability to any great degree.
Id. at 368. Having rejected these two possibilities, Schwartz sets the firm's safety obligation
under his "true" strict liability standard, with contributory negligence and assumption of risk
as bars to recovery. He theorizes that because of these defenses, informed consumers will
adopt a cost-minimizing strategy of care, and firms will incur all accident costs their product
designs cause. He states:
The cost-minimizing strategy for firms in this circumstance is to make optimal
investments in safety-to invest in safety until the cost of further investments
equals the gain in the reduction of expected accident costs. Because it induces
both consumers and firms to reduce accident costs optimally, strict liability with
contributory negligence is efficient.
Id. at 393.
The result of this system in terms of firms' safety obligation, then, is that they will "invest
in safety until the cost of further investments equals the gain in the reduction of expected
accident costs," and the expected accident costs include only pecuniary harms. Id. Schwartz
does not address the question whether consumers would pay to reduce risk below the level
serving compensation goals, except to maintain that courts and juries cannot assess consumer
tradeoffs between safety and risks. This position leaves consumers with a safety goal set by the
compensation goal, a choice I believe consumers would not make.
84. Id. at 370.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 79, at 133-34.
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solution cannot be achieved in a liability system when compensation
and deterrence goals diverge. 7 Yet, under the consumer sovereignty
norm, the question is which goal consumers would select. Consumers
probably would select the compensation goal if they merely were buy-
ing insurance against the risk of harm. Most consumers probably
would select the deterrence goal, however, if it would maximize their
expected utility by lowering the level of risk.
To the extent that a product's price reflects an insurance pre-
mium for expected losses,8 8 that insurance premium differs from a
"real" insurance premium. Commercial insurance premiums are not
paid to the entity with control over the insured risk. "Product insur-
ance" premiums, however, affect the level of risk to which the buyer is
exposed. An increase in the product insurance premium to cover
nonpecuniary loss decreases the buyer's risk of incurring any loss at
all. The increased premium raises the buyer's level of protection
against both pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss, because the manufac-
turer's exposure to an increased level of damages provides it with an
incentive to increase the level of care. To a degree, consumers are
willing to pay not only to insure against expected pecuniary harm, but
also to lower the risk of incurring harm. Consumers, for example, not
only buy health insurance, but also pay for preventive medical care;
together, these expenditures probably maximize consumers' expected
utility. Because "product insurance" premiums control the level of
insurance coverage and also the level of risk, it is simplistic to assume
that consumers would elect a contract serving the compensation goal
rather than the deterrence goal. Thus, to determine consumers'
expected utility, economists must consider not only what consumers
would pay to insure against expected losses, but also what they would
pay to ensure against expected losses-that is, to reduce the risk of
both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses. A premium that serves the
87. See, e.g., id. at 231.
88. Schwartz assumes that a product's price includes an insurance premium that reflects
the expected compensation cost of harm caused by the product. This is a fair assumption for
most but not all products. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and
the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 503-14 (1961). Instead of affecting the product's price,
expected liability costs may produce lower shareholder dividends or employee wages. Cf
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 452 (Wis. 1980) (Abrahamson, J.) (observing
that punitive damages may not cause higher product prices). Even commercial liability
insurance carriers frequently set premiums at competitive prices that do not reflect expected
claims. See, e.g., INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 1987-88 PROPERTY/CASUALTY
FACT BOOK 6 (1987) ("The property/casualty insurance industry's earnings improved
substantially in 1986. For the first time in three years, investment income offset the
underwriting deficit, and the industry produced pre-tax income of $6 billion after two
consecutive years of losses.... The turnaround operating results reflected basically increased
prices following five years of intense price competition that ended in mid-1984.").
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deterrence goal probably achieves a higher expected utility than a pre-
mium that serves only the compensation goal. The former would
reduce the risk of both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses and allow
compensation for both losses if they did occur. The high value that
consumers place on risk avoidance indicates that they prefer the
deterrence goal to the compensation goal.
Schwartz's exclusion of damages for nonpecuniary losses reflects
a contract rather than a tort approach. More specifically, Schwartz's
proposal ignores the reasons for the difference between contract and
tort damages. In contract law, damages generally are limited to com-
pensation for pecuniary losses.8 9 A breach of contract is not a
"wrong," and losses caused by a breach are fully compensable. In
tort law, however, damages for personal injuries include compensa-
tion for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses. A tort is a
"wrong"-even when it is based on a strict liability standard9--and
personal injuries caused by a tort are not fully compensable.
Although the theoretical objective of tort damages is to restore the
injured person to her pre-tort state,9' that objective rarely is achieved
in the case of personal injuries.92 The actual function of tort damages,
then, is the optimal avoidance of accident costs-a function that
reflects the preference of rational persons to avoid severe personal
injuries rather than to sustain them and receive damages for their
89. See, e.g., 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 425 (1951) ("In most actions
for breach of contract, the damages recoverable are restricted to compensation for pecuniary
harm.").
90. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 514 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining "delictum" as a
"delict, tort, wrong, injury, or offense."). From the earliest days of the English common law,
tort law has included liability without fault. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 21-22 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND
KEETON].
91. See 4 FOWLER V. HARPER EiF AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 493 (2d ed. 1986) (asserting
that the objective of tort damages is to make the plaintiff whole "as nearly as that may be done
by an award of money"), see also McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374 (N.Y. 1989)
("The goal is to restore the injured party, to the extent possible, to the position that would
have been occupied had the wrong not occurred.") (citation omitted).
92. Courts recognize the limitations on restoring the plaintiff's pre-tort state:
Damages for nonpecuniary losses are, of course, among those that can be
awarded as compensation to the victim. This aspect of damages, however, stands
on less certain ground than does an award for pecuniary damages. An economic
loss can be compensated in kind by an economic gain; but recovery for
noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life rests
on "the legal fiction that money damages can compensate for a victim's injury."
We accept this fiction, knowing that although money will neither ease the pain
nor restore the victim's abilities, this device is as close as the law can come in its
effort to right the wrong.
McDougald, 536 N.E.2d at 374-75 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 46:1
1991] PRODUCT LIABILITY
losses.93 It is logical to conclude that rational consumers will pay sig-
nificant amounts to avoid risks involving nonpecuniary losses, even
though they would not pay significant amounts to insure against
them.
94
93. Rational persons will risk severe personal injuries in some situations; however, these
situations generally involve compensating utility factors that make the risk of injury
worthwhile. Sports and recreational choices involving personal injury risks, for instance, offer
compensating psychological rewards. Even those who refuse to use seatbelts may consider
freedom from constraint an offsetting value to the risk of injury. (More often, perhaps, they
underestimate the risk.) The risk of brain damage from the use of rubber cement, or the risk of
burns from the explosion of an adhesive used to lay tile, however, are risks that the typical
consumer would be willing to pay some amount to avoid.
94. Like Schwartz, Shavell overlooks this consumer preference when discussing the
liability of firms to customers. He states:
To the extent that firms will be liable for-or would have to pay a supplemental
fine for-nonpecuniary losses of customers caused by their products or services,
and to the extent that customers do not wish to insure against these losses,
customers will be undesirably discouraged from making purchases, other things
equal. This is because prices will reflect firms' expected liability. Consider, for
instance, the price of sending a child to camp, supposing that camps will be liable
for large losses if children die in accidents. The price of camp will then have to
include a component to cover its large liability insurance premiums. Thus in
paying for camp, parents will in effect be purchasing substantial life insurance on
children, a form or amount of insurance that they may well not wish to carry. It
is possible that such forced purchase of life insurance will discourage parents
from sending children to camp when it would be best that the children go to
camp.
In theory, a two-part scheme can be employed to avoid this problem of
socially undesirably discouraging purchases, while at the same time providing
firms with proper incentives to reduce risks and supplying customers with
optimal insurance coverage. First, let fines supplement liability ... so that firms'
incentives will be appropriate even though optimal compensation for customers
may be low. Second, let the state pay a rebate to customers when they make
purchases, where the rebate per unit equals the expected fine revenue collected
per unit. This rebate will lower the effective price to customers, and they thus
will not be undesirably discouraged from making purchases ....
SHAVELL, supra note 79, at 234-35. Like Schwartz, Shavell overlooks the fact that although
parents may not wish to carry life insurance on their children, they frequently pay the cost of
reducing the risk of the harm to which their children are exposed. The parents' expected
utility often is greater if their children's safety is increased. Why do parents pay for their
children's vaccinations against disease? Is it only to prevent future medical expenses that
could be incurred absent the vaccinations? Parents spend countless dollars to promote the
health and safety of their children. Thus parents will pay a premium for safety. Surely, if a
camp received publicity of a child's reasonably preventable death, its business would decline
and perhaps even fail. Although it would be unwise to subject camps to strict liability, a camp
is, and should be, liable to the parents for its negligence in causing the wrongful death of a
child. Damages vary among jurisdictions, but in Florida, for example, wrongful death dam-
ages would include compensation for the emotional distress of the parents. FLA. STAT.
§ 768.21(4) (Supp. 1990).
Finally, a rule requiring that nonpecuniary damages be paid to the state would produce
two undesirable effects. First, it would reduce the injured party's incentive to proceed against
the injurer, or in the case of parents who have suffered only nonpecuniary harm from the death
of a child, remove incentives. Furthermore, states probably could not maintain the necessary
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In Schwartz's discussion of whether consumers underestimate
risks, he states:
Recent survey data showed that consumers have a substantial will-
ingness to pay to reduce the injury rate from common household
products such as drain openers; this willingness implied that sur-
vey respondents valued a hand bum from a chemical drain opener
at $120,000, for example. This figure seems excessive, and thus
suggests either that persons overestimate the costs of harm or are
very risk averse when the issue is personal injury.9
Recent survey data based upon labor market tradeoffs between fatal-
ity risks and wages have doubled the estimate of the value of life over
previous estimates, further indicating consumers' high level of risk
adversity.
96
staff to run such a system, nor would state bureaucracies have the incentive to monitor every
tortious activity and bring the injurer to "justice." Shavell himself admits:
[T]he fine differs from liability in its public nature; private parties do not institute
suits to collect fines nor benefit financially when they are paid. The principal
implication of this difference is that the likelihood of imposition of a fine may be
less than the likelihood of a private suit. Private parties should ordinarily be
more likely to know when harm occurs than a public agency and, as just
observed, will not profit from reporting harm but may from bringing suit.... A
fine could be imposed where suits would not be brought due to difficulty in estab-
lishing causation or where harms are widely dispersed, as in many environmental
and health cases.
Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 373
(1984).
Moreover, the administrative costs of such a system probably would exceed those of the
present system, in which the injured party brings the injurer to "justice." Shavell has observed
that, in the case of ordinary torts, the liability system is more socially desirable than adminis-
trative regulation, because
differential knowledge and the size of administrative costs [point] strongly in
favor of use of liability to reduce the risk of the typical tort, while inability to pay
for harm done [works] with only moderate force against it, and the possibility of
escaping suit [does] not constitute an argument against it. Thus, the use in prac-
tice of liability to control the familiar category of risks known as torts seems to be
the theoretically preferred solution to the problem.
Id. at 368.
Aside from the necessary incentives to hold injurers to the desired level of caution, princi-
ples of corrective justice indicate that damages should go to the injured parties, whether the
parties would have insured against the losses or not.
95. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 379 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The survey
citation is W. Kip Viscusi & W. Magat, Right To Know and Behavioral Responses to Hazard
Warnings 11 (Duke University Center for the Study of Business Regulation 1986)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
96. Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Doubling the Estimated Value of Life: Results
Using New Occupational Fatality Date, 7 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 476 (1988). The
abstract for this article states:
Using a new series of data on occupational fatalities compiled by the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, the authors reassess
value-of-life calculations based on labor market tradeoffs between fatality risks
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Schwartz's proposal to deny damages for nonpecuniary losses is
based upon the misconceived assumption that consumers prefer to
pay a product insurance premium reflecting the compensation goal
rather than the deterrence goal. Schwartz's proposal also is based
upon the valid assumption that insurance for nonpecuniary losses is
less predictable, and thus costlier than insurance for pecuniary losses.
Although this assumption is sound, it does not justify the preclusion
of damages for nonpecuniary losses. Devastating product-related
injuries such as dismemberment and disfigurement may involve small
pecuniary but enormous nonpecuniary losses.97 Even with higher
product insurance premiums for nonpecuniary losses, consumers
probably prefer the deterrence goal over the compensation goal. To
my knowledge, no consumer lobby advocates the abolition of damages
for physical pain and emotional suffering. Thus, Schwartz's assertion
that the consumer sovereignty norm dictates their abolition finds no
support among consumer advocates. The lobby for caps on damages
is a seller's, not a buyer's, lobby.
Informed consumers are also likely to prefer the deterrence goal
because it at least approaches an optimal level of safety, though even
this goal fails to achieve it. The tort system would reduce accident
costs to an optimal level only if all tortfeasors paid damages for all of
the losses they cause. Tortfeasors do not pay damages for all of these
losses because the injured party must pay litigation costs. Many
losses go totally uncompensated because they are too low in value to
justify the expense of litigation.9"
and wages. The new data are less subject to the problems of measurement error
that plague previously used measures of risk. They indicate higher risk levels
than previously believed and a significantly different composition of risk levels
within industries. The more comprehensive risk data yield value-of-life estimates
of $5 million or more-at least twice as large as estimates obtained using the
Bureau of Labor Statistics risk data employed in previous studies.
Id. at 476.
97. See, e.g., Hermes v. Pfizer, 848 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1988) (declaring evidence sufficient to
support drug manufacturer's liability to a post-hysterectomy patient who developed permanent
extrapyramidal symptoms, or "hunting jaw," from the antidepressant drug Sinequan); Larue
v. Nat'l Union Elec. Corp., 571 F.2d 51 (1978) (holding evidence sufficient to support finding
that canister-type vacuum cleaner posed an unreasonable risk to children; the jury in Larue
awarded $93,750 after reduction for comparative negligence to a child who, at age 11, suffered
amputation of part of his penis while riding the vacuum cleaner.).
98. See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 111 (1991); Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the
Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 15-16 (1980).
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C. Schwartz's Criticisms of Current Standards of Liability for
Design Defects
Professor Schwartz criticizes the three tests currently used in
design defect cases: the consumer-expectations test, the risk-benefit
test, and the regulatory-compliance test.99 However, he misconstrues
the functions of all three tests, and presents an unsound cost analysis
of the third.
1. THE CONSUMER-EXPECTATIONS TEST
Schwartz states that "[a] product fails the [consumer-expecta-
tions] test when it is less safe than is reasonable for consumers to
expect. ' 'Ico Having defined the test in terms of consumers' reasonable
expectations, he states that it "is not really a defect test at all," but in
practice either duplicates other tests or "protects interests distinct
from consumer expectations." 10' He concludes that the test merely
functions as a proxy for the risk-benefit test 0 2 and the contributory
negligence defense, 0 3 or in the alternative, "as a means to allow juries
99. Professor Schwartz also discusses the "Learned Hand" negligence test, whereby "an
actor is negligent if the expected accident costs of his actions exceed his accident avoidance
costs." Schwartz, supra note 6, at 385. He notes that courts do not use this test to resolve
design defect issues because it fails to take into account the benefits that consumers derive from
a product. Schwartz states:
[K]nife blades sometimes injure people. The cost to firms of dulling the blades
very probably is less than the costs of these injuries. The Learned Hand test thus
would impose liability on knife makers. Courts, however, never reach this result
because it is absurd to hold a manufacturer liable for failing to make a knife so
dull it can no longer be used as a knife.
Id. at 386.
As noted, Dean Calabresi seems to interpret the Learned Hand cost-benefit test more
broadly than does Professor Schwartz. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58. For these
reasons, I have not included an analysis of this test in this Article.
100. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 384.
101. Id. at 384-85.
102. Describing the consumer expectations test as what a "reasonable consumer" would
expect in the way of safety, Schwartz states:
[T]his raises the question of what safety expectations are reasonable. Apart from
a few obvious cases-it is unreasonable to expect cars to float but reasonable to
expect them not to shed wheels on normal city streets-the reasonableness of
safety expectations cannot be assessed without using the other tests. For
example, it is unreasonable of consumers to expect cars to be as crash resistant as




The test sometimes functions as a substitute for a contributory negligence defense
in states where that defense is not permitted. This occurs when the consumer
can take a simple, obvious action to reduce risk, such as closing the cover before
striking a match, or not using the television in the swimming pool, while the
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to compensate plaintiffs when no basis for legal liability exists. ' ' "°
Schwartz's criticisms of the consumer-expectations test are defi-
cient in three respects. First, Schwartz's definition of the test as the
level of safety a reasonable consumer would expect-and his conclu-
sion that the test merely serves as a proxy for a negligence and con-
tributory negligence standard-are flawed. The Restatement (Second)
of Torts defines the consumer-expectations test, not in terms of rea-
sonable expectations, but in terms of the expectations of "the ordinary
consumer who purchases [a product], with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics." 115 This defini-
tion's emphasis upon ordinary expectations reflects the test's origin as
a strict liability test in warranty law, not in negligence law. I°
Courts and scholars use the terms "reasonable expectations" and
"normal" or "ordinary expectations" interchangeably. 107 The
manufacturer would have to undertake a costly redesign to realize a similar
degree of risk reduction. Courts find against injured consumers in these
circumstances not on the ground that they were negligent, but because the
products at issue were at least as safe as the reasonable consumer would expect.
Id. at 385.
104. Id.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) (emphasis added); see also
Gray v. Manitowoc Co., 771 F.2d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1985) ("In light of the overwhelming
evidence indicating that the existence of a blind spot in the 4100W was common knowledge in
the construction trade, we must conclude that the testimony of Gray and his inexperienced co-
worker did not create a jury question as to the knowledge or expectations of the ordinary
observer or consumer.").
106. See, e.g., Gray, 771 F.2d at 869 ("[T]he consumer-expectation test of section 402A is
rooted in the warranty remedies of contract law, and requires that harm and liability flow from
a product characteristic that frustrates consumer expectations.") (citing Page Keeton,
Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37 (1973)); Gootee v. Colt
Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 1057, 1066 (6th Cir. 1983).
mhe crux of the plaintiffs' warranty claim turned on the argument that the gun
as designed did not comport with a reasonable consumer's expectations and,
hence, was not reasonably fit for its intended purposes. Accordingly, the
evidence of what consumers expected and were generally exposed to with regard
to the operation of the [gun] was essential to the implied warranty theory ....
Dart v. Weibe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 878 (Ariz. 1985) ("[T]he 'consumer expectation' test
arises from and expresses principles of implied warranty, the predecessor of strict liability in
tort.") (citing John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND.
L. REV. 551, 552-53 (1980)); Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 227 (Cal.
1982) ("[The consumer expectations test] reflects a warranty analysis and is based on the the-
ory that when a manufacturer places a product on the market, a representation is impliedly
made that the product is safe for the tasks it was designed to accomplish.").
107. See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co. 435 P.2d 806, 809 (Or. 1967); Reed Dickerson,
Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301, 305-18 (1967).
Compare WILLIAM Y. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 659 (4th ed. 1971) ("The
prevailing interpretation of 'defective' is that the product does not meet the reasonable
expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its safety.") (emphasis added) with PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra note 90, § 99, at 698 ("Under the consumer-contemplation test, as so stated in
Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, a product is defectively dangerous if it is
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emphasis, however, should be upon the frustration of the safety expec-
tations of, at least, intended users of the product, given the ordinary
knowledge these users can be expected to possess.'0 s Thus, if
intended users are illiterate, unable to read the English language, or
have other than average expectations, their expectations deserve pro-
tection."9 Describing the consumer-expectations test in terms of rea-
sonable expectations is not problematic, so long as the test's purpose
is kept in mind: to protect ordinary users from surprising hazards. °
Some courts have made the same mistake as Schwartz, equating the
consumer-expectations test with the risk-benefit test."' Yet to con-
fuse the tests overlooks their important differences.
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchased it with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the product's
characteristics.") (emphasis added).
108. See, e.g., Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 587 P.2d 160, 164 (Wash. 1978).
109. See, e.g., Long v. Penn Fruit Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) $ 6140 (E.D. Pa. 1969) In Long, the court denied the defendant's summary judgment
motion because the plaintiffs, a German family, were unfamiliar with the existence of trichinae
in pork. The court stated that the "plaintiffs should be permitted to produce evidence to
contradict the assumed universality of knowledge of the dangerous characteristics of
undercooked pork." Id. at 9099, cited in MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 8.05(6)(b) n.75 (1987).
110. Dickerson explains:
The reasonable expectations of consumers provide a helpful guide, but a
slippery one. If defectiveness depends on the reasonable expectations of
particular classes of consumers, how can we measure those expectations? How,
for instance, can we measure the expectations of the normal housewife as to
whether and how fully particular pork products need to be cooked? Consumer
expectations are as subtle as perceived meanings; both depend on the particular
environments in which they operate. Fortunately, problems of this kind are
common grist for the courts, and a judgment as to the reasonable expectations
for a particular product is no harder to make than the lexicographical judgment
as to what a particular phrase normally means in a particular speech community.
It is a familiar exercise in judicial empathy.
The most troublesome situations are those in which consumer attitudes have
not sufficiently crystallized to define an expected standard of performance.
What, for instance, should the law do about tractors that overturn, surgical
implants that break, and rear-engined automobiles that tend to swerve at high
speeds? These are products that tend to involve allegedly faulty design. If it is
not feasible to improve the product's performance or to provide a safety device
for situations in which the consumer appears to be undesirably vulnerable, the
answer may lie in requiring appropriate warnings or instructions for use.
Although there is a tendency in such cases to refer to a "duty to warn" or
"duty to provide a safety device" as if they were independent duties, it seems
preferable to approach these "duties" as alternative means of discharging a
single, broader duty to provide, under prescribed conditions, a product that does
not violate the consumer's normal expectations by exposing him to an
unreasonable and concealed danger.
Dickerson, supra note 107, at 306-07 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Ill. See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975) ("In
determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer . . . [t]he gravity of the
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Courts have found shortcomings in the consumer-expectations
test. It does not, for example, provide a remedy in some situations
that justify redress.112 The consumer-expectations test has proved
useful, however, in some design defect cases,'" 3 and many jurisdic-
tions continue to use it as an alternative test of design defect."I4 Com-
mentators have both criticized and defended the test's appropriateness
in design defect cases." 5 Nevertheless, to object to the consumer-
expectations test on the ground that it frequently operates merely as a
surrogate for a negligence test overlooks its origin in warranty as a
strict liability test. Furthermore, in some situations, it is easier for the
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case under the consumer-expecta-
tions test than under the negligence test." 6 Part IV of this Article
defends a limited consumer-expectations test in strict products liabil-
ity actions. 117
potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or
minimizing the risk may be relevant .... ").
112. The consumer-expectations test does not provide a remedy for obvious defects and it
may prevent liability for bystander injuries. For an excellent summary of objections to the
consumer-expectations test, see DAVID A. FISCHER & WILLIAM POWERS, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY-CASES AND MATERIALS 67-68 (1988).
113. See, e.g., Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1514 (6th Cir. 1983)
(applying Ohio law) ("[A] consumer might well expect that the roof of his car would withstand
a low-speed roll-over without significant collapse. As GM's own expert succinctly stated, the
roof design was intended 'to provide structural strength and integrity-it does more than just
keep the rain out.' "); Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 589 P.2d 896 (Ariz. 1978) The trial court
in Brady erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant, a mobile home manufacturer,
in a wrongful death action that resulted from a fire in a mobile home. The court noted that
"[t]here is no evidence, one way or the other, that the reasonable occupant of a mobile home
would appreciate that windows in the mobile home would not provide egress. Nor, based
upon the record presented, can we say as a matter of law such an appreciation should have
been forthcoming." Id. at 903.
114. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 882 (Alaska 1979)
("Consumer expectations are a factor to be considered in determining defectiveness, but the
public policy supporting strict liability would be poorly served if consumer expectations were
the sole boundary of liability."); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 878 (Ariz. 1985)
("Thus, while the consumer expectations test may sometimes work well in design defect cases,
it provides no resolution for those cases in which 'the consumer would not know what to
expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made.' ") (citation
omitted); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857
(1982) ("[T]he policy underlying strict liability in tort, requires that 'a product may be found
defective in design, even if it satisfies ordinary consumer expectations [if] ... the jury finds that
the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefits of such design.' ")
(footnote omitted); see also JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY-PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 528 (1987) (listing cases applying the consumer
expectations test).
115. See, e.g., HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 114, at 528-30. The authors have
compiled a list of articles that either criticize or defend the consumer expectations test.
116. W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10
CUMB. L. REV. 293, 310 (1979).
117. See infra text at notes 281-313.
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The second deficiency in Schwartz's criticism of the consumer-
expectations test is his statement that it "allow[s] juries to compensate
plaintiffs when no basis for legal liability exists."'18 He cites no cases
to support his statement, and it is unclear what he means by it. He
adds, also without authority, that the test "permits juries to hold
manufacturers liable when other bases for liability are absent and the
jury wants to compensate the plaintiff.""' 9 If no legal basis for liabil-
ity exists, the court should grant a motion for a directed verdict or a
motion for a judgment n.o.v.
The third deficiency in Schwartz's criticism of the consumer-
expectations test is its inconsistency with the workings of his own lia-
bility system. The results he describes in the illustrations of his pro-
posal implicitly rely on the consumer-expectations test through a
misconceived application of the assumption of risk defense. 20
Schwartz's own implicit use of the test may indicate that its use is
difficult to avoid in any strict liability context.
2. THE RISK-BENEFIT TEST
Professor Schwartz notes that under the risk-benefit test, "a
design is defective only if it generates risks exceeding its benefits."''
He asserts that the risk-benefit test is workable when applied to items
such as kitchen knives, but is unworkable in harder cases.'22 The
jury's role in applying the risk-benefit test is "to ask whether the firm
chose the design that maximized social welfare."'' 23 He states:
The risk/benefit test is too difficult to apply because the bene-
fit .. .is impossible for either firms or juries to ascertain. The
benefits that particular designs would yield are experienced, in con-
siderable part, as subjective mental states. These benefits vary
across persons: Some people feel happiest with fast, light, inexpen-
sive cars; others feel happiest with slow, heavy, more expensive but
safer cars. Such mental states cannot be measured directly and
translated into the dollar values the risk/benefit test requires.1
24
Schwartz presents a complicated method of performing risk-ben-
efit analysis that does not require measuring mental states. His
method involves constructing risk-adjusted supply and demand
curves and the associated Marshallian consumer surplus for all tech-
118. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 385.
119. Id.
120. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
121. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 386.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 386-87.
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nologically feasible alternative product designs.12 Schwartz soundly
concludes that this type of risk-benefit analysis is beyond the ability of
either firms or juries to apply.1
26
Few would quarrel with Schwartz's point that the risk-benefit
test is difficult to apply in many products liability cases. Moreover, to
function optimally as a deterrent, the risk-benefit test requires perfect
foresight.127  Schwartz's total rejection of the risk-benefit test, how-
ever, is unwarranted. Courts can use the risk-benefit test effectively
when accident and safety costs are relatively clear. 128 In addition, the
risk-benefit test may be the best available in many situations, despite
its shortcomings.1 29 Finally, just as Schwartz rejects the consumer-
expectations test but implicitly uses it in his strict liability scheme, he
rejects the risk-benefit test but uses it in his proposed liability
system. '
30
The greatest deficiency in Schwartz's approach to the risk-benefit
test, however, is his dismissal of a jury's ability to assess benefits
because they involve subjective mental states immeasurable in dollar
values. It neither is, nor should be, the jury's role to translate risks
and benefits into dollar values. Such a role for the jury is unnecessary
to achieve efficiency goals under tort liability rules. As Schwartz rec-
ognizes in his discussion of contributory negligence (yet ignores in his
discussion of the risk-benefit test), the factors a jury considers in
weighing benefits do not involve a measure of happiness. Nor does a
jury necessarily assign dollar values when calculating an unreasonable
risk.' 3 ' The risks and benefits that products pose to consumers
involve non-monetary, as well as monetary, values. Tort law appro-
priately labels the values considered in determining risks and benefits
as social values.13 2 Social, not monetary, values enter the equation a
jury uses to calculate an unreasonable risk.
Thus, a jury likely would place a low social value on the happi-
ness a teenager may derive from driving at 80 m.p.h. along a public
highway, while placing a high social value on the pleasure a racecar
driver derives from the legitimate sport of racing. A jury probably
125. Id. at 387-88.
126. Id at 388.
127. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 29, at 1059.
128. See Calabresi & Klevorick, supra note 4.
129. See infra Part IV.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 213-14.
131. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 395.
132. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the risk-utility factors relevant in
determining whether a risk is unreasonable:
Section 292. Factors Considered in Determining Utility of Actor's Conduct
In determining what the law regards as the utility of the actor's conduct for
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also would recognize that convertibles, which pose a recognizable risk
to their occupants, have socially acceptable utility to many people,
just as light-weight, inexpensive cars have great utility in making low-
cost transportation available. Likewise, in assessing risks, jurors
probably would understand intuitively, at least, that creating a risk of
severe bodily injury has a low social value in most cases. They would
realize that the utility of a non-injured state is much greater than that
of an injured state, because the non-injured state cannot be restored.
Part of the social-value calculus rests upon consumer preference for
deterring personal injuries, precisely because those injuries cannot be
redressed in dollar amounts. 33 In many situations, juries are capable
of assessing risks and benefits in a way that minimizes total accident
costs. 134
the purpose of determining whether the actor is negligent, the following factors
are important:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interest which is to be
advanced or protected by the conduct;
(b) the extent of the chance that this interest will be advanced or protected
by the particular course of conduct;
(c) the extent of the chance that such interest can be adequately advanced
or protected by another and less dangerous course of conduct.
Section 293. Factors Considered in Determining Magnitude of Risk
In determining the magnitude of the risk for the purpose of determining
whether the actor is negligent, the following factors are important:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interests which are
imperiled;
(b) the extent of the chance that the actor's conduct will cause an invasion
of any interest of the other or of one of a class of which the other is a member;
(c) the extent of the harm likely to be caused to the interests imperiled;
(d) the number of persons whose interests are likely to be invaded if the risk
takes effect in harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 292-293 (1965) (emphasis added).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
134. Deciding on the standard of due care [under the negligence concept of
unreasonable risk] often requires some sort of weighing of the magnitude of risk
against the disutility or cost of more careful conduct.
* ' * [T]he level of due care that minimizes total accident costs implicitly
involves just such a weighing of risk against the cost of care. This suggests that
due care is in fact found by a process that operates as if it were designed to
identify behavior that minimizes total accident costs.
I hasten to say that the words as ifare stressed because the claim is hardly
made that individuals or courts think in terms of the mathematical goal of
minimizing a sum. They obviously do not do anything so unnatural. Rather,
they appear to gauge the appropriateness of behavior by a rough consideration of
risk and the costs of reducing it, ordinarily on the basis of felt notions of fairness.
Likewise, the as if interpretation carries with it no specific implications about the
degree to which individuals or courts concern themselves about goals of
deterrence, although both sometimes appear to be concerned about deterrence.
With these caveats in mind, observe that the as if interpretation is borne out
not only by the mere fact that there is a weighing involved in the negligence
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-Schwartz's contention that an assessment of benefits requires a
measurement of mental states apparently assumes that risk-benefit
analysis should serve the utilitarian goal of maximizing happiness.' 3 '
The risk-benefit test, however, need not serve utilitarian goals to be
useful in a tort system that strives to achieve optimal reduction of
accident costs. As discussed in Part IV, 136 scholarly commentary has
justified a cheapest-cost-avoider system as a means of promoting
aggregate autonomy. 137  So justified, a risk-benefit analysis should
assess benefits in terms of social utility. Accepted moral values are
legitimate considerations in a system designed to promote aggregate
autonomy.' 38  Moreover, Schwartz's notion that an assessment of
risks and benefits requires the measurement of mental states overlooks
the role of tort law, and the judicial system as a whole, as part of a
political system. As both courts and juries set policy, they do, and
should, make judgments about social values.
3. THE REGULATORY-COMPLIANCE TEST
Schwartz rejects the current regulatory-compliance rules as a
determination, but also by a consideration of the character of the weighing.
First, the elements that courts take into account in finding due care and the effect
of the elements on the due care level are what we would expect were courts' aim
to minimize total accident costs: the level of due care is generally higher the
greater the likelihood of harm, the larger the probable size of harm, the greater
the number of individuals at risk, and the easier it is for injurers to alleviate risk.
Second, the choice of due care levels probably reflects the possibilities for both
injurers and victims to reduce accident risks, as is consistent with the bilateral
model of accidents. Consider, for instance, accidents in which bicyclists run into
car doors as the doors are opened. My surmise is that most of us would say that
bicyclists should not have to proceed so slowly that were a car door to open
suddenly, they could virtually always stop in time, and that before persons open
car doors to leave, they should look around to see if anyone is approaching. I
suggest too that in coming to this view most of us would have at the back of our
minds-if not in our conscious thoughts-such ideas as that it would be a burden
for bicyclists to have to go so slowly that they could stop immediately before
running into car doors, that it is relatively easy for persons leaving cars to look
for danger, and that it is not necessary for bicyclists to go very slowly if persons
are properly cautious when leaving their cars. In other words, when deciding on
the care that parties of one type ought to exercise, we quite naturally factor into
our thinking the ability of parties of the other type to take care and what their
taking care would accomplish.
SHAVELL, supra note 79, at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).
135. See, e.g., Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian
Approach to Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677, 723 (1988) (stating that utilitarianism
"strives to increase happiness in the society as a whole.").
136. See infra text accompanying notes 317-45.
137. See Attanasio, supra note 135.
138. Id. at 692-93.
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standard of liability in design defect cases. He sets forth two features
of the regulatory compliance test:
First... a firm whose product fails to satisfy a regulatory [or statu-
tory] standard (a "regulation") is negligent per se. Second ... a
firm whose product complies with a regulation is not thereby
exculpated; rather, compliance is just evidence relevant to the
question whether the product is defective. A jury remains free to
find the product defective on the ground that it failed another
test. '
39
Schwartz's description of the regulatory-compliance test over-
simplifies it. A firm that violates a statute or regulation is not always
negligent per se. In many jurisdictions, violation of a statute is only
evidence of negligence,"4 and in most jurisdictions, violation of an
administrative regulation is mere evidence of negligence, not negli-
gence per se.' 4' In jurisdictions using a rule of negligence per se, the
court adopts a statute or regulation as the standard of care only if it
determines that the legislature intended for the statute to protect a
class of persons that includes the plaintiff and to safeguard against the
kind of harm that resulted and the hazard that produced the harm.'42
Even if a statute or regulation meets these conditions, a defendant can
excuse its violation of the statute or regulation by proving reasonable
care to comply, unless the court construes the statute or regulation to
preclude an excuse.
43
Schwartz argues that the regulatory-compliance test is deficient
because it fails to exculpate a firm from tort liability when its product
complies with a regulatory standard. His bases for this argument are:
(1) "[a]gencies are better than courts and juries at devising regula-
tions,"'"1 and (2) "[1letting juries review regulations creates consider-
able uncertainty for firms."' 145  He maintains that allowing firms a
defense against liability when their product designs meet regulatory
standards is more efficient than the current regulatory-compliance
rule.
139. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 388-89 (footnote omitted).
140. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 90, § 36, at 229-31; George R. Heaton et al.,
The Uses of Regulatory Evidence in Tort Actions: Automobiles, Consumer Products, and
Occupational Safety and Health, 4 J. PROD. LIAB. 231, 253 (1981).
141. Heaton, supra note 140, at 244. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Mass. 1985) ("[C]ompliance with FDA requirements, though
admissible to demonstrate lack of negligence, is not conclusive on this issue, just as violation of
FDA requirements is evidence, but not conclusive evidence, of negligence.").
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
143. Id. § 288A.




Schwartz correctly asserts that firms face uncertainty in predict-
ing whether juries will find a product design deficient, despite the
design's compliance with regulations. Yet whether uncertainty about
expected liability costs is a sufficient reason to exculpate firms that
comply with applicable regulations remains doubtful. Part IV
addresses that issue. This Part examines the expertise of agencies and
litigants, comparing the efficiency of current regulatory-compliance
rules with the efficiency of Schwartz's approach.
The traditional common law rule that makes compliance with
regulatory standards only evidence of reasonable care evolved from a
"distrust of the quality of government regulation."' 46 Schwartz's
assertion that agencies are better than courts and juries in devising
safety standards is not supported by the justifications he offers to sup-
port his position. Schwartz would not relieve firms that comply with
technologically outdated regulations from liability. 47  With this
exception, he maintains that courts should defer to safety standards
set by regulators "because agencies often have more expertise" and
"because there are economies of scale to regulation."
' ' 48
To bolster his assertion that regulators have greater expertise
than courts and juries, Schwartz correctly points out that the parties
and their attorneys in design defects litigation must develop the
needed expertise. But his assertion that agency expertise exceeds the
expertise of the parties and their attorneys is not supported by citation
to authority, logic, or factual reality. Schwartz's conclusion is defi-
cient for two reasons: first, he overrates the expertise of regulators;
and second, he underrates the expertise of litigants.
a. Agency Expertise
Schwartz argues that agencies are superior to courts and juries at
devising regulations because agencies have greater expertise. Nothing
intrinsic in the nature of government supports the conclusion that
regulatory agencies have expertise superior to litigants on safety
issues. In fact, those who appoint regulators often give greater weight
to candidates' political qualifications than to their expertise in the
agency's business.' 49 A Congressional Quarterly report on the regula-
146. Aaron D. Twerski, Rebuilding the Citadel-The Legislative Assault on the Common
Law, 15 TRIAL 55, 59 (Nov. 1979).
147. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 389 n.72.
148. Id. at 389.
149. Groton observed:
[Flew people will be nominated who are not politically acceptable to the White
House, and in some cases, politics and patronage may be the prime determinant
in a person's selection. Powerful connections in the right high places often make
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tory process observes that "[t]he quality of regulatory commissioners
has been at issue for many decades."' 150 The report also notes that
"[t]he selection process has taken much of the blame for the lack of
qualified regulators in government service. Critics say it is haphazard
and too often governed by factors other than a candidate's profes-
sional qualifications."' In his book on the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, Professor Viscusi observes:
Political considerations may . . .influence the effectiveness of a
commission. Because policies will be governed by the commission
chairman and the majority on any decision, there is less incentive
to exercise care in each appointment than if a single administrator
were being selected. As a consequence, commissions tend to
include some of the less able political appointees, particularly com-
missions, such as the CPSC, that do not play a dominant role in
regulation. '
52
Schwartz's presumption of regulator expertise also fails to recog-
nize that setting regulatory standards is not a scientific process. An
agency's factfinding process may be less exacting than the factfinding
process produced by litigation.5 3 The methods used and the
a difference in the selection process. The authors of a report released in 1976 that
studied appointees to the FTC and the FCC wrote that "many selections can be
explained in terms of powerful political connections and little else."
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., REGULATION: PROCESS AND POLITICS 36 (M. Gottron
ed., 1982). Aside from acceptability to the White House, congressional sponsorship may be
"an important, if not the predominant, factor in the selection process." Id. In an effort to
avoid a confirmation fight, the President and his advisors often will seek the approval of
affected industries, of senators from the same state as the nominee, and of key senators on the
committee with jurisdiction over the nomination. Id. at 36-37.
150. Id. at 38. For a discussion of the quality of regulators, see id. at 38-41.
151. Id. at 40.
152. W. KIP Viscusi, REGULATING CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 39 (1984).
153. In a recent article, Joan Claybrook, the former administrator of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, urged attorneys to provide information about defective products
to the public and to governmental agencies. She stated:
As a former regulator, I know that the facts trial lawyers collect on a
product defect are usually far superior to those a government agency collects for
an investigation. This is true for a number of reasons. Government agencies
rarely use subpoenas-the type of official command that companies respond to
with accuracy. At the urging of the recipient company and to expedite the
response, many government requests for information are informal. Also, written
government requests for information are usually prepared by scientists,
engineers, or investigators, not lawyers, and thus contain unintended loopholes.
Although it is a criminal violation to lie to the government, corporate lawyers are
trained to obfuscate and to avoid supplying critical, incriminating information.
Further, because government agencies are authoritative decision makers,
they can rely on their own data and analyses. By contrast, trial lawyers as
advocates must persuade judges and juries with admissible facts. Thus, trial
lawyers seek out every scrap of information to make the case, uncovering critical
facts by lengthy discovery motions, detailed personal review of corporate
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rulemaking standards followed vary from one agency to another, and
from one administration to another.154 Agencies must make difficult
estimates to determine whether a product poses greater dangers than
its alternatives might create. 5 5 As the recent controversy over the
use of cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory process demonstrates, no
consensus exists on what considerations agencies should take into
account in setting standards.156 The varying positions taken by the
Department of Transportation on the passive restraint issue, under
three administrations, exemplify the difficulties agencies encounter in
setting safety standards.157
If expertise denotes the attainment of a generally accepted level
of competence in the process, it is fair to say that no such thing as
"expertise" exists in devising regulatory safety standards. The pro-
cess of devising regulatory standards involves setting policy. It thus is
a political, not a scientific, process.I s5 As such, the regulatory process
documents, depositions (rarely used in government investigations), and
eventually cross-examination at trial.
Often, the facts gleaned by trial lawyers are unknown to the regulatory
agency. But, if known, these facts could result in a recall, a labeling requirement,
or a safety standard. For all these reasons, trial lawyers are obliged to share their
work product with the relevant state or federal government agency. The
information will have a far greater impact if a lawyer informs the media as well.
Joan Claybrook, Products Liability--Going Public About Defective Products, 25 TRIAL 34, 34-
35 (Nov. 1989).
154. Samuel P. Hays, Political Choice in Regulatory Administration, in REGULATION IN
PERSPECTIVE-HISTORICAL ESSAYS 1, 2-5 (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1981).
155. The increased use of less flammable fabrics in sofas reduces the risk of death for
smokers by decreasing the chance of a fire but may increase the risk to
nonsmokers since any fire that does occur will produce more highly toxic gases.
Safety caps may raise the risk of poisonings if parents leave the caps off the
bottles because they are too difficult to remove or if the caps lead parents to be
lax about their children's exposure to hazardous products.
Viscusi, supra note 152, at I11.
156. See Hays, supra note 154, at 25-27; see also Viscusi, supra note 152, at 43-47
(criticizing the Consumer Product Safety Commission's explicit disavowal of the accuracy of
cost-benefit analysis.). Viscusi states, in part:
(T]ypically there is no explicit benefit-cost or cost-effectiveness calculation but
simply a partial description of some relevant effects. These shortcomings reflect
not inadequacies in the analyses by the CPSC economics staff but rather a failure
of the CPSC commissioners to give economic analysis more prominence. The
economic analysis is only a small component of the briefing package used by the
commissioners in making their decisions. In contrast, the regulatory analyses
now undertaken by executive branch agencies are much more comprehensive, in
large part because those agencies are subject to formal scrutiny by the OMB.
Id at 44.
157. For a description of the varying orders issued by the United States Department of
Transportation through the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations on passive restraint
systems in automobiles, see Hays supra note 154, at 131-32.
158. In an essay on politics and regulatory administration, Hays explains:
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is subject to the further criticism that a large percentage of agency
activity is unaccountable to elected political leadership.15 9 Therefore,
it is difficult to attribute rationality to the regulatory process, under
either a scientific or political label. Moreover, many students of the
regulatory process perceive the issue of acceptable risks as cultural,
rather than economic or scientific.160
Schwartz correctly discovers no basis for assuming that all regu-
[A]dministrative choices are themselves fundamental political choices and must
be recognized as a major realm of political give and take.
It is often difficult to accept regulation as a central realm of political option
and choice. We are still heavily influenced by the inherited formalism of the past
concerning the separation of powers: the legislature makes the laws, the
administrative branch executes them, and the courts interpret them. Each has a
distinct function; together they constitute an interacting and complementary
system of government. Looked at in a different way, the separation of powers
involves three arenas of political choice, and hence of political combat. Once the
choice is made, the political forces at play in legislation transfer their action to
the next stage-the administrative agency-and seek to recoup, defend, or
extend what they lost or gained in the legislature. Action does not end there, and
soon the same constellation of forces forms around litigation and court decision.
The legislature, the administrative agency, the courts are merely different settings
in which political controversy and choice are ordered. Much of the drama of our
political system arises from the way in which each of these institutions remains
open to making its own distinctive contribution to resolving political
controversies.
Hays, supra note 154, at 125; see also David Vogel, The "New" Social Regulation in Historical
and Comparative Perspective, REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE-HISTORiCAL ESSAYS 155-85
(Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1981) (examining the political influences upon regulation and busi-
ness-government relations in three major 20th century eras). Another author states:
The real purpose of government regulation is not to correct the deficiencies
of markets but to transcend markets altogether-which is to say, government
regulation is not economic policy but social policy. It is an effort to advance a
conception of the public interest apart from, and often opposed to, the outcomes
of the marketplace and, indeed, the entire idea of a market economy.
Paul H. Weaver, Regulation, Social Policy, and Class Conflict, 50 PUB. INTEREST 45, 56
(1978).
159. Howard Ball, Introduction, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES- ESSAYS ON
POWER AND POLITICS 1, 2 (Howard Ball ed., 1984); see also Viscusi, supra note 152, at 39
(commenting on the Consumer Product Safety Commission's lack of accountability.).
160. Maxey describes the cultural issues of the regulatory process:
We cannot understand our situation if we cling to the view that real
knowledge of an external world should be allocated to experts in the physical
sciences, while illusions or mistaken perceptions pertain to the realm of personal
psychology. Given this faulty division, dangers are assumed to be inherent in a
physical situation, and the risks they pose are objectively ascertainable by
experts. When perceptions or attitudes toward risk among non-experts appear to
be out of conformity with "actual risks," it is assumed that the gap ought to be
closed in only one direction-toward the opinion of experts .... According to
this view, subjective personality traits presumably account for a bias toward risk
as a whole: An individual is either a risk-taker or a risk-avoider. Unfortunately,
a subjectivist account cannot explain two critical problems: Why is it that
[Vol. 46:1
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latory agencies are "captured" by the firms they regulate. 6' Noting
experts disagree? Why does one and the same individual fear environmental
dangers to the exclusion of others which are more immediately life-threatening?
A subjectivist and individualistic account of risk perception will not answer
these questions. We need a cultural approach as proposed by Douglas and
Wildavsky in Risk and Culture. A cultural approach begins with a simple
question: On what basis do people decide that certain risks are worth taking,
while others should be relegated to secondary consideration? In view of statistics
dramatizing the premature loss of life from fire, why are alleged cancer-causing
agents such as asbestos or tris (sic) judged more fearsome than fire which both
substances were developed to prevent? If indeed the prevention of cancer in all
its forms is of paramount concern, why is public concern not mobilized to
prevent leisure-time sunbathing which induces skin cancer? Is our primary
moral concern to prevent the most people from suffering a premature mortality
or debilitating morbidity? Then should not public concern about starvation in
third world countries take moral precedence over the fate of the snail darter or
the Furbish lousewort or the El Segundo Blue butterfly? Neither a subjectivist
approach nor a moral calculus can do justice to these questions.
Douglas and Wildavshy maintain that only a cultural theory of risk
selection as a product of cultural bias and social criticism can account for the
anomalies we encounter in Western industrialized economies. Only a cultural
approach can integrate moral judgments about how to live with empirical
judgments about what the world is like. A cultural theory of risk selection is
wholistic [sic]: the social environment, the perceiving subject, and risk selection
principles are integrated in one system. The .risks we choose to control or
mitigate, individually and collectively, are integral to the choices we make with
respect to the best way to organize social relations, to protect shared values, and
to devise institutional mechanisms for formulating public policy.
In the current risk versus safety debate, each side accuses the other of
serving the vested interests of preferred social institutions. Whether the
arguments originate from the "industrial establishment" or the "danger
establishment," each side accuses the other of irrational bias, of misperceptions
of real risks, of subversion of the public interest. Given this impasse, Douglas
and Wildavshy observe that it would be a serious error to treat questions about
"acceptable risk" as if they could be answered by calculationg [sic] the actual
versus perceived probability of danger (risk) "out there" resulting from man's
interaction with nature, in contrast to determining what level of uncertainty is
acceptable "in here" within the rational person's mind. From the perspective of
cultural analysis, the primary task is not one of devising a philosophy of risk
based on technical estimations of how nature and technology may (or may not)
interact to produce latent risks of contamination to ecosystems or endangered
species, including man. The problem for cultural analysis is, first and foremost,
to learn how to recognize cultural bias toward preferred forms of social
organization as a precondition for recognizing risk selection as the instrument for
inducing wanted and rejecting unwanted forms of social organization. There can
be no reconciliation of disagreements about levels of "acceptable risk" until there
is clear recognition that differing political agendas for changing present social
institutions and policies underlie the selection of physical risks for public concern
and governmental control.
Margaret N. Maxey, Introduction, REGULATORY REFORM-NEW VISION OR OLD CURSE? 1,
2-4 (Margaret N. Maxey & Robert L. Kuhn eds., 1985) (footnotes omitted).
161. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 391 n.75.
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political economists' analyses of the demand and supply side of the
"market for regulation," Schwartz states:
On the demand side, groups with low coalition costs and a compar-
ative advantage at solving free rider problems have an above aver-
age ability to secure laws that benefit themselves at the expense of
other groups. Producer groups sometimes have these characteris-
tics, but other groups do also. For example, consumer, labor, and
environmental groups have had considerable success in influencing
health and safety regulation. The success suggests that some regu-
lations will be influenced by capture by producer groups, but other
regulations will not. It is questionable whether courts or juries
could identify "captured" regulations accurately on a case-by-case
'basis.
When supply side considerations are added, the possibility of
identifying regulations tainted by capture becomes even more
remote. The supply side literature asks when legal institutions will
"supply" laws that are in the interest of particular groups. This
turns out to be a complex question. Agencies are recognized to
have "competing principals," such as oversight committees in leg-
islative bodies, legislatures themselves, and various parts of the
executive branch. Agency outputs are the result of a complex
"game" between agencies, these principals, and the nongovern-
mental interests demanding or opposing regulation. Political theo-
rists do not claim to be able to predict the outcomes of such games
with great accuracy. Courts are unlikely to do better. Thus, the
effective choice for courts is to presume that capture always hap-
pens or that it never does. To make the latter choice is to hold that
the possibility of capture is irrelevant to the choice of common law
rules. This is the better result because courts should have a pre-
sumption in favor of the legitimacy of the actions of coordinate
branches of government. Hence, it appears best to adopt the rule
that noncompliance with regulations is per se negligence and com-
pliance per se exculpatory.
1 62
Schwartz's conclusion that courts should defer to regulatory agencies
does not follow from his point that capture does not occur in all, or
even most, instances. 163 Instead, his recognition that many political
forces influence agency actions should lead to the conclusion that the
regulatory process is not well designed to set safety standards at a
level adequate for resolving tort cases. 164 The numerous forces that
162. Id. at 391 n.75 (citation omitted).
163. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Origins of Regulation, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES-ESSAYS ON POWER AND POLITICS 124 (Howard Ball ed., 1984).
164. See, e.g., Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 734 (Minn. 1980), (stating
that industry influence led to development of the flammability test adopted in the Flammable
Fabrics Act of 1953), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980). Plaintiffs' attorneys frequently
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influence agency action1 65 may cause agency standards to be set
established the invalidity of the flammability test by demonstrating in court that pajamas
constructed of newsprint burned only slightly faster than the fabric that burned and injured
the plaintiff. See id. at 730; Howard v. McCrory Corp., 601 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1979).
165. The forces that influence regulatory policies are not all political. Wilson identifies
other important forces such as the motives of agency personnel, changes in the technology and
economics of industry, and generational changes in ideas. Wilson, supra note 163. Wilson
discusses the generational changes in ideas:
A student in college or law school in the 1930s and 1940s would probably have
been taught that government regulation of entry into and the prices charged by
an industry was desirable and that the commission form of regulation was
optimal. James Landis's book on regulation was a root-and-branch defense of
the desirability and feasibility of applying neutral administrative expertise to the
management of economic enterprise.
By contrast, in the 1960s, college and law school students were exposed to
books and articles written by people disillusioned with the regulatory
commission, though not with the idea of regulation. Scarcely any student
majoring in political science could have avoided hearing that regulatory agencies
were "captured" by industry and that commissions went through a "life cycle"
that led inevitably to senility or dependence. A bright student would also have
heard economists say that regulation of entry and rates, as practiced by the ICC
and the CAB, imposed costs on the consumer by keeping prices at above-market
levels. At the same time, they would learn from each other, if not from their
professors, that the environment was being degraded and the consumer "ripped
off." These students would later enter government service carrying with them
the political residue of these intellectual arguments: agencies should be
reorganized to prevent their capture, regulation of entry and rates is of
questionable value, and regulating the nature and quality of the product and the
conditions of the work place will produce substantial benefits.
In short, the political environment of the regulatory agencies changed
significantly in a short time. These changes had many sources, but one common
characteristic: they reveal the extent to which intellectual descriptions (and
criticisms) of institutional arrangements come to have practical consequences.
Any generalization about how government works is vulnerable to the behavior of
persons who have learned that generalization and wish to repeal it.
Id. at 138-39. For a discussion of other forces that affect administrative decisions, including
"the internal setting of administrative choice, the institutional web of that choice, and the
larger ideological context," see Hays, supra note 154, at 127-132.
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too low or too high, 166 and frequently make the process very slow. 167
Thus the problem with requiring courts to defer to regulatory agen-
cies is not that regulated firms "capture" agencies, but rather that
politics encumber the regulatory process. The political nature of reg-
ulation logically supports the current general rule that both violation
of and compliance with regulations constitute only evidence of
negligence.
Schwartz also argues that courts should presume "the legitimacy
of the actions of coordinate branches of government." 16  In defending
his position that courts should defer to the expertise of administrative
agencies, he states:
[A]n appellate court would review an agency's regulation under
the substantial evidence test, on the ground of agency superiority
over courts in devising regulations, while lay juries in design defect
cases review agency output de novo. This contradicts the received
wisdom respecting the appropriate roles of courts and agencies in
regulation.' 69
Received wisdom recognizes that appellate courts should play a lim-
ited role in reviewing agency actions because agencies are better
suited to develop substantive policy. 170 The question is whether
courts or juries breach this accepted principle of administrative law
166. See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance,
Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. REG. 65, 88-
91 (1989) (reporting studies of agencies' cost effectiveness). Viscusi stated that "if efficient
control of risks is the sole objective of a risk-management system, then regulations are far too
stringent in many cases." Id. at 89. Viscusi suggests that society can resolve the problems in
regulation more easily than the problems in tort law. Id. at 93. He considers tort law
problematic because "tort damages underestimate the true cost of risky activity, which causes
inefficient risk-reduction incentives." Id. at 85.
Viscusi comments on the use of regulations to establish the standard of tort liability:
At least when regulations are highly pertinent to the hazard in question,
compliance alone should suffice to remove liability.
Although regulatory compliance can make a significant contribution, it is
not the fundamental issue. It serves as an imperfect proxy for whether risk levels
are efficient. Before adopting regulatory compliance as a defense, society should
be certain that regulations are set at efficient levels. Fortunately, regulation as an
institution is flexible enough to allow the necessary adjustments.
Id. at 103. Viscusi's optimism about improving the regulatory process is questionable because
improving regulation requires surmounting its political character and the many forces that
influence it. See supra notes 158, 165.
167. For a criticism of standards set by the Consumer Product Safety Commission, see
Viscusi, supra note 166, at 88-104. For a discussion of the delay associated with
administrative action, see Richard P. Barke, Regulatory Delay as Political Strategy, in
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES-ESSAYS ON POWER AND POLITICS 144 (Howard
Ball ed., 1984).
168. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 392 n.75.
169. Id. at 389-90.
170. See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts as Guardians of the Public Interest, in
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when they impose tort liability on firms whose product designs com-
ply with administrative regulations. They do not. Courts should not
usurp authority delegated by Congress to an administrative agency.
Courts do not usurp agency authority, however, when they place tort
liability upon a firm whose product complies with regulatory stan-
dards, because absent statutory preemption, the agency has no
authority over tort liability. Legislation sometimes preempts tort lia-
bility for design defect, but in many instances there is no express pre-
emption, or the legislation expressly provides that compliance with
regulatory standards does not exempt a firm from tort liability.171 In
effect, Congress has determined that the regulatory process is not as
well suited as the judicial process to set adequate levels of safety for
purposes of tort actions. Congress is in a good position to decide
whether the administrative process is structured and financed ade-
quately to set reliable safety standards to govern loss allocation in
cases of injury. Moreover, it is reasonable for Congress to allow the
litigation process to allocate tort losses, even though it does not allow
the appellate process to interfere with the substantive policymaking of
agencies. The litigation process is designed to resolve factual disputes;
the appellate process is not.
b. Litigant Expertise
Schwartz's second justification for his assertion that agencies are
better than courts and juries at devising regulations is that parties in
products liability litigation lack expertise. Under Schwartz's argu-
ment, litigants cannot develop the expertise that agencies can because
litigants do not enjoy the economies of scale present in agency regula-
tion. He contends that the larger budgets of administrative agencies
allow them to develop fuller records for evaluating product designs
than litigants can produce. Schwartz believes that litigants determine
the resource level they will devote to design evaluation "by comparing
the expected gain . . . from discovering more information-the
increased likelihood of winning the suit-with the expected investiga-
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES-ESSAYS ON POWER AND POLITICS 250 (Howard
Ball ed., 1984).
171. See, e.g., Sours v. Gen. Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1517 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he
very federal safety statute upon which GM relies makes it abundantly clear that compliance
with the regulations promulgated thereunder does not immunize a manufacturer from
common law liability.") (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1976)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (1988)
("The remedies provided for in [the Consumer Product Safety Act] shall be in addition to and
not in lieu of any other remedies provided by common law or under Federal or State law.").
On preemption generally, see MARSHALL SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
11.03[6] (1987).
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tion cost."' 72 He further states:
If the technical and economic questions at issue are complex, pri-
vate litigants will provide relatively little information unless the
amount at stake is quite high. In contrast, for an agency, in theory
anyway, the expected gain from discovering further information is
a function of the benefits that better regulation will confer on all
potentially affected persons. As this gain commonly exceeds the
gain to any private litigant, an agency rationally would spend more
than the litigant in investigating a particular design, were both to
face the same budget constraint.
1 73
The problem with Schwartz's view of litigants' expertise is his
assumption that litigants start with zero knowledge about a product's
design and that the cost of developing information is high. These
assumptions do not apply, however, to defendants, who generally
have great expertise on the design of their own products. Moreover,
in some cases, non-party manufacturers with an interest in protecting
the products involved provide the defendant with expert assistance.
1 74
Nor do Schwartz's assumptions apply to plaintiffs. Schwartz over-
looks individual firms' and attorneys' high level of expertise on partic-
ular products or product lines. 75  Schwartz also disregards the
numerous ways in which members of the plaintiffs' bar cooperate to
172. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 389.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Carol Haas, Is this Office a Law Firm-Or Is It a Drug Store?, NAT'L L.J.,
July 10, 1989, at 8 (noting that in an action against a pharmaceutical or chemical company,
"[n]ot only is the plaintiff fighting the defendant drug company, but other manufacturers
interested in protecting that product"). The defense bar also receives assistance from the
Defense Research Institute, which regularly publishes materials on products liability defense
and has formed specialized litigation groups concerned with particular products. See Product
Liability Meeting to Feature Industry Litigation Groups, FOR THE DEFENSE, Nov. 1991, at cq3.
The Institute also offers litigation support services such as an expert witness index and a brief
bank. See id. at 19.
175. Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, of Minneapolis, for example, has represented more
than 150 women in actions involving the Copper-7 intrauterine device against G.D. Searle &
Co.. G.D. Searle Settles IUD Case One Day Before Closing Arguments, 17 Prod. Safety & Liab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 334 (Apr. 14, 1989). In June 1989, the parties announced a tentative
settlement in all these cases. Manufacturer, Plaintiffs'Law Firm Reach Tentative Settlement of
133 Cases, 17 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 613 (June 23, 1989). The report of
the tentative settlement stated:
Outside of the settlement, Ciresi said, the Robins firm is providing all of the
information it obtained through the discovery process in [its] cases to all Copper-
7 plaintiffs throughout the country. The only cost to interested parties, Ciresi
said, is the cost of copying the materials. He said Robins was providing the
materials from its research free of charge because smaller law firms may
sometimes have difficulty in obtaining such information because of the expense.
Id. at 614; see also Haas, supra note 174. Haas notes that each attorney is a licensed pharma-
cist in the Atlanta firm of Simmons & Toliver, a firm specializing in pharmaceutical malprac-
tice and products liability cases. The article states:
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reduce information costs. The Association of Trial Lawyers of
America ("ATLA"), for example, provides a research and informa-
tion service, the ATLA Exchange, a repository of data on thousands
of cases tried by ATLA members.176 In addition, ATLA offers an
One problem with suing the large pharmaceutical companies is that Mr.
Simmons' firm can't crow when they work out a large settlement. In 25 percent
to 30 percent of all cases he says his firm settles before trial, a gag order is entered
and the name of the physician or pharmaceutical company may not be divulged.
Nevertheless, Mr. Simmons says that the firm's reputation as specialists in
pharmaceutical malpractice and products liability cases is growing fast and
brings referrals from other firms.
Not only does a pharmaceutical background bring in the clients, but the
firm's expertise brings cases to trial more efficiently and cheaply, he claims: "The
people with the resources are the defense firms because they have a $100 million
dollars to play with. We make up for lack of resources by providing our own
expertise."
Id.
The 42-lawyer firm of Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Pool, of Barnwell, South
Carolina, has 12,000 active asbestos cases. Karen Dillon, Only $1.5 Million a Year, AM.
LAW., Oct. 1989, at 38, 38-40. Partner Ronald Motley developed "an unusual split-the-work,
split-the-fee arrangement" with local counsel, in order to handle all the asbestos cases Motley
was bringing to the firm. Id. at 41. Dillon's article explains:
Beyond the fee split, Motley was able to market his firm by offering local
counse['s] hard-researched national discovery. "Our co-counsel recognize that
we are on the cutting edge of discovery," Motley says.
Motley's firm . . . handles national discovery and manufacturers' liability
issues, while the local firms deal with product exposure and medical problems
and take care of day-to-day administration of a case.
Id.
176. An excerpt from an ATLA publication describes ATLA's services:
The Exchange provides an ATLA member preparing a case with the particulars
of similar cases handled by other ATLA members. (The service has information
on more than 4,000 products, medical procedures, and case topics in the areas of
products liability, medical negligence, premises liability, discovery abuse, civil
rights, and professional negligence....
Lawyers who know what they need from the library-whether that would
be specific documents from the Consumer Product Safety Commission or the
statute of limitations for a negligence case in the Bahamas Code of Civil
Procedure--can expect an immediate response.
The library can expeditiously track down hard-to-find material such as
articles published years back in state trial lawyer association journals or law
school reviews. If the requested material is not at hand, it can be readily
obtained from other area sources or through interlibrary loan.
For more complex projects, the library offers a comprehensive research
packet. An ATLA lawyer handling a case that involves the negligent
entrustment of a vehicle to an incompetent driver, for example, can obtain a 90-
page file on this subject, including annotations, cases, and discovery materials.
Library Research Services Popular with Members, ATLA ADVOC., Mar. 1989, at 2.
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expert witness database,177 a planned deposition bank,' 7 and a brief
and memorandum writing service. 179 ATLA has facilitated formation
of thirty-three litigation groups for exchanging information. Many of
these litigation groups specialize in individual products or product
areas.18° ATLA offers educational programs involving both skills
training and substantive law training. These programs have included
presentations on proof of damages, trial advocacy, products liability,
and toxic torts.""' The ATLA Advocate includes a "Networking" sec-
tion for ATLA members seeking information on specific types of
cases. 18 2 Also, the A TLA Products Liability Law Reporter lists avail-
able briefs and settlements verdicts of surveys."8 3 Currently ATLA is
working to minimize use of judicial secrecy orders prohibiting public
disclosure of safety information following settlement or dismissal of
products liability and other tort actions.'8 4 This project could result
in the general availability of large amounts of information. ATLA
also has formed consortia to pool and generate information in specific
177. ATLA Exchange Adds Experts Database, ATLA ADVOC., Oct. 1989, at 10.
178. Member Services Bulletin Board-Depositions Needed, ATLA ADVOC., Feb. 1991, at
16.
179. ATLA Offers Writing Service, ATLA ADVOC., Oct. 1989, at 7.
180. "Association of Trial Lawyers of America litigation groups, composed of members
handling similar cases, are formed to foster the exchange of information, ideas and
experiences. Their aim is to improve the quality of representation, promote judicial efficiency
and reduce costs." A TLA Litigation Groups, Chairs, NAT'L L.J., July 24, 1989, at 19. ATLA
organizes litigation groups for individual products such as Bic Lighters, the Dalkon shield,
DES, and Yugos. The litigation groups for product areas include defective firearms,
formaldehyde, kerosene heaters, motorcycle crashworthiness, and tire/rim mismatches. Id.
The ATLA Winter Conference in January 1990 held first annual litigation group
seminars, including programs on protective orders, boat and jet ski litigation, lead paint
litigation, and electrical accidents. A TLA Winter Convention in Orlando Features Litigation
Groups, Family Fun, ATLA ADVOC., Oct. 1989, at 5.
Because of the number of research and support services now available, ATLA has
established the Litigation Services Hot Line to assist attorneys in finding out what services
might be of help on particular problems. Member Services Bulletin Board-Hot Line
Established for Litigation Help, ATLA ADVOC., Mar. 1991, at 16.
181. ATLA Sponsors Spring Seminars, ATLA ADVOC., Mar. 1989, at 5; ATLA Offers New
Seminar Tapes, ATLA ADVOC., Mar. 1989, at 6.
182. See, e.g., Networking, ATLA ADVOC., Mar. 1989, at 7-11.
183. See, e.g., Offerings, 8 ATLA PROD. LIAB. LAW REP. 159 (1989).
184. Russ Herman, No More Dirty Little Secrets in the Courts, ATLA ADVOC., Oct. 1989,
at 4.
On the pros and cons of protective orders and recent legislation and judicial rule-making
restricting the use of such orders, see Protective Orders, 19 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 8, Pt. II, at 227 (Feb. 22, 1991); Plaintiff, Defense Bars Remain Divided over Sealed
Documents; Some Attorneys See Public Threat, Others See Vital Role of Others, 19 Prod. Safety
& Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, Pt. II, at 230-31 (Feb. 22, 1991); Note, Sealed Out-of-Court




product areas. 185 It is unrealistic to believe that litigants must develop
their own expertise in each design defect case. Further, it is unrealis-
tic to assume that in each action the litigants and their attorneys
would develop liability theories anew. Schwartz is correct in stating
that a litigant will determine the resource level to devote to design
evaluation by comparing the expected gain from discovering more
information with the expected investigation cost. In some cases, how-
ever, the expected gain from discovering more information may
extend beyond the individual case. In others, expected investigation
costs may be minimal because of previous information expenditures
or cost sharing by a large number of persons.'86 Thus, despite
Schwartz's assertion to the contrary, significant economies of scale
exist for litigants, as well as for administrative agencies.
c. The Efficiency of Schwartz's Proposal
Schwartz argues that his proposal to exculpate firms from liabil-
ity when they comply with regulations is more efficient than the cur-
rent system. Professor Shavell, however, defends the current
compliance rules:
[1]f compliance with regulation were to protect parties from liabil-
ity, then none would do more than to meet the regulatory require-
ments. Yet since these requirements will be based on less than
perfect knowledge of parties' situations, there will clearly be some
parties who ought to do more than meet the requirements-
because they present an above-average risk of doing harm, can take
extra precautions more easily than most, or can take precautions
not covered by regulation. As liability will induce many of these
parties to take beneficial precautions beyond the required ones, its
use as a supplement to regulation will be advantageous."8 7
Schwartz rejects Shavell's position:
[F]irms probably will suppose they can escape liability if they pro-
185. See Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775 (lst Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1030 (1989). The Public Citizen Litigation Group successfully petitioned for the
modification of a protective order that prohibited the plaintiff from disseminating discovery
materials generated in a wrongful death action against the Liggett Group, Inc. and Liggett &
Meyers Tobacco Co.
186. For a report on the large expenses plaintiff's attorneys incurred in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988), the landmark tobacco case in which the plaintiff
obtained a verdict of $400,000, see Andrew Blum, Anti-Smoking Cause Gets Infusion of New
Blood, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 30, 1989, at 1. Attorneys active in the Tobacco Products Liability
Project and in ATLA's tobacco litigation group reported that the plaintiffs' attorneys in
Cipollone spent between $500,000 and $1 million. Now, others can use the work and
discovery produced tobacco actions, which should cost only $25,000 to $40,000 each. Id.
187. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
357, 365 (1984).
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duce an amount of safety Q according to the rule Q=Q*+e,
[where Q* represents the regulatory safety obligation and] where e
is an error term. This term will be positive because juries are
instructed always to hold firms liable that produce Q < Q* and will
sometimes hold firms liable that produce Q > Q*. Because the
error term is a function of what juries are predicted to do, there is
no reason to believe that Qs chosen according to this rule will
equate any firm's marginal costs with the benefits of producing
safety.
Current law respecting compliance with regulations, in sum,
induces firms with high costs for producing safety to produce an
excessive amount of it while not ensuring that low-cost firms pro-
duce the correct amount. Changing the law to make compliance
with regulations exculpatory will permit high-cost firms more
closely to equate the marginal costs and benefits from safety but
reduce the incentive of low-cost firms to make their products safer.
The choice thus is between two rules neither of which can ensure
that firms will produce the optimal amount of safety.
188
Schwartz criticizes current regulatory compliance rules on the
grounds that no firm produces an optimal amount of safety, and that
firms err on the side of overproduction of safety. He maintains that
his approach is more efficient because agency expertise and access to
information probably ensure that fewer distortions exist when firms
comply with regulatory standards than when they comply with a
standard based on predictions of what juries will do.'89 Schwartz's
efficiency argument fails, however, on its assumption that agencies
have greater expertise and access to information than parties to litiga-
tion do. As a result, he fails to establish that current rules are less
efficient than his proposed liability system. Rather, it seems that the
current rules are more efficient. If the current system results in an
overproduction of safety, it is probably not as far from optimal as
Schwartz's system, which requires bare compliance with safety regu-
lations. Under the current system, firms whose optimal safety levels
exceed the regulatory minimum have incentive to exceed the stan-
dards. And it is doubtful that many firms' optimal levels of safety fall
below regulatory standards. Shavell observes that current tort rules
would exculpate such firms, if they exist, because the rules allow
defenses for the violation of statutes and regulations. 90 A defendant
may have difficulty justifying violation of a statute specifically
designed to promote safety.' 9 ' However, courts have flexibility in
188. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 391.
189. Id. at 391.
190. Shavell, supra note 187, at 371.
191. One writer explains this position:
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applying statutes and may refuse to employ a statute that sets an inap-
propriate standard. 192 Furthermore, courts generally treat the viola-
tion of an administrative regulation as mere evidence of negligence,
thereby affording litigants individualized treatment in most products
liability cases.193
Another flaw in Schwartz's efficiency argument is that if numer-
ous firms have found that regulatory standards caused them to over-
produce safety, defendants would attempt to excuse their violations in
products liability cases. I have found no such products liability cases.
This absence of authority suggests that the overproduction of safety is
an insignificant problem. Finally, given that many losses go totally
As a statute becomes more clearly a mandate to deliberate, plan or prepare for
the safety of others, an excuse for its violation becomes inherently more difficult
to prove. It would be very difficult, for example, to establish an excuse for failure
to have a required fire escape upon a theatre. Likewise it is improbable that
excuses for operating a motor vehicle with dangerously worn tires could be
produced. Inevitably as more safety preparation is mandated excuse will become
more difficult and even impossible.
Cleon H. Foust, The Use of Criminal Law as a Standard of Civil Responsibility in Indiana, 35
IND. L.J. 45, 58-59 (1959).
192. Courts should refrain from an inflexible application of the negligence per se rule
because of the impact that may have upon the traditional policy of premising
liability on fault. The approach of the Restatement 2d is consistent with such
restraint. Following the Restatement 2d approach we find: (1) the standard
defined by legislation or administrative rule should only be adopted when the
four criteria of § 286, Restatement 2d, are met; (2) the excused violation of the
legislative enactment or administrative rule is not negligence... ; and (3) even if
the court finds that the criteria of § 286 are met, it is not required to adopt the
legislative enactment as the standard of conduct because of the permissive
language of the Restatement 2d.
Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1198-99 (Wyo. 1987) (citation omitted).
193. Courts would accord individualized treatment to litigants on the negligence issue
because the factors relevant to the question of unreasonable risk take into account the ability of
the particular defendant to avoid the risk that led to the plaintiff's harm. A New York court
stated:
What constitutes "reasonable care" will, of course, vary with the surrounding
circumstances and will involve "a balancing of the likelihood of harm, and the
gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden of the precaution which would
be effective to avoid the harm." Under this approach, the plaintiff endeavors to
show the jury such facts as that competitors used the safety device which was
missing here, or that a 'cotter pin costing a penny' could have prevented the
accident. The defendant points to such matters as cost, function, and
competition as narrowing the design choices. He stresses 'trade-offs'. If the
product would be unworkable when the alleged missing feature was added, or
would be so expensive as to be priced out of the market, that would be relevant
defensive matter.
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78 (N.Y. 1976) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added). Although Micallef did not involve violation of a regulatory standard, if the standard
were mere evidence on the issue of negligence, the factors enunciated in Micallef should still be
the relevant factors.
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uncompensated because they are too negligible to justify the cost of
litigation,194 it is unlikely that overproduction of safety is a serious
issue.
D. The Liability Standard and Defenses Allowed Under the
Schwartz Proposal
1. SCHWARTZ'S DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED STANDARD
AND DEFENSES
Professor Schwartz describes his proposal as a true strict liability
system with contributory negligence and assumption of risk as com-
plete defenses.' 95 This Part analyzes Schwartz's proposal for a true
strict liability system, concluding that it would be highly inefficient.
Part IV.A.5. argues that no system of pure enterprise liability would
achieve an optimal reduction in accident costs.
Schwartz's proposal would hold firms liable "whenever their
designs cause injury," unless they can establish an affirmative
defense. 196 Schwartz claims that this approach yields efficient results
and that it employs neither a risk-benefit test nor a consumer-expecta-
tions test-both of which he considers unworkable. 97 He presents
the following justifications for his approach:
Assume that consumers know what safe use entails and that total
accident costs would be optimally reduced if both consumers and
firms exercised care. A consumer who takes care incurs no acci-
dent costs; the proposed legal rule holds firms liable unless con-
sumers are careless. On the other hand, a consumer who fails to
take care bears all accident costs; contributory negligence is a com-
plete defense. Since a consumer's failure to take care will consti-
tute contributory negligence only if the consumer's expected costs
of care are lower than the expected costs of the accidents that care
would avoid, these informed consumers will by and large adopt the
cost-minimizing strategy of taking care. Therefore, firms will incur
all accident costs their designs cause. The cost-minimizing strat-
egy for firms in this circumstance is to make optimal investments
in safety-to invest in safety until the cost of further investments
equals the gain in the reduction of expected accident costs.
Because it induces both consumers and firms to reduce accident
costs optimally, strict liability with contributory negligence is
efficient.' 98
194. See supra note 98.
195. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 392.
196. Id. at 392.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 392-93 (footnote omitted).
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Schwartz rejects comparative negligence and its use of a risk-ben-
efit assessment of the defendant's product. Although he maintains
that comparative negligence induces optimal behavior when both par-
ties are negligent, 99 he asserts that the risk-benefit test is unworkable
for product designs. 2°° In applying the contributory negligence
defense, Schwartz takes account of consumers' imperfect information.
He states that "one should realize that what constitutes due care for a
consumer is often a function of the firm's safety efforts."' He fur-
ther states:
The assumption that consumers have perfect information is illegiti-
mate, however; if consumers know how safe products are, there is
no need for any form of strict liability, yet we suppose that some
form of strict liability is justified because information is imperfect.
An appropriate definition of contributory negligence will cure
this difficulty: Contributory negligence should be defined as a con-
sumer's failure to take due care when using a product that is opti-
mally safe.
20 2
Schwartz's description of his proposed liability standard and
defenses raises three initial questions. First, beyond the affirmative
defenses, what are the limits of liability under his basic standard?
Absent a defense, Schwartz's standard imposes liability on firms
whenever their designs cause injury. When does a design cause
injury, and what causation rules apply? Schwartz does not address
these questions. Second, although Schwartz finds the risk-benefit test
unworkable for product designs, he employs it by defining contribu-
tory negligence as "a consumer's failure to use due care when using a
product that is optimally safe." 203 A factfinder would need to use a
risk-benefit analysis to determine the optimal safety of a product. 204
199. Id. at 394.
200. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
201. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 393.
202. Id.
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. Shavell states:
[T]o ascertain the optimal level of due care for one party, a court must generally
determine (if only implicitly) the optimal level of care for the other, since the
optimal level of care for one party will in principle depend on the other's costs of
and possibilities for reducing risk. This latter point makes the comparison of
liability rules with respect to their ease of application different from what it
might at first seem to be.
Consider, for instance, the rule of strict liability with the defense of
contributory negligence and the negligence rule with the same defense. It may
seem initially that strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence is
the easier to apply, because courts are not directly concerned with injurers'
behavior under the rule. But to apply -the defense of contributory negligence,
courts must determine optimal due care for victims, and, as just remarked, this
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Schwartz does not explain why a risk-benefit test for the optimal
safety of a product is acceptable on the issue of contributory negli-
gence, but is unacceptable as a standard of liability. He rejects com-
parative negligence as unworkable when applied to product design,
yet his use of the risk-benefit test on the issue of contributory negli-
gence contradicts this position.
The third question is why Schwartz allows defenses of both
assumption of risk and contributory negligence. The law and eco-
nomics literature consistently points to the theoretical optimality of
strict liability with a contributory negligence defense20 5 for the same
reasons Schwartz states in justifying his approach.206 Unreasonable
assumption of risk, a form of contributory negligence, logically would
be a defense under this approach. By contrast, reasonable assumption
of risk is, by definition, non-negligent conduct. In this century the
law has not favored the defense of reasonable assumption of risk, and
in recent years many courts have abolished it.2°7 Schwartz, however,
incorporates reasonable assumption of risk as a defense into his liabil-
ity scheme. This defense destroys the theoretical optimality of the
strict liability system. Schwartz's scheme protects firms from liability
even when consumers use reasonable care. Consequently, the level of
care exercised by firms will be less than optimal. In justifying the
efficiency of his system, Schwartz explains his reasons for recognizing
the contributory negligence defense, 20 but he does not explain why he
allows assumption of risk as a bar to recovery. His use of the assump-
tion of risk defense cannot be justified on an efficiency basis.
Schwartz's illustrations of how his proposed liability scheme
would operate raise additional questions. Analysis of these illustra-
ordinarily effectively requires courts to determine the optimal level of care for
injurers. Therefore, the main difference affecting the ease of application of the
two rules is only that under the strict liability rule courts do not need to
determine the actual (as opposed to the optimal) level of care of injurers.
SHAVELL, supra note 84, at 16-17 (footnotes omitted).
205. See, e.g., id. at 5-46.
206. See supra text accompanying note 198.
207. See, e.g., Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So.2d 1123 (La. 1988). In abolishing
assumption of risk as a bar to recovery and holding that comparative fault rules apply when a
plaintiff is aware of a risk, the court noted:
All told, it appears that sixteen states have totally abolished the defense, and
seventeen more have eliminated the use of assumption of risk terminology in all
cases except those involving express or contractual consent by the plaintiff....
After long ago arriving in the torts arena as a refugee from contract law,
assumption of the risk now appears to be passing from the scene in most common
law jurisdictions.
Id. at 1130 (citation omitted).
208. See supra text accompanying note 198.
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tions reveals that his system uses liability standards and defenses quite
different from those he claims to employ. Schwartz's system denies
liability in some situations in which a product's design causes injury
and the manufacturer cannot establish contributory negligence or
assumption of risk. For example, according to Schwartz's illustra-
tions, a consumer could not recover for a product-caused injury if the
consumer should have known of the product's danger, even if the con-
sumer had acted reasonably in purchasing and using the product in
light of its actual risks. 2 9 In addition, under Schwartz's illustrations,
a non-negligent consumer could not recover for a product-caused
injury if a safer design was feasible, and the manufacturer informed
the consumer of the feasible alternative, even though a product with
the alternative design was not on the market. If no manufacturer pro-
duced a product with the safer design, Schwartz's system would con-
clusively presume that the alternative design was less than optimal.2'0
Schwartz's scheme of liability stems from his definition of assumption
of risk-a definition far broader than any employed in tort law.
Unfortunately, Schwartz's description of his system in the illustra-
tions fails to meet his claim that firms would have incentive under his
system to make optimal investments in safety.
2. SCHWARTZ'S ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE APPLICATIONS OF HIS
PROPOSED PRODUCTS LIABILITY SYSTEM
Schwartz presents four illustrations of how his proposed system
would function. 21 1 This Article analyzes only his first three illustra-
tions, which involve the question of a manufacturer's liability to con-
sumers for product-related injuries.2 12
a. Case (a)
Case (a) is Schwartz's first example of the application of his lia-
bility system to specific facts:
In case (a), a consumer purchases a Volkswagen Golf and is
injured when, with no negligence on her part, the Golf crashes into
a tree. She sues, claiming that had the car been composed of much
heavier metal, she would not have been injured. Under the pro-
posed rule-and under current law-the consumer loses; she knew
or should have known that Volkswagens are less crashworthy than
209. See infra text accompanying notes 222-27.
210. See infra text accompanying notes 239-42.
211. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 398-404..
212. The fourth, involving the issue of contribution between joint tortfeasors, is beyond the
concern of this Article and will not be examined.
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1
Rolls Royces, and therefore assumed the risk.
2 13
Prevailing strict products liability rules easily explain the result
on these facts. The consumer loses because she cannot show that the
Golf had an unreasonably dangerous defect under either the con-
sumer-expectations test or the risk-benefit test. Under the consumer-
expectations test, the Golf did not have an unreasonably dangerous
defect because the dangers did not exceed the expectations of the ordi-
nary consumer with the ordinary knowledge common to the commu-
nity.214 The Golf also is not defective under a risk-benefit test because
the utility of light-weight, inexpensive cars outweighs their risk to
occupants in a crash.21 Additionally, the result is consistent with
both the ex ante and ex post strict liability tests of Calabresi, because
the consumer was in a better position than the producer to weigh the
risk of the Golf against its expected benefits to her and to act upon her
analysis.
Schwartz's proposed system, however, cannot explain the result
in case (a) without a significant alteration in the definitions of the tort
concepts employed. The Golf's light-weight body design caused the
consumer's injuries. Consequently, under Schwartz's system, the
Golf's manufacturer should be liable unless the defense of contribu-
213. Idr at 398-99.
214. See Arbet v. Gussarson, 225 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Wis. 1975) ("[S]ince the ordinary
consumer would expect a Volkswagen to be less safe in an accident than, say, a Cadillac, the
smallness of the car with the attendant danger would not per se render it inherently dangerous.
Rather it must contain a dangerous defect whose presence an ordinary consumer would not
reasonably expect.") (dicta); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmts. g, i (1965).
215. Cf Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974)
(manufacturer of a microbus not liable as a matter of law for an occupant's injuries on the
basis of negligent design). The court in Dreisonstok observed that "a Cadillac may be expected
to include more in the way of both conveniences and 'crashworthiness' than the economy
car."). Id. at 1073. In holding that the risk of the microbus design did not outweigh its utility,
the court stated:
This design was uniquely developed in order to provide the owner with the
maximum amount of either cargo or passenger space in a vehicle inexpensively
priced and of such dimensions as to make possible easy maneuverablility. To
achieve this, it advanced the driver's seat forward, bringing such seat in close
proximity to the front of the vehicle, thereby adding to the cargo or passenger
space. This, of course, reduced considerably the space between the exact front of
the vehicle and the driver's compartment. All of this was readily discernible to
any one using the vehicle; in fact, it was, as we have said, the unique feature of
the vehicle. The usefulness of the design is vouchsafed by the popularity of the
type. It was of special utility as a van for the transportation of light cargo, as a
family camper, as a station wagon and for use by passenger groups too large for
the average passenger car.... There was no evidence in the record that there
was any practical way of improving the "crashability" of the vehicle that would
have been consistent with the peculiar purposes of its design.
Id. at 1073-74 (footnotes omitted).
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tory negligence or assumption of risk applies. But on the facts of case
(a), neither defense applies. A consumer is not contributorily negli-
gent under Schwartz's definition unless she fails to act with due care
while using an optimally safe product. Schwartz specifies that the
consumer in case (a) was not negligent in causing the crash. Further,
the consumer was not negligent in purchasing the car, because its util-
ity to her outweighed its risks. Schwartz explains, however, that the
consumer loses in case (a) because "she knew or should have known
that Volkswagens are less crashworthy than Rolls Royces, and there-
fore assumed the risk."216 Yet, if she knew the car would not with-
stand the crash, she reasonably assumed the risk. As explained
above, strict liability with a defense of reasonable assumption of risk
would not be optimal under Schwartz's own justifications, for his sys-
tem's efficiency.217 Moreover, if the consumer did not know, but
should have known that the Golf would not withstand the crash, she
did not assume the risk. She would not assume the risk unless she
actually knew that the Golf would not withstand the crash.218
Schwartz's proposed system thus is at odds with his result in case (a).
The shortcoming in Schwartz's explanation of case (a) is his fail-
ure to distinguish properly between the consumer-expectations test
and the assumption of risk defense. In stating that the consumer loses
in case (a) because she knew or should have known of the risk,
Schwartz is applying the consumer-expectations test-a test he pur-
ports to reject-not the assumption of risk defense. Schwartz might
216. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 398-99 (emphasis added).
217. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
218. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 496C, 496D (1965). The commentary to
section 496D explains assumption of risk:
b. The basis of assumption of risk is the plaintiff's consent to accept the
risk and look out for himself. Therefore he will not be found, in the absence of
an express agreement which is clearly so to be construed, to assume any risk
unless he has knowledge of its existence. This means that he must not only be
aware of the facts which create the danger, but must also appreciate the danger
itself and the nature, character, and extent which make it unreasonable. ... His
failure to exercise due care either to discover or to understand the danger is not
properly a matter of assumption of risk, but of the defense of contributory
negligence.
a The standard to be applied is a subjective one, of what the particular
plaintiff in facts sees, knows, understands and appreciates. In this it differs from
the objective standard which is applied to contributory negligence. If by reason
of age, or lack of information, experience, intelligence, or judgment, the plaintiff
does not understand the risk involved in a known situation, he will not be taken
to assume the risk, although itmay still be found that his conduct is contributory
negligence because it does not conform to the community standard of the
reasonable man.
Id. § 496D cmts. b, c (citation omitted).
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respond by stating that he does not use assumption of risk as an
affirmative defense, but rather in its "primary" sense as a "no duty"
rule.219 This position, however, still rests on the consumer-expecta-
tions test. The only basis to support a no-duty rule is that the ordi-
nary consumer, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community, knew that the Golf would not provide protection.
Aside from the problem of terminology, the significance of case
(a) is that Schwartz denies liability because the consumer should have
known of the product's danger, even if she was not contributorily neg-
ligent and had not assumed the risk. Consequently, a firm is not liable
if its product meets the consumer-expectations test. The plaintiff
cannot recover alternatively under the risk-benefit test. Thus, when-
ever consumers should be aware of a design's risks, Schwartz's rule
provides firms with no incentive to reduce accident costs.
Dissatisfaction with the consumer-expectations test has led many
courts to adopt the risk-benefit test as an alternative strict liability
standard in design defect cases.220 Even if a jurisdiction does not rec-
ognize this alternative, a plaintiff can still use the risk-benefit test by
proceeding under a negligence theory.22' Access to the risk-benefit
test is significant for plaintiffs because in some situations a product
meets consumer expectations but nevertheless poses unreasonable
219. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 290-91 (Fla. 1977), discusses "primary"
assumption of risk. Blackburn abolished the defense of implied, reasonable assumption of risk,
and merged the defense of implied, unreasonable assumption of risk into the defense of
contributory negligence and the principles of comparative negligence. Id. at 293. The decision
presents an exhaustive review of the various forms of assumption of risk, which encompass
distinctions between express and implied, primary and secondary, and reasonable and
unreasonable. Id. at 290-93.
220. See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 879 (Ariz. 1985); Ontai v. Straub
Clinic and Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 740 (Haw. 1983); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 466, 432
N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982). Courts do not follow uniform
rules in applying the strict liability risk-benefit test. Most jurisdictions place the burden on the
plaintiff to establish that the product created an unreasonable risk of harm, but a few place the
burden on the defendant to show that it did not. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d
443, 455 (Cal. 1978); Ontai, 659 P.2d at 740.
221. See, e.g., Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469, 474 (7th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff
in Delvaux argued a risk-benefit theory in her negligence case, even though the consumer
expectations test was the only available strict liability test under Wisconsin law for design
defect.
Dart, 709 P.2d at 880-82, explains the difference between the negligence and strict liability
tests. Although both tests use the concept of unreasonable risk, requiring the weighing of the
risk-benefit factors, the negligence test asks whether a reasonable manufacturer, under the
circumstances, would have produced the product as designed, while the strict liability test asks
whether a reasonable manufacturer with knowledge of the product's danger would have
produced the product as designed. Id. at 881. Thus, negligence requires a foreseeable risk, but
the strict liability test does not. In the terminology of Calabresi and Klevorick, the negligence
test is an ex ante Learned Hand test and the strict liability test is an ex post Learned Hand test.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
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risks.22 2 In recent years, most courts that have considered the "patent
danger rule"-a rule precluding recovery for injuries caused by obvi-
ously dangerous products-have rejected it.223 Schwartz's proposal
would revitalize the patent danger rule. Except for Schwartz's novel
"failure to warn" test explained in case (b), the consumer-expecta-
tions test would be the only basis for a firm's liability for injuries
caused by product design. A Washington court observed, "The man-
ufacturer of the obviously defective product ought not to escape
because the product was obviously a bad one. The law, we think,
ought to discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its obvi-
ous form.
224
Confining a plaintiff to the consumer-expectations test derives
from the assumption that "the ordinary consumer [or user] is the best
222. See, e.g., Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987) (finding defendant
negligent in failing to develop a safer vaccine where three-month old infant became
permanently paralyzed from innoculation, even though the vaccine was not defective under the
consumer-expectations test); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 828 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1987) (determining
that the jury's findings on defect and negligence were reconcilable).
223. The "open and obvious [or patent] danger rule" is a product of the consumer-
expectations test. Koske v. Townsend Eng'g Co., 526 N.E.2d 985, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
Some jurisdictions, however, also have applied the rule in negligence actions as a restriction
upon the duty of a product seller. See, e.g., id. at 991. The leading case of Campo v. Scofield
defined and applied the patent danger rule:
[Tihe manufacturer of a machine or any other article, dangerous because of the
way in which it functions, and patently so, owes to those who use it a duty
merely to make it free from latent defects and concealed dangers....
If a manufacturer does everything necessary to make the machine function
properly for the purpose for which it is designed, if the machine is without any
latent defect, and if its functioning creates no danger or peril that is not known to
the user, then the manufacturer has satisfied the law's demands.
95 N.E.2d 802, 803-04 (N.Y. 1950). Campo was overruled in Micallef v. Miehle Co.,348
N.E.2d 571, 573 (N.Y. 1976). The Florida Supreme Court rejected the patent danger doctrine
in Auburn Mach. Works Co., Inc. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 1979), stating that
"(t]he patent danger doctrine encourages manufacturers to be outrageous in their design, to
eliminate safety devices, and to make hazards obvious." It further stated:
The modern trend in the nation is to abandon the strict patent danger doc-
trine as an exception to liability and to find that the obviousness of the defect is
only a factor to be considered as a mitigating defense in determining whether a
defect is unreasonably dangerous and whether plaintiff used that degree of rea-
sonable care required by the circumstances.
Id at 1169. For documentation of the trend away from the patent danger rule, see Theresa L.
Kruk, Annotation, Products Liability: Modern Status of Rule That There Is No Liability for
Patent or Obvious Dangers, 35 A.L.R. 4th 861 (1985).
Indiana adheres to the patent danger rule, although it recently held that the rule would
not bar a claim for willful or wanton misconduct. See Koske v. Townsend Eng'g Co., 526
N.E.2d 985, 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). For other decisions adhering to the patent danger rule,
see Hedgepeth v. Fruehauf Corp., 634 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Miss. 1986); McCollum v. Grove Mfg.
Co., 293 S.E.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 300 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1983); Orkin Exterminating
Co. v. Dawn Food Prods., 366 S.E.2d 792 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
224. Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 476 P.2d 713, 719 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
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judge of whether the dangers he perceives are outweighed by the bene-
fits of the product. ' 225 However, allowing producers to escape liabil-
ity unless their products fail the consumer-expectations test does not
result in an optimal level of product-related accident costs. The rea-
son for this is threefold. First, the product may present a demonstra-
bly unreasonable risk.226 Second, the consumer who knows or should
know of a product's danger is not necessarily in the best position to
make a risk-benefit decision and to act upon it.227 Third, consumers
may underestimate risks.228
To illustrate, assume that Farmer Brown bought his tractor
225. Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469, 474 (7th Cir. 1985).
226. In reversing a trial court's grant of a directed verdict to the manufacturer of an ice
machine, an Arizona court stated:
Even when a danger is appreciated, circumstances may cause it to be
momentarily forgotten. When a person must work in a place of possible danger,
the care which he is bound to exercise for his own safety may well be less, due to
the necessity of giving attention to his work, than is normally the situation. In
this case, in order to operate the ice machine in an efficient and economical
manner, Turner had to stand in the vicinity of a closing gate capable of
amputating human limbs and, on occasion, he had to reach within a few inches
of the compression chamber gate to remove from the machine's exit ramp any ice
residue or small unsalable ice blocks which did not have enough weight to travel
down the ramp. Considering the nature of human inattentiveness and
momentary forgetfulness, the risk associated with the unguarded gate was great
despite the fact that the danger was obvious.
Turner v. Machine Ice Co., 674 P.2d 883, 888-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
The court further stated:
The evidence clearly shows that Turner knew of the danger presented by the
unguarded compression chamber gate. On the other hand, a guard would not
have eliminated the machine's usefulness nor would it in any way interfere with
the functional operation of the machine. Moreover, the likelihood of injury was
"only a matter of time" and its probable seriousness was great. Although no
evidence was presented as to the cost of placing a guard on the machine, it is
apparent from the exhibits introduced at trial, showing the cage-like guard which
was installed on the ice machine following Turner's accident, that the cost of the
guard was small by any standard. Ultimately, all of these factors were to be
weighed by the jury in making their determination as to whether the ice machine
was unreasonably dangerous as designed.
Id.
227. In rejecting the patent danger rule, the New York Court of Appeals stated:
What constitutes "reasonable care" will, of course, vary with the
surrounding circumstances and will involve "a balancing of the likelihood of
harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden of the precaution
which would be effective to avoid the harm."
... This does not compel a manufacturer to clothe himself in the garb of an
insurer in his dealings.., nor to supply merchandise which is accident proof. It
does require, however, that legal responsibility, if any, for injury caused by
machinery which has possible dangers incident to its use should be shouldered by
the one in the best position to have eliminated those dangers.
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78 (N.Y. 1976) (citations omitted).
228. See infra note 236.
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before any tractor came with rollover bars. Also assume that a manu-
facturer feasibly could have attached rollover bars at a cost substan-
tially less than the accident costs expected without rollover bars.
While Brown carefully drove the tractor through a field, the tractor's
right wheels fell into a hidden crevice, and the tractor rolled over and
injured Brown. Under prevailing liability standards, Brown could
recover damages for his injuries from the tractor manufacturer.229
Under Schwartz's approach, however, Brown could not recover
because the risk was obvious. This result is not optimal because the
risks of a tractor without rollover bars exceed its utility. Moreover,
because tractors with rollover bars were unavailable, the tractor man-
ufacturer, rather than Brown, was in the best position to make and act
upon a risk-benefit analysis. Under Schwartz's approach, tractor
manufacturers would produce an optimal amount of safety by attach-
ing rollover bars only in response to market forces. Schwartz suggests
that market forces will produce this result.230
b. Case (b)
Schwartz's second example of his liability system, case (b),
introduces a "failure to warn" basis of liability. Like case (a), case (b)
improperly relies upon the assumption of risk defense and produces a
result that is far less than optimal.
In case (b), a magic metal which existed when the Volkswagen
was sold would have made the Volkswagen as safe in crashes as
today's Rolls Royce, though the Volkswagen would have weighed
no more than normal Volkswagens. The manufacturer did not use
the magic metal because it would have added $500 to the car's
costs and cars made of magic metal are much more expensive to
repaint and hammer out in the event of scrapes and dents. Under
current law, the manufacturer would be liable only if Golfs with
magic metal did better on the risk/benefit test than Golfs without
it. Under the proposed test, the manufacturer would be liable
unless it gave an adequate warning that informed consumers of the
additional risk of not using the magic metal. The consumer did
not assume the risk in this second case because, without such a
warning, she was unaware of the full set of options provided by the
229. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1983). In
Donahue, the court upheld the plaintiff's $1,500,000 jury award for the wrongful death of her
husband, killed while operating a front-end loader that rolled over and crushed him inside the
fiberglass cab of the loader. The court affirmed the jury's finding that the loader manufacturer
was negligent for failing to install a rollover protection structure on the vehicle in 1966,
although at that time, no front-end loaders were manufactured with such structures. Id.
230. See infra text accompanying note 242.
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market.23'
If the manufacturer did provide an adequate warning of the risk of
not using magic metal, it follows from Schwartz's explanation of case
(b) that the manufacturer would not be subject to liability for a design
defect. A warning would protect the manufacturer from liability even
if cars with magic metal were not available on the market.232
Current liability standards would allow the consumer to recover,
absent a warning, if she could prove that a Golf made without magic
metal was unreasonably dangerous-that is, that its risks outweighed
its benefits. Alternatively, she could recover if an ordinary consumer
would have expected the car to be made with magic metal.2 33 She
could not recover under current standards, however, if the Golf was
no more dangerous than the ordinary consumer would expect and if
its utility outweighed its risks. If she voluntarily and unreasonably
encountered a known risk, some jurisdictions would bar her from
recovery, while other jurisdictions would allow her to recover only
under comparative negligence rules. Also, ordinary contributory neg-
ligence rules in some states would bar or reduce damages.
Under current law, a manufacturer's "warning" that the Golf
failed to incorporate technology unavailable in any car would not
affect the manufacturer's liability. Such a warning would not alter the
risk-benefit equation. Nor would it affect either the consumer-expec-
tations test or the assumption of risk defense unless, without the
231. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 399.
232. Schwartz does not state so explicitly, but his explanation of case (b) indicates that a
warning would absolve the manufacturer of liability. He states:
True strict liability is justified in case (b) for three reasons: (i) If use of the
magic metal is optimal, given that the consumers behave nonnegligently, the firm
will be induced to use it; (ii) If use of the metal is not cost justified, the price of
Golfs nevertheless will more accurately reflect their accident costs, thereby better
informing consumers of the risk of driving (just as a warning would); (iii) The
administrative costs of trials would be reduced and their results made more
predictable because the only issue would be the adequacy of the warning (if one
were given). The law would not demand a complex risk/benefit test.
Id. Schwartz's discussion of airbags also indicates that a warning would protect the manufac-
turer from liability, even if cars with magic metal were not on the market. Id. at 399 n.92; see
also supra text accompanying note 242.
233. In design defect cases, courts generally allow the plaintiff to use either the risk-utility
or the consumer-expectations test, or both. See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876,
879 (Ariz. 1985); In re Standard Jury Instructions (Civil Cases), 435 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1983);
Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857
(1982). Some courts, however, restrict the plaintiff to the use of the risk-utility test. See, e.g.,
Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979). Other courts restrict the
plaintiff to the use of the consumer-expectations test. See, e.g., Betts v. General Motors Corp.,
689 P.2d 795, 801 (Kan. 1984).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
warning, the consumer would expect the Golf to incorporate magic
metal.
The Calabresi strict liability tests would allow the manufacturer
in case (b) to prevail only if other cars made with magic metal were
available on the market. If the consumer knew that the Golf was not
made with magic metal and if she knew or should have known
(through the advertising claims of automobile manufacturers) that
other cars were available with magic metal, then she would be in the
best position to make and act upon a risk-benefit analysis of the Golf.
If cars with magic metal were unavailable, however, the manufacturer
would be in the best position to make and act upon a risk-benefit anal-
ysis, and the consumer would prevail. The consumer might be better
positioned to make a risk-benefit analysis of her own needs in a car,
but she could not act upon her analysis if she preferred a car with
magic metal. Thus, the consumer should prevail whether or not the
manufacturer informed her of the Golf's risks without the magic
metal.
Schwartz reaches a different result. He concludes that, without a
warning, the consumer did not assume the risk, but with a warning,
she did. This result expands assumption of risk beyond even
Schwartz's use of the doctrine in case (a) to denote a situation in
which a consumer should know of a product's hazards. Schwartz's
application of the assumption of risk doctrine in case (b) does not
consider whether the consumer had knowledge of the product's risks,
but whether she had knowledge of a technologically feasible, safer
alternative design. Under Schwartz's approach, the consumer with
such knowledge assumes the risk, whether or not the safer design is
available.
Schwartz justifies his result in case (b) by assuming that inform-
ing consumers about technological developments will generate market
forces that produce optimally safe products. In explaining case (b), he
states:
[T]he question whether cars are defectively designed when they
lack airbags falls within case (a) rather than case (b). Consumers
know that airbags exist, are safer than not using seat belts, and
would increase the price of cars by a nontrivial amount. The fail-
ure of firms to use them thus seems a response to consumer
preference.234
The airbag analogy implies that if consumers know about magic
metal, but market forces do not cause manufacturers to produce cars
with magic metal, then a car without magic metal is optimal.
234. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 399 n.92.
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The first problem with this view is that a car without magic
metal may not be optimal, even if consumers know of the metal's
existence. Competitive markets will not necessarily produce optimal
safety just because consumers are aware of existing technology. Cor-
porate managers, often more concerned with short-range profits than
with long-range effects, may forego a plant retooling to maximize
short-range profits, rather than produce a safer car with long-range
optimal accident costs. 235 Moreover, if consumers underestimate dan-
gers, they will not demand the production of optimally safe prod-
235. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Products liability and the Passage of Time: The
Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1983). In this article,
Professor Henderson notes "the existence of a rich and growing literature dealing with the
behavioral and legal implications of corporate structures and governance," observing that "the
implications of this literature for the area of products liability have yet to be developed." Id. at
781. He adds:
The place to begin in looking [for these implications] is with empirical
studies of the attitudes and behavior patterns of corporate managers. These
studies reveal that those whose responsibilities include risk management tend to
be significantly more risk averse than their counterparts who do not deal on a
regular basis with the possibility of sustaining substantial losses. At first blush,
these studies might suggest that managers would avoid engaging in behavior that
would increase their firms' long-term exposure to risk of loss or raise the long-
term stakes of the games in which their firms are engaged, but several factors
appear to counterbalance such a tendency. For example, in recent years the
performance of managers has been increasingly judged on the basis of short-run
results. This phenomenon suggests that managers who defer taking necessary
action may reasonably assume that they will be rewarded for the short-run
benefits derived from their deferral tactics and that they will have been promoted
to another position, possibly with another corporation, by the time the negative,
long-run implications of their tactics have fully materialized. Thus, they may
reasonably expect to escape most, if not all, of the blame for the losses eventually
incurred by their deferral tactics. Their escape will depend, of course, on the
extent to which the managers' selfish behavior can be monitored from either
within or without the firm. But there are reasons to believe that substantial
limits inhere in efforts to monitor manager's behavior.
It follows, then, that even for the risk-averse manager, the safer course may
be to avoid incurring losses in the short run. Thus, to the extent that the
individual interests of corporate managers conflict with those of their firms, they
appear to do so in ways that exacerbate the tendency to maintain the status quo.
The decision that is best for the manager may not be best for the firm, but to the
extent that managers can advance their own interests and avoid scrutiny, that
circumstance will not affect their decisions.
Id. at 781-82 (footnotes omitted); see also JOEL KOTKIN & YORIKO KISHIMOTO, THE THIRD
CENTURY: AMERICA'S RESURGENCE IN THE ASIAN ERA 143-45 (1988); Joel Kotkin, Wall
Street's Primacy May Be Ending, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 16, 1988, § C, at 1. Kotkin states in
his article:
[There] is a growing realization among businessmen that following Wall Street's
direction can be harmful to the most fundamental goals of business activity, the
growth and long-term prosperity of the enterprise itself.




2 36 Thus, a Golf without magic metal (or without an airbag) may
the nation's fast-growing, small, private firms found that over half had little or no
interest in taking their companies public.
"The problem is that people mistake Wall Street for business. You end up
putting all the focus on impressing the folks in New York with short-term earn-
ings. A private firm can focus on the more crucial things, like maximizing long-
term growth and profits," says Warren E. Braun, president of Comsonics, a fast-
growing Virginia cable-television equipment and service firm with 1986 sales of
nearly $7 million.
Id. Kotkin and Kishimoto state:
As founders died or deteriorated with age, most of the great organizations
formed by them--such as Ford Motor Company and U.S. Steel-lost their sense
of mission. Rising in their place was, in Pitirim Sorokin's phrase, a "managerial
aristocracy" who has replaced the sense of mission with a bureaucratic mentality
fundamentally opposed to the company-building ethos of a Thomas Watson,
Henry Ford or Andrew Carnegie. By stripping away the "transcendental" ele-
ment in business and replacing it with a blind adherence to the "cash nexus," the
builders of the modem bureaucratic corporation, as Sorokin noted in 1941, unin-
tentionally dealt "the first mortal blow" against the spirit of capitalism.
The deadening effects of this bureaucratization-the world in which the
lawyer, accountant and stock analyst replaced the entrepreneur in the corporate
driver's seat-were at first disguised by the predominant position of the United
States after World War II. Only later, when integrated industrial challengers
emerged first in Europe and then Asia, did the weaknesses of the "managerial
aristocracy" become clear.
By the mid-1970's, financialism had established a firm grip even on the larg-
est of the classic industrial corporations, General Motors. Epitomized by the rise
of chairman Frederick G. Donner, a former accountant, and his eventual succes-
sor, Roger Smith, GM became a pure expression of the "cash nexus." To Smith,
Donner-who served as GM's chairman from 1958 to 1967- represented "a
true financial genius... with a well-ordered, analytical mind" under whom "the
corporation flourished.., establishing new records in dollar sales, earnings, divi-
dend payments and world-wide sales." Yet at the same time, for the corporation
and its long-term mission (to be the dominant automobile manufacturer in the
world), Donner proved to be a disaster. In his Decline and Fall of the American
Automobile Industry, veteran auto journalist Brock Yates notes that it was under
Donner that an increasingly finance-driven GM management began ignoring its
engineers and production staff, cutting costs at the expense of quality, ignoring
the emerging small-car market and, for the saving of $100 worth of parts, made
the Corvair the menace described in Ralph Nader's Unsafe at Any Speed.
By the time Donner had retired, the legacy of Smith's hero was firmly
embedded in the corporation. Once renowned for quality, GM now became
synonymous with shoddy workmanship. In 1971, it was found that a fault with
engine mounts forced GM cars to spin out of control; that year an astounding 6.7
million Chevrolets had to be recalled. Yet years afterward, the iron grip of
financialism remained so strong that the manager of the company's Tarrytown,
New York, plant-recognized for producing "the poorest quality cars" among
all of GM's twenty-two U.S. assembly plants-received one of the highest
bonuses in the company simply because his plant also had among the lowest
production costs.
KoTKIN & KIsHIMoTo, supra, at 143-45.
236. Schwartz maintains that "[t]he essence of the risk underestimation claim is that
because consumers are optimistic, they either misprocess information about risk or will not
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not be more dangerous in a crash than the ordinary consumer would
expect, but consumers may underestimate the chance that they will be
involved in a crash. In these situations, insulating the producer from
liability on the ground that the consumer was informed about
unavailable technology would not reduce the total cost of accidents to
invest time in learning about it." Schwartz, supra note 6, at 379 n.48. Based on an analysis of
evidence on consumer optimism, he concludes that "evidence drawn from surveys and actual
market behavior more strongly supports the view that consumers are informed [about risk
levels] than the view that they are ignorant." Id. at 380. Schwartz further finds "considerable
evidence that people respond rationally to the provision of information about risk." Id. at 382.
The factual data cited, however, are both minimal and conflicting.
Whether or not people generally misperceive information about risk, their level of
information is frequently inadequate. Marketing techniques often build consumer confidence
in a product's quality and safety beyond its actual levels of quality and safety. These
marketing techniques have been a key factor in courts' adoption of strict liability. An oft-
quoted statement by Justice Traynor expounds this point:
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great
markets and transportation facilities, the close relationship between the producer
and consumer of a product has been altered. Manufacturing processes,
frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken
of the general public. The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to
investigate for himself the soundness of a product, even when it is not contained
in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady
efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and marketing
devices such as trade-marks. Consumers no longer approach products warily but
accept them on faith, relying on the reputation of the manufacturer or the trade
mark.
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
Most people will acknowledge that manufacturers devote greater resources to promoting
product quality and attaching positive images to products than they do to warning the public
about risks. As a result, consumers cannot acquire much information about product risks
without cost. Schwartz cites studies indicating that housing prices reflect earthquake risks and
the probability of defects, and that workers exact substantial wages in risky jobs. Schwartz,
supra note 6, at 379. However, people are likely to invest time and resources in acquiring
information about risks in these situations. Moreover, the cost of earthquake insurance and
the efforts of unions alert people to the hazards of natural disasters and jobs. In contrast,
people are less likely to invest time and resources discovering in advance the hazards of tile
adhesives and carpet cleaning products because they do not suspect danger from these sources.
See Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. 1976), in which the plaintiff sustained
severe burns when the vapors created by a tile adhesive he was applying to his kitchen floor
exploded; see also Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 41 A.2d 850 (Pa. 1945). Mrs. Maize died after
cleaning her carpets with "Safety-Kleen."
In Schwartz's "magic metal" hypothetical, he would not label the car without the magic
metal defective if the producer informed consumers that magic metal existed. Schwartz
assumes that the existing car was optimal provided that consumers knew of the alternatives,
even if cars with magic metal were unavailable. Yet consumers who underestimate the risk of
automobile accidents are unlikely to organize and urge car manufacturers to use safer materi-
als. Schwartz himself cites one study indicating that consumers underestimate their chances of
being injured in automobile accidents. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 379-80 n.51 (citing Warner,
Public Policy and Automobile Occupant Restraint: An Economist's Perspective, 19 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 39, 48 (1987). Even if consumers knew of the danger, however,
transaction costs would handicap their efforts to promote production of the magic metal car.
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an optimal degree. Airbags illustrate these points: the slow appear-
ance of air bags and other passive restraints in the automotive market
may be more attributable to short-range managerial policy23 and con-
sumer underestimation of risks238 than to informed consumer
preference.
A second problem with Schwartz's warning requirement is that if
a Golf without magic metal is optimal, then producers should not be
burdened with a duty to warn consumers of technology that the pro-
ducers have rejected. Schwartz's case (b) analysis holds the manufac-
turer liable for injuries that magic metal could have prevented if the
manufacturer.failed to warn the consumer that a car without magic
metal created more risks than a car made with it. Accordingly,
Schwartz's system would hold a manufacturer liable if it did not prop-
erly warn consumers, even if the Golf without magic metal satisfied
both the consumer-expectation and risk-benefit tests. As a result, the
proposed duty to warn requires producers to warn consumers of an
infinite array of technologically feasible safety devices that no pro-
ducer would find practicable. For example, a producer presumably
would be liable to a non-negligent consumer for injuries she sustained
in a crash, if the producer failed to inform her of a feasible and sophis-
ticated detection system that warns the driver of environmental
hazards and that would have prevented the crash. Liability would
attach to the producer even though the detection system would add
237. In response to industry opposition to air bags, Rep. Timothy Wirth (D. Colo.),
Chairman of the House Consumer Protection Committee, said, "I am concerned that a delay
[in implementing the Department of Transportation's passive restraint order] will only
exacerbate the economic troubles of the American auto industry by encouraging them to defer
safety improvements while their foreign competitors gain the edge once again by offering
increased safety features." CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., supra note 149, at 132.
238. For a discussion of the underutilization of seat belts, see Schwartz, supra note 6, at
379-80 n.51; see also American Motorists Applaud Airbags but Question Reliability, ACTS
Survey Says, 17 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) No. 15, at 351 (Apr. 14, 1989). The
article reports:
The majority of motorists think airbags are a good idea, but they also
question their reliability, according to a survey released April 6 by the American
Coalition for Traffic Safety Inc.
Phil Haseltine, ACTS executive director, announced the results at a news
conference where he said the survey revealed widespread myths and
misconceptions consumers harbor about airbag effectiveness. The most prevalent
public misconceptions, Haseltine said, are that airbags "might not inflate when
they should, inflate when they should not, block the driver's vision, and pin the
driver in the car."
Haseltine said the entire traffic safety community must accept the challenge
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$25,000 to the price of the car. If Schwartz did not impose liability on
the producer in this circumstance, he would have to deny liability in
case (b) on the ground that the Golf's utility outweighed its risks.
Technology experts predict that many electronic safety systems
that are technologically feasible today will be in widespread use by the
year 2000. These advances include anti-lock brakes, electronically
controlled automatic transmissions and suspensions, electronic keys,
and voice-activated control devices. Today, however, they are not
developed to the point of being cost effective for widespread use.
Other safety systems, such as a head-up display, which projects
instrument panel information onto the windshield in front of the
driver, are not expected to gain widespread acceptance because of
their high cost and low perceived consumer benefit.239 Under
Schwartz's warning requirement, car sellers would have to inform
consumers of all these technologically feasible devices.
The warnings required by Schwartz's approach are burdensome
and do little to reduce accident costs. Manufacturers would invest
considerable time and money in useless warnings, and courts would
spend needless time determining whether alternative designs not
warned about would have prevented accidents.
c. Case (c)
Schwartz's third example, case (c), illustrates his treatment of
research incentives:
In case (c), magic metal is invented after the Golf is sold. A
majority of jurisdictions today, applying the state-of-the-art
defense, would exculpate the manufacturer on the ground that con-
sumers could not expect products to contain features whose use
was infeasible when the products were made. Scholars criticize
this rule as creating insufficient incentives for firms to develop
safety improvements. Two alternative rules may be considered.
One rule would hold that liability depends on the effectiveness of a
firm's research program. If a firm had an optimal safety research
program and did not discover a safety improvement, then it would
not be held liable. Such a program would require a firm to equate
the marginal costs of safety research with its marginal gains.
These gains would be the increased profits resulting from lowering
expected accident costs through improved safety information. The
other alternative would be to hold the firm liable absolutely, that is,
liable regardless of when knowledge of the safety improvement
239. Electronic Innovations Will Improve Safety, Comfort of Auto's in Most Us Cars by
2000, 17 PRODUCT SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) No. 39, at 961 (Sept. 29, 1989).
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could have been learned.2' °
Schwartz concludes:
[T]he manufacturer should be strictly liable for failing to
make cars with magic metal only if the existence of the metal
would have been revealed by an optimal safety research program.
Such a result will create either correct or excessive incentives for
firms to do research; either outcome is acceptable. It also has rela-
tively low uncertainty costs. The current state-of-the-art rule prob-
ably produces insufficient safety incentives, while an absolute
liability rule generates excessive uncertain costs.24'
Schwartz's analysis in case (c) underrates current incentives for
research. His purported optimal safety research program requirement
is not a marked departure from current rules, which provide signifi-
cant incentives for safety research. Under the consumer-expectations
test, "[s]tate-of-art evidence helps to determine the expectation of the
ordinary consumer." '242 Consequently, if consumers understand a
product's dangers, the consumer-expectations test does not encourage
investment in new knowledge. However, the consumer-expectations
test provides incentive for firms to engage in optimal safety research
programs when courts use it to establish liability for injuries resulting
from risks not understood by the ordinary consumer. For example, as
a strict liability test for a design defect in asbestos,243 the consumer-
expectations test places liability on the party in the best position to
determine and act on the costs and benefits of a safety research pro-
gram. Additionally, the risk-benefit test subjects a manufacturer to
liability if another safer and practicable product design was feasible at
the time of manufacture. 2 Feasibility depends upon the reasonable-
240. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 400 (footnotes omitted).
241. Id. at 403.
242. Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976). The court
commented:
A consumer would not expect a Model T to have the safety features which are
incorporated in automobiles made today. The same expectation applies to
airplanes. Plaintiffs have not shown that the ordinary consumer would expect a
plane made in 1952 to have the safety features of one made in 1970. State-of-art
evidence was properly received and considered by the trial court.
Id. at 447.
243. See Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo. 1984) (state-of-the-art
evidence has no relevance to strict liability based upon the consumer expectations test). The
plaintiff in Elmore was entitled to recover damages for asbestosis based upon a design defect
theory.
244. See, e.g., Singleton v. Int'l Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying
Md. law) (plaintiffs did not produce evidence upon which a jury could find that it was feasible
and practicable in 1948 for a manufacturer to produce a tractor with a roll-over protective
structure); Lease v. International Harvester Co., 529 N.E.2d 57, 60-61 (IIl. App. Ct. 1988);
Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 94-97 (Minn. 1987); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg.
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ness of the manufacturer's efforts to develop a safer design.2 4 Thus, if
the producer of the Golf should have discovered magic metal, and a
Golf with magic metal would have prevented the plaintiff's injuries,
the producer would be subject to liability if the utility of a Golf with
magic metal outweighed its risks. Thus, current authority provides
incentives for firms to engage in optimal safety research programs.
Schwartz's proposal, however, would reduce those incentives.
In case (c), Schwartz requires an optimal research safety pro-
gram and provides a sanction of strict liability for firms failing to con-
duct such a program. In case (c), however, Schwartz fails to discuss
the effect of case (b) upon the strict liability sanction. The apparent
incentives for an optimal safety research program that case (c)
describes become illusory in light of the assumption of risk defense
illustrated in case (b).
The assumption of risk defense recognized by Schwartz in case
(b) allows a producer to protect itself from liability by advising con-
sumers of the existence of a safer and feasible product design. As
explained in the discussion of case (b), the advised consumer
"assumes the risk" of the more dangerous product, even if a product
employing the safer design is not on the market. This assumption of
risk defense dramatically reduces firms' incentive to invest in safety
research. Such a defense would allow "strictly liability" for injuries
that a Golf with magic metal would have prevented only if the pro-
Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983). Some jurisdictions place the burden of persuasion on
the defendant. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979).
245. See supra note 229; see also James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension
in Products Liability, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 926 (1981); cf Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod.
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1973) (discussing the standard of reasonableness of a
manufacturer's efforts), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). In Borel, the court noted:
[I]n cases such as the instant case, the manufacturer is held to the knowledge and
skill of an expert. This is relevant in determining (1) whether the manufacturer
knew or should have known the danger, and (2) whether the manufacturer was
negligent in failing to communicate this superior knowledge to the user or
consumer of its product. The manufacturer's status as expert means that at a
minimum he must keep abreast of scientific knowledge, discoveries, and advances
and is presumed to know what is imparted thereby. But even more importantly,
a manufacturer has a duty to test and inspect his product. The extent of research
and experiment must be commensurate with the dangers involved. A product
must not be made available to the public without disclosure of those dangers that
the application of reasonable foresight would reveal. Nor may a manufacturer
rely unquestioningly on others to sound the hue and cry concerning a danger in
its product. Rather, each manufacturer must bear the burden of showing that its
own conduct was proportionate to the scope of its duty.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). An exception to the requirement that the plaintiff
establish a feasible, safer, practicable alternative is the rare case in which it is unreasonable for
the manufacturer to market the product at all. See Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92,
97 n.8 (Minn. 1987).
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ducer sold the Golf causing the injuries between the time the producer
should have discovered magic metal and the time it learned of the
discovery of magic metal by someone else. As soon as the producer
learns of magic metal, it can protect itself from liability by advising
consumers of the existence of the safer alternative. Consequently, the
producer would not invest in research on safer designs if the expected
cost of research exceeded the expected cost of the accidents preventa-
ble by safer designs for the time between when an optimal research
program would have revealed the safer alternative and when someone
else discovered and announced it. The result would be to discourage
substantial research by any producer.
If Schwartz omitted his so-called assumption of risk defense,
however, his system would provide incentives for firms to develop
optimal safety research programs. Schwartz's system, so modified,
would employ an interesting combination of tests: the ex ante strict
liability test, conditioned on a firm's failure to satisfy the ex ante
Learned Hand test applied to research. Thus, the producer would be
liable in case (c) if, when it sold the Golf, it was in a better position
than the consumer to decide whether expected accident avoidance
costs would be cheaper than expected accident costs. The producer
would be in the better position to make this decision if an optimal
safety research program would have revealed the feasibility of produc-
ing Golfs with magic metal.
If determining whether a firm has conducted an optimal safety
program is feasible, then Schwartz's strict liability rule, without his
assumption of risk defense, seems to encourage an optimal level of
accident costs.246 Imposing strict liability for failing to conduct such
a program avoids the necessity of a trial on the issue whether the
utility of a Golf with magic metal exceeds its risks-a difficult issue
for a court and jury to resolve.247 The producer has an incentive to
make a cost-justified decision on this issue because the producer bears
either the cost of accidents preventable by the use of magic metal, or
the cost of producing the Golf with magic metal. The availability of
Schwartz's assumption of risk defense, however, destroys this
incentive.
Schwartz's proposal is farther from achieving an optimal safety
system than either his proposed system without an assumption of risk
246. For Schwartz's argument that an ex ante Learned Hand test is feasible when
considering whether a firm has an optimal safety research program, see Alan Schwartz,
Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote
Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 695-703 (1985). For further discussion of this
argument, see infra text accompanying notes 367-69.
247. Calabresi & Klevorick, supra note 4, at 611.
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defense or current risk-benefit rules." 8, Nevertheless, each of these
other tests has flaws. Section IV discusses how an acceptable prod-
ucts liability system should accommodate these flaws.
IV. A PROPOSED LIABILITY SYSTEM FOR DESIGN DEFECT
INJURIES
A. Policy Justifications for Liability for Product-Related Injuries
In his milestone 1980 article on the policies of a products liability
system, Professor David Owen reviews the three developmental stages
of modem products liability law.249 In Stage I, strict liability emerged
in first warranty and then tort law during the 1960's.250 Stage II
involved the expansion and definition of doctrines in the 1970's.251
Stage III, Owen says, "should be the time for doing what usually
comes late in the common-law process: [developing] a system of fun-
damental social values and goals to be protected and advanced by the
law in this area. '25 2 He further observes:
248. The availability of the "assumption of risk" defense in Schwartz's proposal reduces
firms' incentives to produce optimally safe products below the level that Schwartz's' ex-ante
strict liability test would provide without the defense. Under the latter test, the producer
invests in safety research until the cost of further research equals the gain in reducing expected
accident costs. The producer analyzes these costs of producing a safer product for the time
between when an optimal research program would have revealed the safer design and when a
product with the safer design becomes available on the market. If no product with a safer
design was available, a warning to consumers that a safer design was feasible would not protect
the producer. The reason is that the producer is in a better position than the consumer to
conduct and act upon a risk-benefit test for safer design. This rule provides an incentive for
producers to market a safer product if the producer determines that its benefits outweighs its
risks. The incentive exists because the producer bears either the costs of accidents preventable
by the safer design or the cost of producing the product with the safer design until the safer
product is on the market, placing the consumer in a better position than the producer to make
the risk-benefit analysis and to act upon it.
Schwartz's proposal also reduces firms' incentives to produce optimally safe products
below the levels induced under current risk-benefit rules. Under those rules, the producer
invests in a safety research and production program until the marginal cost of the program
equals the reduction of expected accident costs achievable by sale of a product with a safer,
practicable design. The producer analyzes these costs of creating a safety program for the time
between when an optimal program would have placed the product with the safer design on the
market and when the producer placed the product on the market.
249. Owen, supra note 9, at 681-84. More recently, Owen has discussed the foundations in
moral philosophy that inform a principled regime of products liability law. See David G.
Owen, Products Liability: Principles of Justice for the 21st Century, 11 PACE L. REV. 63 (1990)
[hereinafter Owen, Products Liability: Principles of Justice]. Owen also has an article in
progress developing these ideas in greater detail. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations
of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the author).
250. Owen, supra note 9, at 681.
251. Id. at 681-83.
252. Id. at 683-84 (footnote omitted).
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Broadly stated, an appropriate balance between individual liberty
and social welfare needs to- be struck within a fair and workable
adjudicatory system. Once a jurisprudential basis of this type has
been set, we may then begin to develop a consistent set of princi-
ples tailored to this area of the law. It will then be possible to
construct one or more "tests" or rules of liability (and defense)
which are firmly rooted in the values of society.253
Stage III is far from completion in 1991. During the 1980's,
courts developed diverse definitions of liability standards and
defenses. At the same time, some state legislatures restricted the
scope of liability. These developments reflected diverging views of the
social values and goals that products liability law should advance.
Owen recognizes the need for "deliberate analysis of the relevant
political values that can support a principled system of goals and
rules." 254 Although scholars have debated these social values and
goals, no consensus has emerged. As this search for a principled sys-
tem of goals and rules proceeds, it remains vital to examine critically
the policies justifying the numerous liability systems advanced.
This Part reviews Owen's conclusions concerning the validity of
conventional policy justifications for strict liability in tort. Owen
finds some of these justifications inadequate and suggests they be dis-
carded. 2 5  He determines that other justifications reflect important
social values, but conflict with other significant goals.256 Further-
more, he finds that the tools of analysis for adequately resolving these
apparent conflicts have not been developed.257 Owen concludes that
"[t]he difficult resolution of questions involving the proper accommo-
dation of the relevant goals and values in different contexts still lies
ahead. ' 258  This Part examines recent literature suggesting ways to
accommodate conflicting social goals. It concludes that the goal of an
optimal reduction in accident costs is the most defensible foundation
available to construct a products liability system.
253. Id. at 684.
254. Id. at 683.
255. See, e.g., id. at 703-07 (discussing the justifications of compensation, loss shifting, and
loss spreading).
256. See, e.g., id. at 707-09 (discussing the conflict between the protection of consumer
expectations and consideration of fairness and efficiency).
257. See, e.g., id. at 709, where Owen states: "While consumer expectations should clearly
be accorded significant respect in products liability law, we are far from understanding just
how this objective may best be made to fit within a scheme that also accords respect to other
goals of fairness and to the economic interests of the group."
258. Id. at 715.
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1. COMPENSATION AND RISK SPREADING
Owen finds that the frequently articulated goals of compensation
and risk spreading cannot, alone, justify strict liability in tort.2 59
Owen considers these goals "'structurally' inadequate as decisional
tools, since they point in one direction only-toward liability."'2" He
also finds the goals problematic because they employ the costly litiga-
tion process, although compensation and risk spreading for pecuniary
losses generally are available today at administrative costs far below
the costs of litigation. Moreover, compensation and risk spreading by
themselves provide no justification for preferring "compassion" for
accident victims over "compassion" for those who benefit from the
welfare of institutional defendants.26'
Owen's position is sound. Professor Shapo explains the persis-
tent references to compensation as a justification for strict liability in
tort in the following cogent (and perhaps wry) observation:
[T]he limited coverage and deficient benefit levels of the legis-
lative social schemes conspire with rising expectations to keep a
strong compensationist feature in the cases. If there is imprecision
in the logical support for this phenomenon, it derives only from the
unruliness of the world.262
Compensation and risk spreading lower secondary accident costs.
263
They cannot be the principal goals of tort law, however, because they
do nothing to reduce accidents. Moreover, serving these goals would
require compensation for all adverse human experiences. 26 Private
and social insurance provide better means than tort law to accomplish
these objectives.265  Furthermore, as Professor Shavell notes, the
development of insurance has decreased the necessity for tort law to
259. Id. at 703-07.
260. Id. at 707.
261. Id. at 704-07.
262. Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1293 (1974).
263. Secondary accident costs are the "costs of rapid changes in income distribution."
CALABRESI, supra note 8, at 33. Dean Calabresi states:
The advantages of interpersonal loss spreading would probably be stated as a pair
of propositions: (1) taking a large sum of money from one person is more likely
to result in economic dislocation, and therefore in secondary or avoidable losses,
than taking a series of small sums from many people; (2) even if the total
economic dislocation were the same, many small losses would be preferable to
one large one simply because people feel less pain if 10,000 of them lose one
dollar apiece than if one person loses $10,000.
Id. at 39 (citation omitted).
264. CALABRESI, supra note 8, at 43-44.
265. SHAVELL, supra note 84, at 297.
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assure compensation for accident victims.266
2. DETERRENCE AND MANUFACTURER'S PROBABLE NEGLIGENCE
Owen also finds other stated goals of strict liability-deterrence
and the manufacturer's probable negligence-inadequate.267 Both of
these goals burden the sale of all dangerous products, no matter how
useful, and therefore ought to be discarded. Moreover, a deterrence
rationale discourages accidents at all cost-a proposition no one
would advocate. 268  Finally, Owen properly observes that a manufac-
turer's probable negligence may warrant the shifting of evidentiary
burdens in some situations, but as a liability rationale it ignores the
extent of product misuse in causing injuries and overlooks the central
issue of product defectiveness.269
Having identified the indefensible justifications for products lia-
bility, Owen turns to the problems presented by three other rationales
for a products liability system: consumer expectations, 270 risk con-
266. Shavell explains:
Before the development of insurance markets, liability furnished victims a source
of compensation that presumably would not otherwise ordinarily have been
forthcoming. Tort law thus served to an important degree the dual purposes of
compensation and deterrence. Moreover, in early times before criminal law and
tort law had emerged as separate branches of law, a significant additional
purpose of the making of money payments for harm was the maintenance of
social order. Without the system of money payments, private vengeance would
often have followed the doing of harm.
SHAVELL, supra note 79, at 297-98.
267. Owen, supra note 9, at 709-11.
268. Calabresi expresses his views on society's commitment to avoiding accident at all costs:
Our society is not committed to preserving life at any cost. In its broadest
sense, the rather unpleasant notion that we are willing to destroy lives should be
obvious. Wars are fought. The University of Mississippi is integrated at the risk
of losing lives. But what is more pertinent to the study of accident law, though
perhaps equally obvious, is that lives are spent not only when the quid pro quo is
some great moral principle, but also when it is a matter of convenience. Ventures
are undertaken that, statistically at least, are certain to cost lives. Thus we build
a tunnel under Mont Blanc because it is essential to the Common Market and
cuts down the traveling time from Rome to Paris, though we know that about
one man per kilometer of tunnel will die. We take planes and cars rather than
safer, slower means of travel. And perhaps most telling, we use relatively safe
equipment rather than the safest imaginable because-and it is not a bad
reason-the safest costs too much. It should be apparent that while some of
these accident-causing activities also result in diminution of acci4ents-the Mont
Blanc tunnel may well save more lives by diminishing traffic fatalities than it took
to build it-this explanation does not come close to justifying more accident-
causing activities. Railroad grade crossings are used because they are cheap, not
because they save more lives than they take.
CALABRESI, supra note 8, at 17-18 (citation omitted).
269. Owen, supra note 9, at 711.
270. Id. at 707-09.
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trol,2 I and enterprise liability.272
3. CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS
Owen finds that the consumer-expectations rationale for prod-
ucts liability poses significant problems, but at the same time serves
important social goals. He observes that the consumer-expectations
test is based upon the principle of autonomy, which recognizes the
importance of consumers' ability to order their affairs without fear of
unexpected economic loss. 273  Although "consumer expectations
should clearly be accorded significant respect in products liability
law,"' 274 this objective suffers from the difficulty of defining precisely
whose expectations to respect, the possibility of conflict with the
greater economic good, and the likelihood of confrontation with pro-
ducers' autonomy. 275 As Owen puts it, "we are far from understand-
ing just how this objective may best be made to fit within a scheme
that also accords respect to other goals of fairness and to the eco-
nomic interests of the group. 
' 276
The fundamental importance of protecting consumer expecta-
tions has been recognized throughout the development of products
liability law. Professor Shapo's landmark article on representational
theory published in 1974 documents the centrality of product por-
trayal as an influence on the determination of liability.277 Shapo
observes that product portrayals arise not only from explicit represen-
tations, but also from a myriad of implicit representations created
by advertising, product appearance, social context, and other
intangibles.278
The subjective and open-ended nature of the consumer-expecta-
tions test, however, has drawn criticism.279 Professor Twerski persua-
sively defends the test and proposes some promising methods for
making it workable. 280 In defending the consumer-expectations test,
Twerski agrees with Shapo that product image created by producers
271. Id. at 711-13..!
272. Id. at 713-14.
273. Id. at 709.
274. Id. at 709.
275. Id. at 708-09.
276. Id. at 709.
277. Shapo, supra note 262.
278. See, e.g., id. at 1370.
279. The drafters of the Model Uniform Products liability Act, as well as some judicial
decisions, have rejected the test in design defect cases. See Aaron D. Twerski, From Risk-
Utility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Products
Liability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 861, 901 (1983).
280. See Twerski, supra note 279.
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and advertisers influences consumer behavior.2"' :Although these
"soft," or implied, representations created by product image do not
rise to the level of express warranties, they do generate expectations
about quality and safety that deserve protection.2"2 Nevertheless,
Twerski acknowledges the difficulty of determining the nature of con-
sumer expectations for any given product. In an attempt to devise a
workable consumer-expectations test, he proposes both a narrow defi-
nition of the test and a careful judicial screening of its use. The test
would be whether the product failed "to meet consumer expectations
when the product fail[ed] in a normal use context."2 3 Twerski rejects
a test of "foreseeable use" because it "is so elastic that it could be
stretched to encompass some very remote risk, ' 28 4 thereby destroying
the test's validity. Thus the consumer-expectations test, according to
Twerski, "must be limited to those cases in which consumer use pat-
terns are so clear that the product can be said to have failed in its
normal use. In defining normal use patterns, courts will take into
account the impact of product image on use patterns. "285
Under Twerski's approach the consumer-expectations test is a
true strict liability test. It is no defense that the utility of the product
outweighed its risks28 6 or that the danger was unforeseeable. 28 7 Twer-
ski also allows a plaintiff to use both a consumer-expectations and a
risk-utility test as theories of product defect. He states:
Once it is understood that the consumer expectation test is not
the sole test for defect, but provides a method for resolving a hard
core of product defect cases, many of the problems disappear. It
would be the function of the court in the first instance to determine
whether the injury took place when the product was being put to a
normal use.... Similarly, the problem of how to resolve the fore-
seeable misuse cases evaporates; only hardcore normal uses would
be governed by the consumer expectation test. All other cases
would be subject to the imposition of liability only if the plaintiff
were able to establish that the product failed to meet societal
acceptability under risk-utility analysis.
288
Professor Twerski's case for a limited and clearer consumer-
expectations test is convincing. He unrealistically claims, however,
that his test does not require determining the hypothetical expecta-
281. Id. at 897.
282. Id. at 897-901.
283. Id. at 906.
284. Id. at 916.
285. Id. at 907.
286. Id. at 918.
287. Id. at 919.
288. Id. at 908.
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tions of consumers. He explains that the test predicates recovery
upon the failure of a product to perform safely in normal use.289 He
defines the test, however, as "the failure of the product to meet con-
sumer expectations when the product fails in a normal use context. ' ' 290
Under this definition, a court or jury determination of whether an
injury occurred during normal use of the product would not suffice;
the court or jury also would have to determine whether the product
frustrated consumer expectations. Thus, a hammer might "fail" in a
normal use if the user hit her thumb with it while striking a nail, but
no liability would attach under the consumer-expectations test unless
the hammer's danger was greater than a consumer would expect.
Likewise, a small car might "fail" in a normal use if the car was
"totaled" when hit by a larger car, but no liability would attach under
the test unless the danger to the occupant of the small car was beyond
consumer expectations.
Thus, despite his claim to the contrary, Twerski's approach
requires deciding whether a product's danger exceeds consumer
expectations; it is necessary to decide whose expectations should con-
trol-those of the individual injured consumer, the "ordinary" con-
sumer with "ordinary" knowledge of the product's danger, the
"reasonable" consumer, or the "foreseeable" consumer. This deci-
sion, however, can draw on the same approach that Twerski employs
on the use issue: normal user expectations should control. If the jury
could not find that the product posed a surprising risk to a normal
user of the product, the court would relegate the plaintiff to a risk-
utility test.
An additional problem remains with defining "normal" uses and
users. Although "normal" uses and users may be a narrower concept
than "foreseeable" uses and users, it is no more self-defining. Shapo
urges that the fundamental starting point in product frustration
problems should be the portrayal of the product and the consumer's
likely image of it.29 1 Shapo's concept of the objectively determined
intent of the seller in its product portrayal sheds light on the defini-
tion of normal uses and users. Like Twerski, Shapo finds the foresee-
ability test "obfuscatory, or at least inadequate. ' 292 Shapo states his
basic thesis as follows:
Judgments of liability for consumer product disappointment
should center initially and principally on the portrayal of the prod-
289. Id. at 906-07.
290. Id. at 906 (emphasis added).
291. Shapo, supra note 262, at 1240.
292. Id. at 1224.
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uct which is made, caused to be made or permitted by the seller.
This portrayal should be viewed in the context of the impression
reasonably received by the consumer from representations or other
communications made to him about the product by various means:
through advertising, by the appearance of the product, and by the
other ways in which the product projects an image on the mind of
the consumer, including impressions created by widespread social
agreement about the product's function. This judgment should
take into consideration the result objectively determinable to have
been sought by the seller, and the seller's apparent motivation in
making or permitting the representation or communication.
2 93
Thus, normal uses and users can be determined by "the result
objectively determinable to have been sought by the seller, and the
seller's apparent motivation in making or permitting the representa-
tion or communication. ' 294 Courts can use this standard to screen
cases from the jury that do not fit the narrow scope Twerski would
allow for the consumer-expectations test. The standard's objectivity
makes it less susceptible than a bare test of normality to the problems
of elasticity and unpredictability that concerned Twerski.
With the modifications this Article suggests, Twerski's definition
of the consumer-expectations test appears to solve one of the
problems critics have found with the test-its open-endedness. Pro-
fessor Epstein approves of a similar test based on the realities of insur-
ance markets. 295  This definition of the test properly reflects its
implied warranty origins and may solve the otherwise intractable
problems of identifying foreseeable uses and deciding whose expecta-
tions are relevant. This definition is not a perfect solution, but few
legal tests are capable of simple application. It is the courts' function
to apply legal standards in light of the policies they embody. Courts
should have no more difficulty grappling with a narrowly defined
consumer-expectations test than with many other tests they apply
everyday.
A solution to the definitional problem does not resolve all the
difficulties with the consumer-expectations test. The major issue
remaining is whether courts should use the test as a "true" strict lia-
bility test, allowing recovery even if the utility of the product out-
weighs its risks or the risk is unforeseeable. Although Shapo
293. Id. at 1370.
294. Id.
295. Epstein accepts a rule of liability holding manufacturers liable "for latent defects in a
product in its original condition that causes harm to a user who makes normal and proper (or
'intended') use of the product." Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance
Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 663 (1985).
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recommends the firm's product portrayal and the consumer's likely
product image as starting points in product frustration cases, he does
not advocate that consumer expectations invariably should control
the outcome of cases.296 Shapo recognizes that policy factors may
"refute the case established by the image the [seller projected to the
user]. ' 297 Owen observes that the consumer-expectations test may
pose a conflict with the greater economic good and with producers'
autonomy. Thus, preservation of individual autonomy-like risk
spreading, compensation, and deterrence---cannot be a primary goal
of a tort-liability system. Natural disasters, illnesses, and other events
interfere with individuals' ability to order their affairs without fear of
unexpected economic loss. As with risk spreading, liability for inter-
ference with autonomy would require compensation for all adverse
experiences-including those of consumers generally and of persons
adversely affected by interference with a producer's autonomy. No
tort liability system can accomplish such a goal; at best, it can pro-
mote aggregate autonomy.29 As Professor Shavell states, "The main
difference the presence of the liability system [makes] is that it creates
incentives toward safety. This, then, must be said to be the chief pur-
pose of the liability system today.
299
Professor Attanasio has advanced the thesis that the principle of
aggregate autonomy supports liability under the Calabresian cheap-
est-cost-avoider theory.300 The following Part discusses the relation
of Attanasio's thesis to risk control as an objective of tort law. The
principle of aggregate autonomy implies that a liability system should
not protect consumer expectations in all circumstances. For instance,
Attanasio states that his thesis might not support liability for "totally
unforeseeable" harms,30 1 or for harms caused by "a product of high
necessity and expense that liability renders totally unavailable.
3 2
296. Shapo, supra note 262, at 1240.
297. Id. at 1225.
298. See Attanasio, supra note 12, at 707.
299. SHAVELL, supra note 79, at 297.
300. See Attanasio, supra note 12.
301. Id. at 711-12.
302. Id. at 737. Attanasio explains more fully his position on harms caused by necessary
products:
Another poignant case on the demand side is the seriously ill patient who is
denied the use of a drug that accident costs render prohibitively expensive or
even unmarketable. Again, the attack hits the fringe of an aggregate autonomy
defense of Calabresian theory. Nevertheless, this qualification hardly rebuts the
initial criticism. The hypothetical assumes a product of high necessity and
expense that liability renders totally unavailable. Perhaps, in a few extreme cases
similar to this one, the principle of aggregate autonomy might allow such
products to be marketed without liability if appropriate warnings were given.
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Even if the frustration of consumer expectations does not justify
liability in every instance, as Owen observes, consumer expectations
warrant "significant respect."3"3 Calabresi and Klevorick's interpre-
tation of the consumer-expectations test accords it an integral role in
products liability law, but avoids the problem of conflict with the eco-
nomic interests of the larger group. Calabresi and Klevorick find that
courts using the test are reaching for a liability theory that places
responsibility upon the party in the best position to make a risk-bene-
fit judgment and to act upon it.3°4 They further recognize that strict
liability sometimes conflicts with the best economic interests of the
group. Consequently, the test should be used only when other avail-
able tests are unlikely to reduce total accident costs. Calabresi and
Klevorick conclude:
[I]f the court is comfortable with its own (and a jury's) capacity to
decide what risks are worth taking-at least when all the retro-
spective data are available-it is apt to impose liability regardless
of which party can assess risks and benefits better. It will insist on
its own prerogative, as representative of the state, to decide what is
and what is not worth doing. This will be true especially when
important choices are available to both parties so that which party
is in a better position to decide between safety and risk and to act
on that choice is quite uncertain. Conversely, the more difficult it
is to tell whether a product is worth having in its current state, the
more a court will seek to determine which of the parties can make
that decision most intelligently. It will try to determine where
incentives are best placed and assign accident costs accordingly.
It follows that in evaluating and criticizing judicial decisions
in each area of torts, we must consider whether the courts have
insisted on their own capacity to assess risks and benefits when, in
fact, they would have done better had they looked to the parties'
relative capacity to choose. But we should be equally critical if
courts have been too hesitant and have sought the best decision
maker when in fact the decision should clearly be for or against the
product.305
The task, then, is to determine when the test is suitable for use-that
is, when the test is likely to serve the goal of reducing total accident
costs or of promoting aggregate autonomy.
Alternatively, society might choose to pay for the autonomy infringements
caused by such products.
Id. at 737 (footnote omitted.)
303. Owen, supra note 9, at 709.
304. Calabresi & Klevorick, supra note 4, at 586-87, 608.
305. Id. at 611-12 (footnote omitted).
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4. RISK CONTROL
Owen observes that although liability based upon ability to con-
trol risk-Calabresi's cheapest-cost-avoider test-has much in its
favor,3°6 it presents "the problem of allocating priorities between the
values within the rationale and other interests raised by other val-
ues." 3°7 In Owen's view, "[t]his issue principally involves the push
and shove between efficiency and 'rights' deserving of protection,
which may arise from expectations of product safety or from views of
fairness in the rules of law.
308
Professor Attanasio examines the conflict of values posed by the
cheapest-cost-avoider test.309 Attanasio rejects the Nozickian, liberta-
rian theory of autonomy,310 because its "commitment to absolute or
near-absolute rights may, in the aggregate, reduce autonomy across
the society: people may feel inhibited to act if shackled by such perva-
sive and stringent side constraints. ' 31 1 Under many circumstances,
Nozickian theory sanctions strict liability; however, that theory
appears to permit warranty disclaimers and limitations. Attanasio
notes that "[i]n certain respects ... the Nozickian conception may
reach too far to protect victims; in others like products liability, it
may leave accident victims inadequately protected.
'312
Attanasio takes the position that liberty and order have a symbi-
otic relationship, and that an important goal of tort law is to keep
liberty and order in balance, to increase autonomy.313 In Attanasio's
words: "[T]ort liability imposes a degree of order on the individual
liberty of the tortfeasor in order to advance victim autonomy. If tort
law is working properly, compensation should increase victim auton-
omy without unduly constricting the long term choices, or autonomy,
of others. ' 314 Attanasio maintains that tort law must strike "a propi-
tious balance between liberty and order to preserve autonomy for as
many individuals in society as possible. 31 5  He further posits that
tort law promotes aggregate autonomy rather than utility, and that
utility is indeterminate because "the ideal mix of order and freedom of
306. Owen, supra note 9, at 712.
307. Id. at 713.
308. Id.
309. See Attanasio, supra note 12.
310. See ROBERT NoziCK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (1981); ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
311. Attanasio, supra note 12, at 722.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 686-87. My summary of Attanasio's thesis necessarily is oversimplified, so I
caution those with an interest in his ideas to consult his entire article.
314. Id. at 687.
315. Id. at 707.
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action is virtually impossible to calculate with confidence."316
Attanasio asserts:
[P]rinciples of tort compensation may require paying millions of
dollars to allow one badly mangled person to survive in a relatively
"unproductive" existence. Often, this money might more effi-
ciently be spent to alleviate other human suffering. For example,
society might place the amount that a severely damaged victim
might recover into a general fund used to reduce malnutrition. For
the same price needed to sustain one badly mangled tort victim,
society might save many people. If tort law adhered strictly to
utilitarian concerns, it would follow this hypothesized arrangement
or some similar plan that did not waste so much money on victims
who could not efficiently be healed.317
Attanasio maintains that negligence law promotes aggregate
autonomy. On one side of the balance of interests, accidents impose
severe restrictions on victims' autonomy. On the other side, the
requirements in negligence law of foreseeability, unreasonableness,
and causation avoid undue restriction upon the autonomy of potential
tortfeasors.31 8 Thus if the perpetrator of the accident could foresee
the risk and take precautions with less sacrifice of liberty than the risk
of sacrifice to the victim's liberty, liability would advance victims'
autonomy without undue constraints on others' autonomy.31 9
Attanasio further maintains that the principle of aggregate
autonomy supports liability under the Calabresian best-decider the-
ory, and that the Calabresian theory, when joined with enterprise lia-
bility, is superior to negligence. According to Attanasio, the "weak
principle of aggregate autonomy" supports action "to protect the
individual against severe constrictions of life plans whenever such
protection may be accomplished through de minimis wealth-related
interference with the life plans of some members of society.
'320
Attanasio observes that "accidents that maim or kill impose some of
the most severe constraints against choice imaginable" 321 -choices of
both the victim and those affected by the victim's injuries. The notion
of extended responsibility supports placing a duty on the manufac-
turer to help victims when the manufacturer is the best decider,
because the best decider's superior knowledge makes it the party best
able to protect its own autonomy and to make the election between
316. Id. at 713.
317. Id. at 689 (footnote omitted).
318. Id. at 694-97, 701-02.
319. Id. at 694-702.
320. Id at 723.
321. Id. at 724.
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safety and insurance.322 Attanasio further finds that placing liability
on the best decider helps the consumer make informed product
choices and reduces product consumption and resultant accidents.
The consumer has better information through effective warnings or
higher product prices. 323 The enterprise liability aspect of the best-
decider rule allows manufacturers to spread the risk through insur-
ance, thus alleviating the infringement on the defendant's liberty.324
Because of its reliance on superior knowledge, Attanasio con-
tends that the best-decider rule advances autonomy in four ways.
First, it reduces the effort required to make the decision between
safety and insurance. Second, it improves the accuracy of the deci-
sion. Third, it increases the likelihood of safety measures to reduce
the number and severity of injuries. Fourth, it places the insurance
decision on the party with superior knowledge about insurance
needs.325
Attanasio observes that the best-decider rule enhances autonomy
more than the negligence rules do because it protects victims while
not unduly infringing on others' autonomy. Firms with superior
knowledge can spread the risk of loss. Although the best-decider rule
generates somewhat higher product prices than does negligence, it
also increases aggregate autonomy, which in turn reduces the
profound autonomy infringements suffered by accident victims.
326
Despite these justifications for the best-decider rule, Attanasio
acknowledges its limitations. Thus he expresses reservations about
liability for totally unforeseeable risks:
Even under these conditions, however, the superior ability of
producers to spread the loss and to factor in some unforeseeable
loss when marketing a product might favor imposing the liability
on them. However, the better solution may be for society to shoul-
der the loss through general tax revenues. In some sense, such a
loss may be more accurately attributable to the march of techno-
logical progress than to any particular product. Because we all
benefit from technological advances, we perhaps should all pay for
the costs they impose.327
Using the best-decider rule for unforeseeable risks weakens the supe-
rior-knowledge justification for the rule. Recognizing this problem,
Attanasio observes that a lack of foreseeability "impairs the ability of
322. Id. at 708.
323. Id. at 709-10.
324. Id. at 711.
325. Id. at 708-09.
326. Id. at 712-13.
327. Id. at 712 n.148.
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the alleged tortfeasor to avert liability, thus undermining his power to
defend his liberty against the order imposed by tort liability. It also
impairs the possibility of insuring against liability." '28
The seriously ill patient "who is denied the use of a drug that
accident costs render prohibitively expensive or even unmarket-
able"3 29 also troubles Attanasio. He explains: "Perhaps, in a few
extreme cases similar to this one, the principle of aggregate autonomy
might allow such products to be marketed without liability if appro-
priate warnings were given. Alternatively, society might choose to
pay for the autonomy infringements caused by such products. 3 30 In
addition to recognizing these limitations, Attanasio presumably
would recognize limitations upon the best-decider rule when a court
cannot identify the best decider. Calabresi and Klevorick have
acknowledged that sometimes "important choices are available to
both parties so that which party is in a better position to decide
between safety and risk and to act on that choice is quite uncer-
tain. '3 31 In that case, the court should "insist on its own prerogative,
as representative of the state, to decide what is and what is not worth
doing. 332 In other words, the court should determine whether a
product's risks outweigh its benefits when the court cannot identify
the best decider.
The question arises whether Calabresi's goal of an optimal reduc-
tion of accident costs (including the costs of accidents and the costs of
accident avoidance) differs from Attanasio's goal of promoting aggre-
gate autonomy. Attanasio agrees that negligence law promotes aggre-
gate autonomy, because if a defendant creates an unreasonable risk,
"the imposition on [the defendant's] liberty in taking precautions is
less than the magnitude and scope of risk to the victim's liberty.
33 3
The best-decider rule further promotes autonomy by allowing more
compensation to victims and by recognizing the ability of commercial
firms to make safety decisions and to spread costs. Also, a cost-reduc-
tion objective does not abjure consideration of moral values. As Part
III.2.C's discussion of the risk-utility decision observed, the concept
of unreasonable risk balances social values. Analysis of accident
"costs" need not, and should not, ignore the implicated moral val-
ues. 3 4 Thus, the goals of Calabresi and Attanasio employ different
328. Id. at 704-05.
329. Id. at 737.
330. Id. (footnote omitted).
331. Calabressi & Klevorick, supra note 4, at 611-12.
332. Id.
333. Attanasio, supra note 12, at 696.
334. See supra note 138; see also Owen, Products Liability: Principles of Justice, supra note
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
languages-one of economics, the other of philosophy-but they are
consistent.
The minimization of accident costs, as informed by the principle
of aggregate autonomy, provides a defensible objective for products
liability law. Owen raises important concerns about "the push and
shove between efficiency and 'rights' deserving of protection, which
may arise from expectations of product safety or from views of fair-
ness in the rule of law. ' 335 Attanasio's theory of aggregate autonomy
goes a long way toward resolving these concerns. In fact, given
Attanasio's view of the apparent conflict between liberty and order,
Owen's use of the term "push and shove" is apt. Though Attanasio
recognizes the tension between liberty and order, he believes that
neither can exist without the other.336 Thus, if the goal of accident
cost reduction takes account of social values and promotes aggregate
autonomy, efficiency and rights will not conflict to an unacceptable
degree.
The idea that risk control alone promotes efficiency also troubles
Owen. He notes that risk control rules "may not work in practice as
well as in the thoughts of man."'337 Calabresi's admonition that no
one rule of liability is appropriate in all circumstances338 helps in the
search for plausible liability rules. Both the best-decider rule,
reflected in part by the consumer-expectations test, and negligence
law can minimize accident costs and promote aggregate autonomy
when used in the appropriate circumstances. The task is to identify
those circumstances.
5. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
Owen tentatively finds an enterprise or cost-internalization
rationale for products liability somewhat appealing. He states:
While one's initial tendency is to reject summarily such a very
strict causation approach to products liability.., the thought may
need much more analysis. At an early date, Professor Cowan
pointed to the deliberate nature of many if not most decisions con-
cerning product safety. Managers routinely decide how much risk
to leave in the product's design, in the production and quality
assurance process, and in the package of safety information carried
249, at 64 (arguing that "the rules that ... govern products liability into the twenty-first
century [should be] constructed on considered principles of justice set firmly upon a sound
moral philosophy").
335. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
336. Attanasio, supra note 12, at 686.
337. Owen, supra note 9, at 712.
338. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
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with the product. To the extent that accidents from manufacturer-
created conditions are not the result of deliberate choices but result
instead from oversight, such failures may fairly be charged to man-
ufacturers on more traditional grounds of fault. This would appear
to exhaust the possibilities, since unforeseeable misadventure from
external sources was excluded by hypothesis from the scope of lia-
bility. "Ultra-strict" liability of this kind may thus amount to little
more than liability for intentionally or negligently inflicted harm.
From another perspective, it may reduce essentially to something
like the best-risk-controller economic standard . . . . Under any
form of "ultra-strict" liability, one would very probably have to
exclude from coverage losses attributable to serious consumer
abuse not only on grounds of economic sense but also to treat fairly
the careful consumers who do apply a rule of reason to curtail their
personal liberties for the common economic weal. Such an exclu-
sion would also seem required to eliminate the apparent unfairness
of forcing manufacturers to internalize consumer "madness" in
putting products to unpredictably dangerous use.
The cost-internalization rationale thus contains the germs of a
theory of "ultra-strict" liability that may deserve some further
study. The concept is close to that of risk control, and thus to
Calabresi's cheapest-cost-avoider test as well. While only embry-
onic, some of these combined ideas appear to shed at least potential
light upon important issues in this field of law.339
Owen's focus upon probable fault and risk control is useful in
evaluating the desirability of enterprise liability. Yet in this article,
Owen does not discuss the problem of products that pose unforesee-
able risks-a controversial problem that emerged in the 1980's.
340
Also, the principle of intentionally inflicted harm as a basis for impos-
ing "ultra-strict" liability is not very helpful. If a product poses an
unforeseeable risk, its producer has caused harm to the consumer
unintentionally. 34 ' Even if the producer knew to a substantial cer-
tainty that its product would harm someone, that knowledge alone
would not justify liability. No fundamental social policy supports
placing liability upon a person solely because he intentionally inflicted
339. Owen, supra note 9, at 713-14 (citations omitted). For the discussion of deliberate
choice Owen refers to in this quotation, see Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products
Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077 (1965).
340. In a later article, Owen has taken the position that principles of moral philosophy do
not support liability for unforeseeable risks. See infra note 359. For a thoughtful
consideration of products that pose unforeseeable risks, see Henderson, supra note 245.
341. Henderson states, "In contrast to producers' quality control decisions affecting
manufacturing defect rates, which arguably amount to the deliberate taking of plaintiffs'
physical well-being, it is difficult to see how the decision to market a product believed to be free
of hazards involves the deliberate taking of the plaintiff's well-being." Id. at 950.
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harm on another. The law does not consider all intentionally inflicted
harms tortious, for good reason. Western Union, for example, would
not be liable for harm caused by a telegram delivery informing par-
ents of the death of their child, despite the company's agents' substan-
tial certainty that the telegram would cause severe emotional
distress.342 Nor is one liable for intentional harms inflicted in the
course of reasonable self defense or a lawful arrest.343 The question
for purposes of products liability is whether, for example, the manu-
facturer of baseball bats, who knows to a substantial certainty that
some persons will be harmed by use of the bats, should be liable for
the inevitable harms that the bats will produce.
The reasonableness of an actor's conduct provides abasis for the
defense of privilege for the intentional infliction of harm. As with
negligence, the law has generally refused to impose liability for inten-
tional harms when the social utility of the actor's conduct outweighs
its risks.344  The law does make an exception to the rule of nonliabil-
ity for privileged-and therefore reasonable--conduct when a defend-
ant acts out of "necessity. ' 34 5  In a "necessity" situation, the
defendant caused damage to another to avert harm to itself. Courts
allow an invasion of the other's interest if the defendant acted reason-
ably; however, they attempt to mitigate the invasion by requiring the
defendant to pay compensatory damages because the plaintiff derived
no benefit from the defendant's conduct. Arguably, the privilege of
necessity could justify strict liability on the ground that the producer
benefits from selling a risky product that harms the plaintiff. This
argument is unpersuasive, however, if courts view product risks and
benefits as widely distributed throughout society. 3 6
342. A defendant's conduct must be outrageous before liability attaches for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
343. For these and other privileges that apply to the use of force, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 63-156 (1965).
344. See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 90, § 16, at 108-09.
345. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W.2d 221, 222 (Minn. 1910);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 (1965).
346. Cf. Henderson, supra note 245, at 965. Henderson takes a broad view of product risks
and benefits:
If one views product manufacturers as dominant, powerful actors who impose
value choices on passive, unconsenting users, consumers, and bystanders, then
the forms of strict liability considered in this Article are likely to be attractive on
fairness grounds. If one views manufacturers as conduits through which the
value choices of users and consumers find expression, and if one feels that
product-related costs and benefits are fairly evenly distributed throughout our
interdependent society, then principles of fairness will seem less important in
deciding whether or not to impose strict liability. Because this writer tends to
agree with the latter view, he finds it difficult to support, on fairness grounds,
those forms of liability that seem likely to result in the waste of scarce resources.
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The concept of intentional harm is inadequate to support enter-
prise liability. The principles of probable fault and risk control, how-
ever, support an important-but not an exclusive-role for strict
products liability.
A pure enterprise liability system that held producers liable for
all harms caused by their products, except those caused by the plain-
tiff or a third party, would not achieve optimal reduction in total acci-
dent costs. Although such a system would reduce judicial
administration costs and spread accident costs, it would produce
either excessive costs resulting from preventable accidents or exces-
sive costs of accident prevention. No defenses exist that would make
enterprise liability workable as an effective cost-reduction system, nor
can a system use a cheapest cost-avoider standard to support the con-
clusion that such a system would be efficient.
A rule of "true" strict liability with a contributory negligence
defense-the rule that Schwartz purports to advocate, but fails to
implement in his proposals-would not reduce product accidents to
an optimal level. Although economic models portray true strict liabil-
ity as efficient,347 these models make fallacious assumptions about the
influence of tort rules upon human behavior. The inevitable careless-
ness of product users causes many product-related injuries that could
be avoided by the incorporation of safety devices in the product
design at reasonable cost.348 Scholars have argued persuasively that
the fear of losing a tort action does not deter consumers from using
products negligently any more than the fear of injury itself. Thus, a
rule of contributory negligence cannot substantially alter human
behavior; however, a rule of liability for producers can alter the
behavior of firms in designing products.349 Indeed, safety engineers
assume that if injuries can result from the negligent use of a product,
Id. (footnotes omitted).
347. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 79, at 12-13.
348. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 29. Calabresi and Hirschoff believe that the
product user's contributory negligence does not necessarily show that the product user was the
best cost avoider. They illustrate:
[T]he fact that a use of the product is deemed contributorily negligent does not
necessarily mean that the manufacturer is not in a better position than the user to
evaluate the costs and benefits. To take an example from a different area of strict
liability, a worker may negligently use a piece of equipment, but his employer
may nonetheless be in a better position to evaluate the relevant costs and benefits.
That is, he may know the propensity to negligent use and be better able to
evaluate a substitute piece of equipment which cannot readily be negligently
used. This explains why contributory negligence has not been an inevitable
defense to an action based on strict liability.
Id. at 1064.
349. See e.g., Mark E.. Roszkowski & Robert A. Prentice, Reconciling Comparative
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they will. Often the best way to prevent such injuries is to make the
product safer.35°
Owen views an enterprise liability system as requiring manufac-
turers to "absorb the costs of all those accidents that are not the 'fault'
of product users or third persons (perhaps defined in terms of unfore-
seeable abuse)." 35 1 Of course, if a liability system exonerated manu-
facturers whenever a product user or a third person caused a product-
related injury, many more injuries would occur that could be pre-
vented at a reasonable cost than would if a system allowed only a
contributory negligence defense. A defense of the plaintiff's or a third
party's negligence would not reduce preventable injuries for the same
reasons that a contributory negligence defense would not reduce such
injuries. An employer who uses punch presses without protective
guards, for example, is unlikely to add guards out of fear that the
employee will be unable to collect damages from the punch press
manufacturer.
At the other extreme, if unforeseeable product misuse were the
only defense available in a products liability action, enterprise liability
would be socially unacceptable. Consider the situations in which
manufacturers would be liable for injuries if unforeseeable product
misuse were the only available defense in an enterprise liability sys-
tem. Manufacturers would be liable to persons who cut themselves
with knives; persons injured by bicycles and by striking the corners of
tables; children injured by falling off of wagons, scooters, and tricy-
cles; children who run into the paths of oncoming cars; baseball play-
Negligence and Strict Liability: A Public Policy Analysis, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 19, 59-64, 85-91
(1988).
For an excellent example of why contributory negligence should not be a defense in a
products liability case, see Turner v. Machine Ice Co., 674 P.2d 883 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
While attempting to wipe crushed ice off the ramp in front of an ice machine, Turner
accidentally stuck his hand into the metal gate at the front of the machine and failed to remove
his hand before the guillotine-like metal gate closed. His hand was crushed, and the gate
amputated three of his fingers. Id. at 885. On cross examination, the defense attorney asked
the plaintiff's expert, a safety engineer, "No one needed to tell you, even though you never saw
this machine in operation, that if you put your hand in there where that gate operates, you
would be injured?" Id. at 888. The expert answered:
Well, to me, as a safety engineer, I know that that type of arrangement
results in only a matter oftime until someone, for some reason, somehow gets their
hands into it and then an injury results. So, my life has been geared to the
prevention and it's very basic to me that the way you prevent these types of
injuries is not to base it upon hopefully hoping that all human performance is
going to be 100 percent perfect 100 percent of the time. The easiest, the cheapest
and the most expedient method it to put a guard on it.
Id. (emphasis in original). For the court's holding in Turner, see supra note 226.
350. See Roszkowski & Prentice, supra note 349, at 86-88.
351. Owen, supra note 9, at 713.
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ers or bystanders who are struck by flying balls and bats; people who
fall off of ladders or through glass doors and windows; people who
step upon dropped nails, needles, or pins and develop serious infec-
tions; children who fall while running with a crayon or pencil and
sustain the loss of their eyesight; patients who suffer unforeseeable
side effects from essential, life-saving drugs; patients who fall out of
hospital beds; babies who suffocate in pillows; and all workers injured
by state-of-the-art, high-powered machinery. All of these situations
involve injuries resulting from foreseeable product misuse, or from
"pure accident." All result from "product design" and from products
generally considered to be reasonably safe.3 52 In each case, no safer,
feasible alternative design exists that would allow these products to
perform the same socially useful function.
Should a system use enterprise liability in such situations?
Higher prices for baseballs, bats, bicycles, ladders, glass doors, cray-
ons, and pencils would reduce consumers' use of those products and,
consequently, the number of injuries they produce. Internalizing
accident costs, however, would not make these products safer. Nor
would higher prices provide greater information about these products'
risks to the public; the risks are already well known. However, these
facts alone do not explain fully why enterprise liability is inappropri-
ate for situations involving foreseeable product misuse.
The only plausible reason not to use enterprise liability in these
situations is the courts' belief-unconstrained by a contrary legislative
judgment-that the aggregate utility of these products outweighs
their aggregate risk as a matter of social policy. Baseball bats and
bicycles provide affordable recreation and transportation, both
socially valuable activities. Manufacturers cannot make these prod-
ucts safer without reducing their utility. Society is willing to subsidize
the prices of these products because their aggregate utility with lower
352. Viscusi reported the ten products involved in the most injuries (excluding death) in
1981:
Product Group Injuries in thousands
Stairs, steps, ramps, and landings 763




Nails, carpet tacks, screws and thumbtacks 244
Chairs, sofas, and sofa beds 236
Skating 225
Nonglass tables 225
Glass doors, windows, and panels 208
W. Viscusi, supra note 161, at 36, (citing U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, 1982
ANNUAL REPORT 22ff).
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prices outweighs the aggregate losses that higher prices for these
products would prevent. In other words, society is unwilling to
reduce injuries caused by certain "reasonably safe" products because
a reduction in the number of accidents arising out of the use of those
products would cost too much.
Calabresi's best-decider rule cannot explain the rule of nonliabil-
ity for these reasonably safe products. Persons injured by such prod-
ucts are not in the best position to make a risk-benefit decision and to
act upon it. Generally, young children and bystanders cannot make
and act upon choices to avoid injury. It is doubtful that even an adult
purchaser of such products is in a better position than the producer to
make and to act upon a risk-benefit decision. Human fallibility, the
inevitable and predictable carelessness of product users, supports this
conclusion. Neither the producer nor the consumer is in a good posi-
tion both to make the risk-benefit decision as to the safety of the prod-
uct and to act upon that decision.
To illustrate, assume that P buys a pair of skis and begins learn-
ing how to ski. P enjoys the sport, and so she skis frequently, continu-
ally improving her skills. On one occasion, she attempts to traverse a
steep slope for advanced skiers, and she falls. Despite having safety
bindings on her skis, she breaks her leg.
In this situation, the ski manufacturer should not be liable for P's
broken leg. Is the reason that P was in the best position to decide how
to maximize her own happiness or to make a risk-benefit decision and
to act upon it? To assume that skiers know better than ski manufac-
turers the odds of breaking a leg, the circumstances most likely to
produce a fall, and the medical complications that may result from a
broken leg overestimates human knowledge and intelligence. Skiers
probably are unaware of the specific risks they encounter, unless they
are professional skiers with M.D. degrees. Moreover, "rational" peo-
ple sometimes take "foolish" risks, become distracted, and fail to
inform themselves thoroughly of hazards. Thus, human fallibility
makes skiing injuries inevitable. Even skiers who comprehend the
risks of skiing are unable to avoid falls.
If a liability system required the ski manufacturer to internalize
all injury costs from consumers' use of skis, producers would charge
more for skis and better educate the public about the hazards of ski-
ing. Consumers, in turn, would purchase fewer skis and ski less often.
Injuries from skiing would decline. Yet, in most situations, courts are
satisfied if products contain warnings of risks generally not known by
foreseeable users and do not require that consumers know as much
about risks as product manufacturers know, or would know, if they
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internalized accident costs. Skis with safety bindings are "reasonably
safe." Few would advocate enterprise liability for such products.
The same analysis applies to Schwartz's case (a), which involves
the consumer injured when her Golf crashed. A Golf is less safe than
a Rolls Royce in a crash. If no magic metal exists, a Golf is reason-
ably safe. But does the owner possess greater ability than the manu-
facturer to make a risk-benefit judgment on the Golf and to act upon
it? Is she as aware as the manufacturer of the specific hazards posed
by the design, the frequency of crashes, and the conditions most likely
to create crashes? Even if she is aware of these factors, does she have
the ability to avoid accidents? If a liability system required the manu-
facturer to internalize injury costs, Golf prices would rise, fewer Golfs
would be sold, and injuries from Golfs would decline.
Skis and Golfs provide affordable recreation and transporta-
tion-two socially valuable activities. Manufacturers cannot make
skis safer, nor can they make Golfs safer if magic metal does not exist,
without raising prices. Skis and Golfs are reasonably safe because
their aggregate utility with the lower prices outweighs the aggregate
losses that higher prices would prevent.
The best-decider rule is not helpful in these situations because
consumers do not have a greater ability than manufacturers to evalu-
ate product risks and benefits and to act on the evaluation even when
consumers understand those risks in a general way. a53 Although pro-
353. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 29, at 1065. They assert:
Just as the employer may be in the better position to evaluate the costs and
benefits of a piece of equipment given the likelihood of occasional employee
negligence (defendant's strict liability), so a spectator at a baseball game may be
best suited to evaluate the desirability of sitting in an unscreened bleacher given
the likelihood of occasional negligent wild throws by the players during the game
which may result in the spectator's being hit on the head (plaintiff's strict
liability, or assumption of risk). In both these situations, the conclusion as to
whether an accident cost should be shifted depends not on whether a party was
negligent, but rather on a judgment as to which party was in a better position to
make the cost-benefit analysis irrespective of the other's negligence. In each
situation, strict liability (whether defendant's or plaintiff's) is imposed regardless
of whether the other party "ought" to have done what he did.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
It is debatable whether the spectator is really in a better position than the operator of the
ball park to make a risk-benefit decision and to act upon it. The baseball fan may be aware of
the risk of being struck. However, he or she probably does not know the odds of being hit.
Thus, the operator of the ball park is in a better position than the spectator to know the odds
of a spectator being hit and the location of the riskiest seats. If the operator had to internalize
these costs, it would charge more for baseball tickets or screen more seats. Injuries would be
reduced, either because the field would have more screened seats, or because fewer persons
Would attend baseball games because of the higher cost of tickets. However, the reduction in
either a clear view of the field or in attendance at baseball games is undesirable. Baseball fans
value the pleasure of clear views, and courts have decided that ball park operators use "reason-
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ducers are in a position to understand the risks these products create,
they cannot (and should not) pass judgment on the benefits of these
products to consumers. Even if producers could evaluate the risks
and benefits of these products to individuals, producers could not act
on that evaluation because they could neither make their products
safer nor control consumer's use of their product. Producers cannot
completely educate consumers about the risks of their products.
Highly detailed explanations of every potential hazard would be
costly and, for the most part, would go unread. For products such as
Golfs and skis, courts allow the loss to fall on the accident victim if
consumers have a relatively good understanding of product risks,
despite the injuries that those products are bound to cause. Judges,
not victims or producers, are in the best position to make and act
upon the risk-benefit decision for these products.354
able care" when they provide a "reasonable" number of screened seats. Given the spectators'
general awareness of the hazards involved, the risk of a spectator being hit is outweighed by
the utility of unscreened seats. The injuries that higher ticket prices or more screened seats
would prevent fall upon the victims, not becaluse the park operator is less able than the specta-
tor to make the risk-benefit decision and to act upon it, but because utility outweighs risk.
354. See, e.g., Metal Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972). The plaintiff in Metal Window, a guest at a cookout, passed through an open sliding
glass doorway several times. Id. at 356. Incorrectly believing that the door was still open, she
attempted to reenter the apartment and bruised her face and damaged her teeth. 1d. She had
believed the door was still open because a light was on inside the apartment and she could see
objects inside clearly, although she could not see the door. Id. In an action against the glass-
door manufacturer, the trial court entered judgment for the guest. Id. at 356-57. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the door was not defective under either a risk-utility test
or a consumer-expectations test. Id. at 358-60.
On the issue whether the door was dangerous beyond the expectations of the ordinary
user, the court stated:
In light of the extensive use of glass doors and common knowledge as to the
possibility and frequent occurrence of collisions with them, a reasonable user
must be held to appreciate the risk inherent in them. The danger posed is not a
hidden or latent one but on the contrary is perceptible. The fact that glass can be
invisible is itself the clue to the public that glass doors are a potential hazard.
Id. at 358 (emphasis added). The court's reasoning is internally inconsistent. The plaintiff ran
into the door because she could not see it, yet the court said the door's danger was perceptible.
The court really meant that the plaintiff should have been more careful in light of her knowl-
edge of the dangers of glass doors. That analysis involves contributory negligence rules, not
the consumer-expectations test. Under the consumer-expectations test, it would be logical to
conclude that an invisible glass door is dangerous when it is closed because an ordinary user
may not see it.
Shapo observes that in cases involving injuries from glass doors, "it is not always easy to
determine the cheapest cost avoider." Shapo, supra note 262, at 1346. Under a best-decider
analysis, the plaintiff in Magnusen may not have been in a better position than the manufac-
turer to make a risk-benefit decision and to act upon it. Perhaps she could decide, based upon
her understanding of the dangers of glass doors, whether to remain at the cookout or to leave.
But the manufacturer was in a better position than the cookout guest to determine the fre-
quency with which people run into closed glass doors, and to act upon that determination.
People may understand generally the dangers of glass doors, but they cannot act upon that
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This result comports with Attanasio's principle of aggregate
autonomy. It is sound to base enterprise liability on the best-decider
rule. For many reasonably safe products, however, neither the pro-
ducer nor the victim is a best decider. The defendant has created a
foreseeable, but not an unreasonable, risk. In this situation, enterprise
liability would constrain the autonomy of producers and those
affected by the producer's liability. The principle of extended respon-
sibility places a duty upon the producer to protect the victim of prod-
uct accidents. Under Attanasio's version of the best-decider theory,
the producer has this duty because of its greater knowledge and abil-
ity to spread loss.355 But "[a]s between two parties with relatively
equal ability to avert and redress a particular loss, shifting the loss
from one to another without any additional reason will not advance
the level of autonomy in society."3 6
Thus, an enterprise liability system with a contibutory negli-
gence defense, or a defense of the plaintiff's or a third party's negli-
gence, would result in an excessive amount of preventable injuries. In
contrast, an enterprise liability system with only a defense of unfore-
seeable misuse would result in an excessive accident prevention cost.
If the purpose of a products liability system is to reduce total accident
understanding because they are fallible. Placing decals on glass doors is one means of reducing
the number of injuries. If manufacturers did not use decals, they would be forced to internal-
ize accident costs, which would reduce the sale of glass doors and the number of injuries they
cause. Shapo notes that "[e]ven the contributing conduct of those who elect to use these prod-
ucts may not save manufacturers from judgments of defect based on appearance, which in the
case of this product is fully determined by function." Id. In Magnusen, however, the court's
risk-benefit analysis "trumped" the best-decider formula. On risk-benefit, the court stated:
It is true that a transparent glass door, because of the illusion of space it
maintains even when closed, represents a degree of danger that persons will col-
lide with it. Given the widespread use of such doors and the large number of
injuries resulting annually from collisions with them, it is proper to expect a
manufacturer to anticipate that some users might fail to see a closed door and
walk into it. But glass doors are purposely designed without bars, etchings or
decals. "Indoor-outdoor living, the 'gracious and spacious' concept, and the
desire for a 'view' have lead to widespread use of clear transparent glass panels in
... construction .... Doors, once considered as providing merely a means of
ingress and egress, are now regarded as sources of light and ventilation, and as a
means of adding 'size' to a room." ... Markings on the door would, to whatever
degree they can be observed, detract from the illusion literally millions of persons
seek, and apparently upon which they insist. The virtual invisibility now com-
plained of is the very quality which gives desirability and value to glass doors.
Interestingly that quality, invisibility, is the only feature complained of in the
instant situation.
Magnusen, 485 S.w.2d at 357-58 (citation omitted).
355. Attanasio, supra note 135, at 728.
356. Id.
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costs, the manufacturer must be able to produce safer products at
cost-effective prices.
B. A Summary of Applicable Tort Goals in Design Defect Cases
This Part's review of tort goals applicable to product design
defect liability concludes:
(1) Compensation, risk spreading, deterrence, and manufac-
turer's probable negligence are inadequate bases, in themselves, to jus-
tify the imposition of liability on manufacturers.
(2) The consumer-expectations test presents problems of vague-
ness that can be solved by framing the test narrowly. Protecting con-
sumer expectations is an important consideration in products liability
law, but it cannot be the fundamental objective. Protecting consumer
expectations promotes autonomy to a degree, but tort law can pro-
mote autonomy only in the aggregate. Both negligence law and the
best-decider rule promote aggregate autonomy, but aggregate auton-
omy does not support liability for totally unforeseeable harms or for
harms inflicted by essential, life-sustaining products.
(3) The goal of minimizing accident costs, as informed by the
principle of aggregate autonomy, is the only defensible, unifying
objective of accident law. This goal can accommodate both efficiency
and rights if the objective of accident cost reduction takes account of
social values and promotes aggregate autonomy. No single liability
rule, however, can achieve this goal.
(4) A pure enterprise-liability system would either underproduce
or overproduce safety and would not promote aggregate autonomy.
Use of a contributory negligence defense undermines efficiency goals
when a feasible alternative design would prevent the injury. In addi-
tion, product prices should not reflect the cost of harm caused by rea-
sonably safe products. Courts should predicate liability for harm
caused by product designs upon the ability of manufacturers to pro-
duce safer products at a cost-effective price.
(5) A system that bases liability on product defectiveness is
likely to come closer than an enterprise liability system to achieving
an optimal level of accident costs. A liability system should deter-
mine defectiveness using a risk-benefit test when a product's risks and
benefits can be assessed without significant difficulty. The best-
decider rule should govern the harder cases, when it is applicable, and
perhaps the hardest cases should be resolved outside the tort
system.357
357. See infra Part IV.C.I.b.
[Vol. 46:1
PRODUCT LIABILITY
Liability based on product defectiveness would involve adminis-
trative costs higher than those under enterprise liability and would
pose uncertainty for firms in predicting the findings of courts and
juries. The question is whether the savings in total accident costs
would offset the administrative and uncertainty costs. My own assess-
ment is that a defect-based system can be cost effective in accident
prevention.
C. A Design Defect Liability System Based on the Goal of an
Optimal Reduction in Accident Costs
1. CHOICES BETWEEN EX POST AND EX ANTE RULES, BETWEEN
NEGLIGENCE AND A BEST-DECIDER RULE, AND ON THE
BURDEN OF PERSUASION
The selection of liability tests for injuries caused by product
designs requires consideration of the four basic liability standards
defined by Calabresi and Klevorick.358 Those standards pose two fun-
damental choices: (1) between a negligence and a best-decider rule,
and (2) between ex ante and ex post rules. Another necessary choice
is where to place the burden of persuasion. The liability system this
Article proposes chooses ex ante over ex post rules and uses both neg-
ligence and the best-decider rule. Non-negligence is a defense to lia-
bility under the best-decider rule.
a. Ex Ante Liability Rules over Ex Post Rules
A liability system for design defects should use ex ante rules,
because liability for unforeseeable harms creates both efficiency and
autonomy problems.35 9 The uncertainty associated with liability for
358. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 304-07, 336-37; see also David G. Owen, Products
Liability: Principles of Justice, supra note 249, at 84-85. In his examination of the foundations
in moral philosophy that support a principled regime of products liability law, Owen concludes
that "[m]anufacturers should be responsible for foreseeable harm that reasonably could have
been prevented by (a) designing out unreasonable dangers, or (b) providing danger
information." Id. at 84. For unforeseeable dangers, however, Owen states:
A principled theory of products liability law probably should seek to take into
account a manufacturer's ability to know that its product is good or bad, for
reasons both practical and moral. The manufacturer is not likely to be much
deterred from selling a product that reasonably appears to be a "good" one, nor
would society appear to be much helped by deterrence of this sort. From the
moral standpoint, fairness appears to suffer if even a corporate actor can be held
legally accountable for harm that it could not foresee or guard against, when its
actions reasonably were expected to benefit, not harm, other persons. Like the
other conventional rationales, the simple notion of deterrence provides no help in
the search for moral principle in products liability law.
Id. at 74.
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unforeseeable risks creates insurability problems3"° and discourages
the development of new technologies and products.3 61 As Owen
observes, however, plaintiffs face difficulty in establishing producers'
negligence, especially in proving that risks were foreseeable. a62 Pro-
fessor Rabin has suggested that shifting the burden of persuasion can
resolve these difficulties, without destroying producers' incentives to
develop Safer products.3 63 Shifting the burden of persuasion to the
defendant constitutes a reasonable infringement upon the autonomy
of producers under some circumstances because producers have supe-
rior access to information about their own product designs. 364 At the
same time, producers would not be liable for harms that they could
360. See Epstein, supra note 295.
361. See Henderson. supra note 245, at 940-49.
362. See infra notes 374-76 and accompanying text.
363. Professor Rabin states:
[M]y guess is that in virtually every case where a producer of drugs or toxics
might have its bias toward promoting further research "corrected" by a
hindsight test, it would be similarly impelled to act by the future prospect of
having to demonstrate that it neither knew nor should have known about
potential human health risks associated with its product. And in the rare case of
absolute ignorance neither liability rule is likely to have any incentive effect.
These propositions apply with even greater force to investments in avoidance
technology, which raise such imprecise questions of "feasible expenditures" that
a shift in the burden of proof seems tantamount to a hindsight rule, as far as
correcting a bias toward underinvestment is concerned.
Moreover, this is a situation in which modesty about empirical guesses is
unwarranted. In virtually all drug and toxic cases, superior access to data on
health and safety risks and technological know-how will be in the hands of either
product suppliers or third-party research enterprises and not consumers. As a
consequence there is no reason to think that an ex post test will create on balance
greater incentives to reveal vital information. If anything, product suppliers
would be inclined toward nondisclosure of damaging information under an ex
post rule, as Calabresi and Klevorick admit. Finally, disclosure policies of
independent third-party researchers (government sponsored studies, for example)
would be largely unaffected, one way or the other. Realistically, then, it is again
difficult to discern the special virtues of an ex post approach.
Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Risk and Tort Reform: Comment on Calabresi and Klevorick,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 633, 638-39 (1985) (footnote omitted).
364. Cf Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984). The court in Feldman
justified placing the burden of persuasion upon the defendant:
In strict liability warning cases, unlike negligence cases ... the defendant
should properly bear the burden of proving that the information was not
reasonably available or obtainable and that it therefore lacked actual or
constructive knowledge of the defect. The defendant is in a superior position to
know the technological material or data in the particular field or specialty. The
defendant is the expert, often performing self-testing. It is the defendant that
injected the product in the stream of commerce for its economic gain. As a
matter of policy the burden of proving the status of knowledge in the field at the
time of distribution is properly placed on the defendant.
Id. at 388 (citations omitted.)
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prove were unforeseeable. The producers' control of the riskjustifies
liability for some unforeseeable harms, to the extent that such liability
may result from producers' bearing the burden of persuasion.
b. Negligence and the Best-Decider Rules with Non-Negligence as
an Affirmative Defense
Courts should use both of Calabresi and Klevorick's basic liabil-
ity rules, but with non-negligence as an affirmative defense. Thus,
strict liability in the form of the best-decider rule is a default basis of
liability. The best-decider rule would not function as an independent
liability test; nevertheless, it would operate when the producer was in
the best position to make the risk-benefit calculation and to act upon
it. Optimal cost reduction, however, is not achieved by basing liabil-
ity upon foreseeable harms caused by reasonably safe products;36
negligence, therefore, is the "preferred" rule. Liability should be
predicated upon the ability of the manufacturer to produce safer
products at a cost-effective price. As with foreseeability, and for the
same reasons, the defendant should bear the burden of proving that it
used reasonable care.
Whether the producer used reasonable care is a difficult issue to
litigate, particularly with regard to whether the defendant should
have discovered a risk.366 Schwartz has developed a model for the
365. See supra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.
366. On this point, Twerski and Weinstein discuss a manufacturer's knowledge of risks:
What could a manufacturer have known at the time of manufacture about a
product hazard if due diligence would have been applied? There is perhaps no
issue more difficult for a plaintiff to litigate than what the state of knowledge
should have been for a manufacturer with expertise in his field. Were the tell-tale
hints of a possible hazard available and were they properly considered? What
testing as full and complete as it might have been? In the rush to the
marketplace, were factors overlooked that now loom large in retrospect? These
questions are inordinately difficult to prove. We have, as yet, no mechanism in
place to assure that negative test results will not be secreted and destroyed by the
wary manufacturer. The histories of some of the drug cases indicate that
scandalous liberties have been taken with test results. However, even putting
such unethical practices aside, it is simply unfair to burden the plaintiff with
proving that a product hazard that did become a reality was foreseeable at the
time of manufacture. This issue should be determined by the application of strict
liability. However, if there is belief that fundamental fairness demands that the
manufacturer be given the opportunity to establish that a hazard was
scientifically unknowable at the time of manufacture, then the defendant should
be required to carry the burden of proof on that issue. The state of scientific
knowledge and the adequacy of testing is within the control of the manufacturer
who has expertise in the field. Thus, it would appear to be a fair allocation of
burdens of proof to require the defendant to either convince the court that the
risk that inhered in the product was not capable of scientific detection at the time
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resolution of this issue.367 The Schwartz model assumes, however,
that a set of research stages exists that the scientific community agrees
upon as appropriate, and that a scientifically acceptable point exists at
which researchers perceive danger. These assumptions are questiona-
ble. For example, if research reveals that a chemical causes cancer in
rats, should the chemical producer have a duty to warn consumers
that the product may cause cancer in humans? Recently chemical
manufacturers have attempted to enjoin a government publication
listing certain chemicals as potential human carcinogens, because
manufacturers and government scientists disagree upon the signifi-
cance of the findings from animal studies.3 6
If the defendant cannot establish a clear case for reasonable care
in developing safer alternative designs or in discerning the risks posed
by a product, a best-decider rule should apply by default. Again, a
liability system should exonerate the defendant using reasonable care
because liability in the face of such care is justifiable solely upon com-
pensation and risk-spreading goals. If the negligence equation cannot
produce a reliable result, however, the default strict-liability test is
appropriate.
The choice of a defense of reasonable care differs from decisions
holding that the "unavoidably unsafe" defense recognized under sec-
tion 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts369 requires the defend-
ant to show that the product meets an "exceptional social need. 37 0
Similarly, the reasonable care defense departs from Attanasio's posi-
tion that the best-decider rule would not apply if the harm caused by
a product was "totally unforeseeable. ' 3 71  Attanasio also states that
"in a few extreme cases [such as essential drugs], the principle of
aggregate autonomy might allow such products to be marketed with-
out liability if appropriate warnings were given. ' 372 A defense of rea-
sonable care is preferable to a defense using a nebulous measure of the
degree of foreseeability of a product's risk or the degree of a product's
of manufacture, or, in the alternative, to bear the burden of rebutting a
presumption that such knowledge was attainable.
Aaron D. Twerski & Alvin S. Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Products liability La--A
Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 227-28 (1978-1979) (citations omitted).
367. Schwartz, supra note 246, at 695-705.
368. See Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Secretary, Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., 720 F. Supp. 1244, 1253-56 (W.D. La. 1989). The court denied preliminary injunctive
relief, stating: "Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood that they will prevail
on the merits of their claim that defendants' classification criteria are arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion in violation of the APA." Id. at 1257.
369. See infra note 402.
370. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Arkansas law).
371. Attanasio, supra note 135, at 712.
372. Id. at 737.
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utility, because marginal degrees in balancing. the utility of aproduct
against its risks cannot be defined with any precision.373 Moreover,
the issue arises whether courts would reach different results under the
different tests, as a risk-utility balance considers the gravity of the risk
in relation to the utility of the product.3 74
2. THE PROPOSED LIABILITY TESTS
This Article proposes three alternative tests for a design defect.
Under these tests a product is defective in design if-
I.
A. The plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the product was dangerous beyond the expectations of a
normal user of the product, when put to a normal use, and
B. The defendant fails to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that, at the time the defendant sold the product, the prod-
uct did not pose a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm.
or II.
A. The plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that, at the time the defendant sold the product, it was feasi-
ble to produce a safer design that would have prevented the injury
suffered by the plaintiff, and
B. The defendant fails to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that, at the time the defendant sold the product, the prod-
uct did not pose a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm.
or III.
The plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that, at the time the defendant sold the product, the product posed
373. Starting in the 18th century, courts developed the doctrine of degrees of negligence-
including slight, ordinary, and gross negligence-as standards of liability. PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra note 90, § 34, at 210. Because the doctrine of degrees of negligence generated
confusion and many appeals, most writers opposed its use and, except in bailment cases, most
courts have rejected it. Id.
374. In Hill, for example, the court stated:
In the case of the CU-7, Searle should bear the risk of injury caused by the
CU-7, if the CU-7 is defective and unreasonably dangerous. The reasons are that
alternative methods of birth control are available and that Searle has made no
showing that CU-7s, or IUDs in general, are exceptionally beneficial to society.
The CU-7 is certainly not the sine qua non for birth control, as is the Pasteur
vaccine for the treatment of rabies.
Hill, 884 F.2d at 1069-70 (citation omitted). In Hill, the plaintiff alleged that the CU-7 had
perforated her uterus and had become partially implanted in her small bowel. Id. at 1065. A
product posing such foreseeable risks should be found unreasonably dangerous if safer contra-
ceptive devices were available and the defendant failed to warn of the risk. The unreasonable
risk test weighs the seriousness of the risks posed, the number of persons endangered, and the
overall utility of the product. Thus, a product is unlikely to pass the unreasonable risk test if it
poses grave risks not found in alternative products serving the same purpose.
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a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm.375
3. FURTHER EXPLANATIONS OF THE PROPOSED LIABILITY TESTS
a. The Burden of Proof Rules, the Problem of Polycentricity, and
Optimal Cost Avoidance
The three proposed design defect tests incorporate Dean Cala-
bresi's and Professor Henderson's concerns that the negligence test is
ill suited to resolve some design defect issues.37 6 The seminal article
by Professor Henderson on the limits of adjudication on products lia-
bility issueS377 elucidates the differences between manufacturing and
design defects and the reasons why justiciability problems arise in
design defect cases. Henderson discusses polycentric issues, which
courts and juries are ill equipped to resolve. 378 A polycentric issue in
a design defect case may be illustrated by an allegation that a car
should have been designed to give better occupant protection in a
side-impact collision, when a car so designed might give less protec-
tion in a head-on collision. Thus, whether the overall benefits of a
car's design outweigh its overall risks depends upon the performance
of interrelated design features in many different situations. The litiga-
tion process cannot resolve this type of risk-benefit issue effectively.
379
375. These proposed rules resemble those adopted by the Alaska and California Supreme
Courts. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'g
Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). For a discussion of the differences between the proposed rules
and the Barker/Beck liability tests, see infra text accompanying notes 400-05.
376. This Article has noted Calabresi's concerns previously. See supra text accompanying
notes 45-46.
377. James A. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973).
378. Henderson describes polycentricity:
[P]olycentric problems are many-centered problems, in which each point for
decision is related to all the others as are the strands of a spider web. If one
strand is pulled, a complex pattern of readjustments will occur throughout the
entire web. If another strand is pulled, the relationships among all the strands
will again be readjusted. A lawyer seeking to base his argument upon established
principle and required to address himself in discourse to each of a dozen strands,
or issues, would find his task frustratingly impossible. As he moved from the
first point of his argument to the second and then to the third, he would find his
arguments regarding the earlier points shifting beneath him. Unlike most of the
traditional types of cases in which litigants are able, in effect, to freeze the rest of
the web as they concentrate upon each separate strand, the web here retains its
natural flexibility, adjusting itself in seemingly infinite variations as each new
point, or strand, in the argument is reached.
Id. at 1536. For a list of articles discussing the conceptual ancestry of polycentricity, see id. at
1534 n.18.
379. See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
959 (1981). In Dawson, the court reluctantly affirmed a judgment for the plaintiffs entered
upon a jury finding that a police car was defectively designed. Id. at 963. The plaintiff police
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Henderson's discussion of manufacturing defects maintains that
the question of the reasonableness of a manufacturer's quality control
procedures presents a polycentric issue. Once courts abolished the
no-duty rule of privity, they resorted to a rule of strict liability for
manufacturing defects-a rule that circumvented adjudication of an
issue difficult for judges and juries to resolve. Courts found a ready-
made strict liability test available in manufacturing defect cases: the
manufacturer's own product standard. Henderson observes that "the
manufacturing flaw area represents a happy coincidence of the sub-
stantively desirable and the institutionally feasible."380
In Henderson's discussion of design defects, he observes that
"unconscious" design defects, like manufacturing defects, present jus-
ticiable issues. These defects "do not adequately conform to basic
design standards developed and universally accepted by the engineer-
ing profession, and the courts adopt and apply those standards to
determine the acceptability or defectiveness of the product
designs."381
In contrast, many conscious design cases present severe adjudica-
tion problems. In these cases, Henderson finds that the courts face
three possible options: absolute liability, judicial determination of the
reasonableness of the product's design, and a no-duty rule.3"2 Hen-
derson recommends adoption of the no-duty rule, exonerating the
manufacturer for harms caused by conscious designs, unless the
officer suffered severe injuries when his car slid off a road and into a steel post. Id. at 953-54.
The left side of the car struck the post, which pierced through the body of the car. Id. at 954.
The plaintiffs alleged that the design of the car was defective because it lacked sufficient
protection for the occupants in side-impact crashes. Id. Although the court affirmed the
plaintiffs' judgment under the applicable New Jersey rules on design defect, it expressed
concern over the result:
[W]hile the jury found Chrysler liable for not producing a rigid enough vehicular
frame, a factfinder in another case might well hold the manufacturer liable for
producing a frame that is too rigid. Yet, as pointed out at trial, in certain types
of accidents-head-on collisions-it is desirable to have a car designed to
collapse upon impact because the deformation would absorb much of the shock
of the collision, and divert the force of deceleration away from the vehicle's
passengers. In effect, this permits individual juries applying varying laws in
different jurisdictions to set nationwide automobile safety standards and to
impose on automobile manufacturers conflicting requirements. It would be
difficult for members of the industry to alter their design and production
behavior in response to jury verdicts in such cases, because their response might
well be at variance with what some other jury decides is a defective design.
Under these circumstances, the law imposes on the industry the responsibility of
insuring vast numbers of persons involved in automobile accidents.
Id. at 962.
380. Henderson, supra note 377, at 1546.
381. Id. at 1550.
382. Id. at 1553-54.
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design failed to conform to governmental regulations or industry stan-
dards, or the manufacturer failed to warn of hidden dangers. 3 He
rejects adjudicating the reasonableness of the design because the con-
scious design issue is classically polycentric.38 4 The lack of a defec-
tiveness standard leads Henderson to reject absolute liability.
Absolute liability would make manufacturers insurers against the
risks of harm posed by their products.385 In support of his rejection of
absolute liability, Henderson notes that courts consistently have
refused to adopt absolute liability for product manufacturers.38 6
Examination of Henderson's defect categories, in light of Cala-
bresi's theories, suggests that Henderson's conclusions coincide in
most respects with Calabresi's cost-reduction objective. Not only is a
manufacturing defect standard available that makes the issue of defect
adjudicable, but a violation of that standard places the loss upon the
party in the best position to determine and act upon the optimal level
of quality control. The negligence test adequately redresses uncon-
scious design defects because courts and juries can be trusted to weigh
a design's utility against its risks.
Calabresi's cost-reduction goal and Henderson's no-duty rule
diverge, however, in addressing conscious design defects. I base the
first two proposed design defect tests upon the notion that the manu-
facturer should be liable, as the best cost decider, if the plaintiff can
establish a violation of consumer expectations, or a safer, feasible,
alternative design, and the manufacturer cannot establish that the
design was reasonable.387
The proposed defect tests do not involve absolute liability, but
rather a default rule of strict liability. Under this system, a producer
would not insure against harms caused by all reasonably safe prod-
ucts. The threshold requirements would obviate liability for injuries
caused by products such as knives, skis, and Golfs, because the plain-
tiff could establish neither a violation of expectations nor a safer, fea-
sible alternative design. If, however, the plaintiff could establish
either a violation of expectations or a safer feasible design, and the
383. Id. at 1555-62.
384. Id. at 1540-41, 1557-58.
385. Id. at 1554.
386. Id.
387. For example, in Schwartz's case (b), because the manufacturer did not make the Golf
with magic metal when magic metal was available, the plaintiff would prevail unless the
manufacturer could convince the jury that the Golf as made would perform better on the risk-
benefit test than a Golf with the safer metal. If that question is polycentric, then the plaintiff
would prevail under the proposed rules. A warning that the Golf was made without magic
metal would not protect the defendant, at least if comparable cars were unavailable on the
market, because the warning would make no difference to the safety of the plaintiff.
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design issue was polycentric, then, unlike Henderson's approach, the
proposed tests would place the loss upon the manufacturer. As
Attanasio maintains, placing the burden on the manufacturer with
superior knowledge of product design is fair.38 s Additionally, the
result is closer to optimality than Henderson's. The automobile man-
ufacturer, as the best decider, would be induced to balance the factors
of a car's safety in head-on crashes versus its safety in side impact
versus esthetic feature, and so on, to reach the most cost-effective
design. In contrast, Henderson's no-duty rule provides no incentive
to optimize safety costs beyond a duty to warn of hidden dangers and
a duty to comply with governmental regulations.
Building upon Henderson's theories, Professor Twerski has
developed a set of criteria for courts to employ to screen out plaintiffs'
allegations of unreasonable design when the design defect issue is
unsuitable for adjudication.38 9 My proposed defect tests would
employ these criteria under the first two liability rules, instead, to
determine whether the jury should hear the manufacturer's evidence
of the reasonableness of its product's design. In agreement with Hen-
derson's-and Twerski's concerns with both justiciability problems and
the use of absolute liability, the third proposed test would place the
burden upon the plaintiff to show that the product's design posed an
unreasonable risk. In this situation, courts should screen out polycen-
tric issues and find liability only if the plaintiff can establish an uncon-
scious design flaw or a conscious design flaw that does not raise a
polycentric issue. When the plaintiff can prove neither a violation
of consumer expectations nor the existence of a safer, feasible alterna-
tive, courts cannot conclude that either the plaintiff or the defendant
was in the best position to make a risk-benefit decision about the
safety of the product and to act on it.
Professor Bender recently proposed shifting the burden of per-
suasion to corporate defendants in all mass tort cases in which the
court finds the defendant to be "the more empowered party in the
dispute. ' 391 The premise of her proposal is sound in many respects.
She notes that burdens in the criminal justice system favor the indi-
vidual defendant to counterbalance the collective power of the state.
388. See supra text accompanying note 322.
389. See Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in
Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 521, 527, 550-78 (1982); Twerski, supra note 287, at 868.
390. Henderson, supra note 377, at 1567-68. Industrial machinery lacking safety devices,
for example, generally does not present such an issue.
391. Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts Power,
and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 886.
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She argues that burdens in mass tort cases also should favor the indi-
vidual to counterbalance the considerable power of large corpora-
tions.3 92  However, in products liability actions, courts should
determine burden shifting under the best-decider theory rather than
on power alone. There is no broad social benefit in forcing a corpo-
rate defendant into court and placing the burden of exoneration upon
it, absent a minimal showing that it was the best-decider. In fact, a
burden of exoneration based upon power alone probably would
increase the price of reasonably safe products, making them less
affordable for less empowered people.
b. Why Courts Do Not Use the Best-Decider Rule as an
Independent Liability Test
The approach just described may solve one problem with the
best-decider rule-how courts should use it. A consumer-expecta-
tions test reflects a portion of the best-decider rule, and it appears to
be a test that, given proper judicial screening, juries can apply.
393
Beyond the consumer-expectations test, however, who is to apply the
best-decider theory? Courts and juries might apply it inconsistently,
particularly if they failed to understand its complexities. Currently,
courts consult the best-decider rule as a factor in resolving products
liability issues.394 Yet courts do not use it as an independent test of
liability. Under the proposed design defect tests, the best-decider the-
ory should occupy an appropriate place in the doctrinal scheme.
Under the first two tests, a manufacturer is strictly liable if it cannot
establish reasonable care. This result is justified on the ground that,
in these situations, the manufacturer was the best decider. Under the
third test, the plaintiff is "strictly liable" if he fails to prove the manu-
facturer's negligence. This result is justified on the ground that either
the plaintiff was the best decider, or that neither party was the best
decider, and no liability should attach for reasonably safe products.
c. The Consumer Expectations Test with a Non-Negligence
Defense-The Problem of Foreseeable Harm to Some
Product Users
The first proposed test protects consumer expectations and
392. Id. at 878-88.
393. See Twerski, supra note 279, at 895-932 (describing a useful approach to judicial
screening of consumer-expectations issues).
394. See, e.g., Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1984); Johnson v.
William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, Inc., 604 F.2d 950, 955-56 (5th Cir. 1979); Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547-48 (N.J. 1982); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348
N.E.2d 571, 577-78 (N.Y. 1976).
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places liability on the best decider, unless the defendant can establish
that given what the defendant knew or should have known at the time
it sold the product, its product posed reasonable risks. This test com-
ports with the arguments made above, that the conflict between
expectations and optimality should be resolved in favor of optimality,
and that the test promotes aggregate autonomy because it does not
pose liability for unforeseeable risks. The first test recognizes, how-
ever, that the manufacturer should bear the burden of proof on the
risk-utility issue. Furthermore, if the plaintiff finds the issue of negli-
gence difficult to adjudicate, the court should use strict liability in
default.
Under the proposed defect tests, however, a problematic situa-
tion occurs when a plaintiff is injured by a reasonably safe product
that poses a foreseeable risk to some, but not all, product users. A
seriously ill patient, for example, may suffer a rare but known side
effect from the best medication available to alleviate his illness. Con-
temporary jurisprudence has struggled to allocate liability for damage
caused by such a side effect.3 95 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
would place the loss upon the plaintiff if the product was "unavoid-
ably unsafe" and the defendant had warned of foreseeable risks.396
395. See, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 29, at 1062; Page Keeton, Products
Liability--Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L. REV. 131, 133-34 (1972); Page Keeton, Some
Observations About the Strict Liability of the Maker of Prescription Drugs: The Aftermath of
MER/29, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 149 (1968).
396. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides:
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the
present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for
their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of
drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences
when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death,
both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding
the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly
prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs,
vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold
except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in
particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of
time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance
of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is
justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically
recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that
they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply
the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a
known but apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, cmt. k (1965).
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Calabresi and Hirschoff, by contrast, argue that this type of loss
should fall upon the product manufacturer, because the manufacturer
is in the best position to evaluate whether the need for a safer product
justifies additional research.
3 97
Although Calabresi and Hirschoff's solution places the loss on
the best decider, it does not necessarily minimize total primary acci-
dent costs. The appropriate rule to serve the cost-minimization goal
is to place the loss on the plaintiff if the defendant warned of the risk
and establishes the reasonable safety of its product. A product is rea-
sonably safe if its benefits exceed its risks and if the defendant had a
reasonable research and testing program for improving product
safety. Absent the reasonable-safety defense, the manufacturer's lia-
bility would rest exclusively upon the compensation and risk-spread-
ing goals, rather than upon the cost-minimization objective. The
manufacturer, however, should bear the burden of proving reasonable
safety, because it has superior access to product safety information
and therefore is the best decider.
Nevertheless, the proposed defect tests may not address the situ-
ation in which a product poses a foreseeable risk to a limited number
of consumers. The proposed tests require the manufacturer to estab-
lish a product's reasonable safety only if the plaintiff proves frustra-
tion of consumer expectations or the existence of a feasible,
alternative product design. Two alternative solutions would correct
this deficiency. First, courts could tailor an additional liability rule to
address this specific problem. 398 However, a proliferation of liability
397. Calabresi & Hirschoff explain:
Suppose that a product occasionally causes the user's leg to fall off. Failure to
warn the potential user that this may happen in .0001 per cent of the cases will
normally result in manufacturer liability. But even such a warning is not likely
to allow the user to make an intelligent cost-benefit analysis between accident
and avoidance costs. Unless the user has reason to believe himself to be in the
dangerous category and unless a close substitute exists which at some cost avoids
the danger, the user is hardly in a position to evaluate the benefits of the product
as against its costs. The producer may seem to be no better suited, but if we
move from a static to a dynamic situation, this will not be the case. The
producer is in a position to compare the existing accident costs with the costs of
avoiding this type of accident by developing either a new product or a test which
would serve to identify the risky .0001 per cent. The consumer, in practice,
cannot make this comparison. Relatively, the producer is the cheapest cost
avoider, the party best suited to make the cost-benefit analysis and to act upon it.
Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 29, at 1062 (footnote omitted).
398. Courts would hold the defendant liable if:
A. The plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the product posed a
foreseeable and unavoidable risk to some users, in its normal use, and
B. The defendant fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time
the defendant sold the product, the product did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm.
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rules, each targeted at a narrow issue, would be impractical. A sec-
ond alternative would be to apply the first proposed defect test,
including its reasonable safety defense. When a product threatens a
finite number of consumers and users, it is arguably dangerous
beyond a normal product user's expectations. Dean Keeton observed:
"The typical consumer or user may be aware of the dangers of allergic
reactions and yet not anticipate or guard against them. Although the
product is no different than anticipated, the consumer does not expect
to be in the group of those who are sensitive to it." '399 Once the plain-
tiff establishes consumer frustration, the manufacturer could avoid
liability under the first test only by establishing that its product was
reasonably safe.
d. Proof of a Feasible Alternative with Non-Negligence Defense
The proposed defect tests resemble those adopted by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,' but they dif-
fer from the Barker rules in two major ways. First, in contrast to
Barker, the first proposed test permits a defense of reasonable design
to a claim brought by a plaintiff under the consumer-expectations
test.401 Second, under the proposed second and third tests, the plain-
tiff has the burden of persuasion on the negligence issue, unless he can
establish that a safer, feasible, alternative design available existed at
the time the defendant sold the product. Under Barker, once the
plaintiff establishes that the product's design was the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injury, the defendant has the burden of proving the
399. Keeton, Some Observations, supra note 394, at 155.
400. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). Alaska adopted the same design defect tests in Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979). Under Barker, a product is defective in
design if:
(1) the plaintiff proves that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner, or (2) the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused
injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on
balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent
in such design.
Barker, 573 P.2d at 452; see also Caterpillar, 593 P.2d at 884-85 (adopting the Barker test).
401. Under Barker, a product is defective in design if it frustrates consumer expectations, or
if the design proximately causes an injury and the defendant fails to prove that the design was
reasonable. See supra note 400. The defense of reasonable design does not seem available
under Barker if the plaintiff proves a frustration of expectations. See Anderson v. Owens-
Coming Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991) (Broussard, J., concurring). Also, in
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988), the California Supreme Court held that
the Barker rules do not apply to prescription drugs. The court held in Brown that "a
manufacturer is not strictly liable for injuries caused by a prescription drug so long as the drug
was properly prepared and accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities that were
either known or reasonably scientifically knowable at the time of distribution." Id. at 482-83.
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reasonableness of the design." 2 Scholars have criticized this aspect of
the Barker rules as "open-ended," because it forces a seller to defend
its product whenever it causes injury and inhibits judicial control over
the "polycentricity" problem." 3 In contrast to Barker, the proposed
defect tests deter vexatious litigation and forced settlement by requir-
ing the plaintiff to prove either frustration of consumer expectations,
the existence of a safer, feasible, alternative design, or negligence.
Because the safer alternative must be in the same category as that of
the product that caused the injury, the alternative design option is not
"open-ended"; for example, the design of a hardtop sedan is not an
acceptable alternative to a convertible."' As previously discussed,
the polycentricity problem should favor the injured plaintiff rather
than the product designer under the first two tests.4° 5 Once the plain-
tiff meets its initial burden, the burden of persuasion on product safety
shifts to the manufacturer due to its expertise and superior access to
information.
4. ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
The issue of allowable affirmative defenses in products liability
actions is complex. It implicates the debate between contributory
negligence rules that bar recovery if the plaintiff is negligent and com-
parative fault rules that merely reduce the plaintiff's recovery. Fur-
thermore, affirmative defense rules must define the roles of various
402. Barker, 573 P.2d at 455.
403. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product
Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1979);
Gary T. Schwartz, Forward: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435, 468
(1979). For a discussion of the "polycentricity" problem, see supra note 378 and
accompanying text.
404. See, e.g., Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969). The
court stated:
The defendant argues,,with considerable plausibility, that [an adverse] result
would be equivalent to declaring all "soft-top" convertible automobiles
unreasonably dangerous per se, at least in the absence of roll bars. However, all
that is involved is differentiation between various models of automobile, and a
recognition of the inherent characteristics of each. The manufacturer cannot be
expected to provide a convertible which is as safe in roll-over accidents as a
standard four-door sedan with center posts and full-door frames. But the
manufacturer can be expected to provide a convertible which is as safe as it
reasonably can be made, and which is not appreciably less safe than other
convertibles. So, too, in the present case, the manufacturer was not necessarily
under an obligation to provide a hardtop model which would be as resistant to
roll-over damage as a four-door sedan; but the defendant was required, in my
view, to provide a hardtop automobile which was a reasonably safe version of
such model, and which was not substantially less safe than other hardtop models.
Id. at 1073-74.
405. See supra text accompanying notes 387-88.
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types of plaintiff misconduct: "ordinary" contributory negligence,
failure to discover or guard against the presence of a defect, reason-
able and unreasonable assumption of the risk, and foreseeable and
unforeseeable product misuse.1 ' Because many commentators have
explored this issue in detail, this Article confines its discussion to a
review of their conclusions. Drawing upon the sound analysis of Pro-
fessor Twerski,4°7 Professors Roszkowski and Prentice have investi-
gated thoroughly the defenses available in strict products liability
actions."° Their analysis is generally consistent with this Article's
analysis of the proper objectives of products liability law,' and their
conclusions identify the proper effect of plaintiff misconduct on prod-
ucts liability actions.
In addition to a manufacturer's affirmative defense that its prod-
uct did not pose a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm, avail-
able under the first two proposed tests, a limited comparative fault
defense should be available to a manufacturer. In accordance with
the conclusions of Roszkowski and Prentice, this defense should use
pure comparative fault. Moreover, plaintiff misconduct should
diminish damages only when it "relates to and exacerbates the defect
in the product, ' 410 or when the plaintiff breaches a duty to maintain
the product's safety.411  This limited defense is justifiable upon the
principle that courts should restrict defenses to situations in which
they will realistically deter plaintiff misconduct and will not dampen
the deterrent effect of products liability rules.
Roszkowski and Prentice recognize that plaintiffs in many "mis-
use" cases cannot establish either the existence of a product defect or
a causal connection between the defect and the plaintiff's injury.4 12 In
such cases, an affirmative "misuse" defense is unnecessary. If the
plaintiff succeeds in proving both a product defect and causation,
Roszkowski and Prentice contend that ordinary contributory negli-
gence and assumption of the risk as defenses would subvert the deter-
406. See, e.g., Roszkowski & Prentice, supra note 349.
407. See Aaron D. Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some
Products liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297 (1977); Aaron D. Twerski, Old Wine in a
New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA L. REV.
1 (1974); Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging
Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403 (1978); Aaron D. Twerski, The
Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REV. 797 (1977)
[hereinafter Twerski, The Use and Abuse].
408. Roszkowski & Prentice, supra note 349.
409. Id. at 25-30.
410. Id. at 78.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 72-75.
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rent value of products liability rules and would not avert product
users' carelessness. 413 The authors would allow a pure comparative
fault defense when "(1) the product is proved to be defective; (2) the
defect is a contributing cause of the injury; and (3) the plaintiff's
unforeseeable misuse relates to the defect and magnifies it, so that the
plaintiff's conduct is arguably a concurring and contributing cause of
the injury. "414 Roszkowski and Prentice justify the comparative fault
defense by relying on Twerski's argument that "[e]quitable considera-
tions preclude a plaintiff from total recovery when the plaintiff's con-
duct is similar in scope and in nature to that of the defendant. '41 5
They conclude that courts should be cautious in using comparative
fault, scrutinizing its effect on the policy bases of products liability
law.41 6 The authors emphasize that products liability rules have far
greater effects upon the manufacturers' behavior than upon consum-
ers' behavior.4" These conclusions are sound. Practical realities
must form the bases of affirmative defenses related to the plaintiff's
misconduct to promote the goal of minimizing total accident costs.
These realities include the manufacturer's superior ability to reduce
accidents.
5. QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE PROPOSED LIABILITY TESTS
The proposed design defect tests represent an attempt to deter-
mine which liability rules, in which circumstances, best serve the fun-
damental goal of tort law: minimizing total accident costs. Although
the proposed tests seek to minimize such costs, incalculable litigation
costs and secondary accident costs could outweigh the intended sav-
ings in primary accident costs. These cost questions suggest four
potential problems with the proposed tests. First, trying negligence
issues involves undeniably high litigation costs. Both strict liability,
at one extreme, and the recognition of contract limitations and dis-
claimers, at the other, are alternatives with less costly litigation.41 8
Second, settlement becomes more difficult when negligence is an issue
than when courts use the alternative extremes. All parties face a rise
in litigation costs, and the accident victims face delayed payments.41 9
413. See id. at 51-68, 85-91.
414. Id. at 75.
415. Id. at 79 (quoting Twerski, The Use and Abuse, supra note 406, at 800).
416. Id. at 102.
417. Id.
418. For a comparison of the litigation costs of negligence and strict liability, see SHAVELL,
supra note 79, at 264. Logically, negligence litigation is costlier than a system recognizing
defenses of contract limitations and disclaimers because these defenses would reduce the
number of cases that go to trial.
419. The trial outcome on the negligence issue is less predictable than on strict liability;
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Third, the proposed system does not recognize compensation and
risk-spreading as tort goals in themselves. Consequently, if victims of
product-related accidents can obtain neither commercial nor social
insurance, secondary accident costs could be very high. Fourth, pro-
ducers will argue that only a negligence system or a system enabling
them to disclaim or limit their liability by contract will work; other-
wise, consumers will be deprived of new technology and higher prod-
uct prices will offset any cost savings from accident reduction.
All of these cost problems are troublesome. For the following
reasons, however, the problems posed by the more extreme alternative
liability systems appear to be greater:
(1) Although both strict liability and the allowance of contract
disclaimers and limitations would lower litigation costs, they are not
attractive alternatives. Strict liability is likely to produce more than
compensating costs in higher product prices. Reasonably safe prod-
ucts with high utility would cost substantially more in a strict liability
regime than under the proposed system. Moreover, strict liability
would distribute wealth inequitably because the higher cost of useful
products would fall more heavily on the poor than on the rich. The
recognition of contract disclaimers and limitations would produce
more than compensating costs in terms of accidents. This problem is
addressed in (4), below.
(2) Although settlement becomes more difficult when negligence
is an issue, under two of the three proposed defect tests, the defendant
has the burden of persuasion to show reasonable product safety.
Placement of this burden on the defendant should produce more set-
tlements than a traditional negligence rule. The defendant possesses
the most complete information about its product, its uses, its users,
and its costs. Knowing that justiciability issues will be resolved in
favor of the plaintiff, the defendant should be able to make a relatively
sound assessment of its chances of success. Plaintiffs still must engage
in discovery in an attempt to show negligence; however, the predict-
ability of success or failure on the negligence issue appears to be
greater when the cards are "stacked" against the best cost decider.
(3) Under the proposed tests, secondary accident costs would be
substantial if not covered by commercial or social insurance. A strict
liability system serving the goals of compensation and risk spreading
would reduce the secondary accident costs, if such insurance were
unavailable. Nevertheless, spreading the risks of accidents is a social
therefore, settlement is less likely in negligence cases. Id. The same comparison would hold
true between a system using negligence and a system recognizing contract limitations and
disclaimers.
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problem far larger than a rule of strict products liability can solve.
Products cause only some of life's catastrophies; illness, old age, and
natural disasters take a larger toll. A products liability system with
the major goal of reducing secondary accident costs would solve only
a small portion of the risk-spreading problem at the expense of higher
product prices and unavailability of new technology. The better
social solution for secondary accident costs would address larger
social problems.42 °
(4) Either a traditional negligence system or a system allowing
producers to disclaim or limit liability by contract is less efficient than
the proposed rules. A traditional negligence system leaves the burden
of persuasion on the plaintiff in all cases, despite the defendant's supe-
rior access to product information. More important, the best-decider
rule, available under the proposed tests when a negligence issue is dif-
ficult to resolve, produces results closer to the cost-minimization goal
than a traditional negligence system produces. A system allowing
contract limitations and disclaimers leaves safety incentives to the
market. Corporate managers' incentive for short-term profits, as well
as consumer underestimation of risks, suggest that the costs of acci-
dents would offset the savings in litigation costs. Although these
problems cannot be documented specifically, the evidence suggests
they are substantial.4 21 This Article argues that both the pecuniary
and nonpecuniary costs of severe personal injuries and deaths are very
high. Because people are highly risk averse, accident avoidance has
great social value.422
A final consideration bearing upon some of these cost factors-
particularly delay and litigation costs-is the value that accident vic-
tims place upon the opportunity to be heard in an impartial setting
and to have their claims adjudicated on the merits.42 a The judicial
420. See CALABRESI, supra note 8, at 43-44.
421. See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 95, 96, 236 and accompanying text.
423. See ROBERT J. MACCOUN ET AL., ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION-AN EVALUATION
OF THE NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM (RAND Corp. Institute for
Civil Justice No. R-3676-ICJ, 1988). The report states:
In recent years, legislators and court officials have become increasingly
interested in the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures to
dispose of civil lawsuits. The goals of these procedures are to reduce congestion
on trial calendars, to diminish court costs, to speed case disposition, and to
reduce costs and time for litigants. ... ADR programs divert certain cases from
the regular trial court calendar to some form of arbitration or mediation process.
Id. at I.
The study found, however, that the New Jersey Automobile Arbitration Program has had
an insignificant effect on the trial rate and on litigation costs. Cases assigned to the program
have terminated at a slower rate than those not assigned to the program, and the program has
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system exists as a forum for peaceful dispute settlement, and individu-
als value the availability of the judicial forum. A recent RAND cor-
poration-funded study on tort litigants' perceptions of justice reported
that "[i]mpressions of the litigation process were the most powerful
determinants of procedural fairness judgments and satisfaction with
the court, and judgments of dignity, procedural care, and procedural
bias were among the most powerful of these impressions in the their
effects." '424 The study further explained:
The litigants' judgments of fairness and their satisfaction with
the court showed remarkably little relation to the cost of the case
or how long it took to resolve. Litigation cost, in particular, was
more weakly related to satisfaction and perceived fairness than we
expected: there was in fact no indication at all that litigation cost
was a source of perceived injustice or dissatisfaction. Economic
concerns of all sorts seemed to play at most a minor role in deter-
mining litigants' attitudes.425
Case outcome, delay, and litigation costs affected litigants' satisfaction
with the proceedings less than the availability of dignified, careful,
and unbiased hearings in which the litigants felt they had a degree of
control.4 26  The researchers concluded that "whatever procedure-
formal or informal-is used, it must be perceived to be enacted well
and seriously if it is to be viewed as fair."'4 27 Furthermore, "improve-
ments in perceived justice.., are more likely to come from changes in
the tone of the judicial process than from innovations designed to cut
reduced dramatically the number of cases disposed of without any adjudication. The authors
conclude:
It appears that the New Jersey arbitration program is providing a service to
disputants involved in auto negligence suits, albeit a somewhat different service
than the designers might have envisioned. The program appears to be meeting a
demand for informal adjudication. Disputants want a hearing, an opportunity to
present their case before an impartial third party and to receive a judgment based
on the merits of the case. They want a hearing to be dignified, respectful, and
impartial, and they feel that arbitration hearings in New Jersey meet these crite-
ria. Attorneys do not appear to mind the fact that arbitration hearings are infor-
mal, and litigants actually see this informality as a plus. In fact, it appears that
disputants who might otherwise settle privately are willing to wait a year or more
to take their case to arbitration. Thus, the arbitration program is providing an
opportunity for more cases to be adjudicated, and it appears to be doing so with-
out adding to private litigation costs.
Id. at 73 (footnote omitted).
424. E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE-TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF
TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETrLEMENT CONFERENCES
(RAND Corp. Institute for Civil Justice No. R-3708-ICJ, 1989).
425. Id. at 77.
426. Id. at 75-78.
427. Id. at 76.
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costs or reduce delay. ' 428  The report further stated:
In some respects, the most surprising results of the study were
those showing how tort litigants view trials. Litigants in this study
had relatively favorable views of trial. Trials are seen as high in
dignity and procedural care. Few of the criticisms of trials were
borne out by the data. Trials were not perceived to be uncomforta-
ble, they did not make litigants feel that they had lost control of
their cases, and they engendered feelings of high, rather than low,
participation.429
The study's findings imply that it may be more important for
litigants to perceive a system as fair than to have speedier justice at
lower cost.43  Thus, the value litigants place on fairness might offset
the costs of litigation and delay attributable to trying negligence
issues. Negligence law reflects individuals' perceptions of fairness.
Attanasio stated:
[I]n the wake of prominent efficiency models, explicit moral con-
siderations have endured. While autonomy is not frequently dis-
cussed, the dogged tenacity of the concept of fault among judges,
academics, practitioners, and the general public imbues tort law
with deeply moral flavor. Some may dismiss this persistence as
merely evidencing a lack of knowledge or understanding. This
explanation fails to give judges and others sufficient credit. Fault
considerations persist precisely because they are important: they
ensure that the order that tort law imposes does not denigrate
autonomy, and they offer moral justifications more substantial than
economic efficiency for the restraints on liberty that tort law
exacts. I do not think that this commitment to moral concepts
such as fault exists simply to paint the tortfeasor as bad or evil.
Rather, it focuses on the deprivation of autonomy that the victim
has suffered in an attempt to justify the imposition that tort law
will make on the liberty and autonomy of the tortfeasor.43'
The appeal of fault as a proper accommodation of the autonomy
428. Id. at 78.
429. Id. at 79.
430. The implications of the RAND study upon the substantive rules of products liability
law are tentative in light of the inherent limitations of the study sample, consisting of personal
injury cases involving awards of $0 to $35,000. Id. at 36, 50. The report stated:
Because the defendants in our study were typically insured, because the stakes
involved were modest, and because those litigants are not "repeat players," there
is reason to believe that these findings may not be representative of the
expectations of litigants involved in larger-stakes cases or those who are repeat
players. On the other hand, the majority of cases in the system (although not
necessarily the majority of the dollars at issue) involve such modest stakes.
Id. at vi.
431. Attanasio, supra note 135, at 692-93 (footnotes omitted).
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interests of victims and injurers, together with the high value litigants
seem to place on due process, suggests that the proposed defect tests
may serve a goal at least as important as accident cost minimization-
the goal of satisfying the simple human desire for fairness and dignity.
V. CONCLUSION
Since Professor Owen's cogent analysis of the policy justifications
for strict products liability in 1980, a rich literature has continued to
advance the theories available to accommodate the conflicting social
goals implicated in liability for product-related injuries. The best
thinking leads back to Dean Calabresi's Costs of Accidents and his
position that the most defensible goal of accident law is the minimiza-
tion of accident costs. Nevertheless, a single, albeit complex, goal of
tort law does not lead to a single liability theory that serves this goal
in all instances. Consistent with the conclusions of Calabresi and
Klevorick, courts cannot avoid the need to determine when strict lia-
bility or negligence is the more appropriate rule to apply in order to
serve the policy objective. A major reason why Professor Schwartz's
"single theory" liability system breaks down is that no effort to con-
struct a single theory to meet the consumer welfare objective can suc-
ceed. Thus, the consumer-expectations and negligence tests inevitably
crept into the applications of his strict liability construct, despite his
protestations against their use. More fundamentally, Schwartz's lia-
bility system would not serve the cost-minimization goal.
The proposed design defect tests attempt to define the circum-
stances in which each of the available liability rules is most appropri-
ate to serve the cost-minimization objective. They also attempt to
factor both economic and moral or social values into the cost minimi-
zation calculus-values that tort law always has accommodated.
Attanasio's principle of aggregate autonomy provides a promising
means of reconciling conflicting social policies as well as a justification
for taking account of moral and social values in the cost-minimization
process.
The proposed tests provide a fair balance between the interests of
producers and consumers. Ex ante rules take preference over ex post
rules, because the latter create insurability problems and discourage
new technology. Negligence takes preference over strict liability
because, under the cost-minimization goal, no liability should attach
for reasonably safe products; however, the producer must establish
that the product was reasonably safe when the circumstances point to
the producer as the best decider. In these circumstances, the pro-
posed rules place the burden of persuasion on the negligence issue on
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the producer, who has greater access to the relevant information. The
producer is in the best position to make the risk-benefit analysis and
to act upon it when the product has frustrated consumer expectations,
or when a safer, feasible product design was available. In these cir-
cumstances, if the defendant cannot establish that the utility of the
product outweighed its risks at the time of sale, the defendant should
bear the loss.
The proposed tests are not overly complicated. Nor are they
extreme departures from the rules now in use. They do, however,
serve the cost-minimization goal better than either an exclusive use of
negligence or an exclusive use of strict liability, and they come closer
to minimizing costs than Professor Schwartz's proposals.
Some features of the proposed liability rules run counter to the
cost-minimization goal. The most troublesome is the cost of litigating
the negligence issue. It is impossible to calculate how these costs bal-
ance against the reduction of primary accident costs. I estimate that,
despite these costs, the proposed liability rules are more efficient than
either a pure negligence system or a pure strict liability system.
If the proposed liability rules do not achieve the cost-minimiza-
tion goal, they may at least advance the debate over the policy objec-
tives of tort law. The attempt to reconcile conflicting social values
presents, perhaps, the most challenging problem of all. Any products
liability system that does not make this attempt will not achieve con-
sensus-and products liability reform will continue to be a futile
exercise.
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